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This thesis examines three cases studies in Fremantle’s history that can be defined 
as times of crisis.  These studies are; the visitations of the Bubonic Plague 1900 to 
1904; the Great War 1914 to 1919 and the Depression Era 1929-1933. 
 
Each of the periods in this thesis examines the challenges faced by Fremantle’s 
council, as representative of Fremantle community.  Fremantle’s council had an 
engaged sense of what was needed in each crisis and it determined its actions and 
policy to manage and resolve the challenges in each case.  In essence, Fremantle’s 
leaders pursued policies of change, both locally and on a State-level, which would 
better the lives of its community, in response to three times of crisis.  
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This thesis will examine the role of a municipal authority in three times of crisis in 
the early twentieth century: the visitation of bubonic plague (1900-1904), the Great 
War (1914-1919) and the Depression era (1929-1933). Traditionally, as the 
governing body representing a local community, a Council has certain obvious 
obligations and responsibilities. However this thesis suggests that in these times of 
crisis, the role of the Council in Fremantle went even further. It played the part of 
protector, confidante and champion – an advocate for, and a part of, the community 
it represented. In each of the episodes examined in this thesis, the evidence suggests 
that Fremantle thought of itself as a definable community and, as such, the town’s 
Council had a more engaged sense of what was needed and understood the needs of 
its community more than the Western Australian state authorities in Perth or, 
indeed, the Federal government in Melbourne.1 
Fremantle’s leaders pursued policies of change, both locally and on a State-
level, that would better the lives of its community. Under the leadership of its 
Mayor, councillors and a committed Town Clerk, the Council proactively sought 
solutions to the crises it faced. In doing so it had to operate within or against the 
constraints of higher authority: both State and Commonwealth governments and 
their various authorities and departments. In each time of crisis, Fremantle Council 
in essence asked: ‘what can we do to get our local people through?’ And in each 
period, the Council successfully created and changed policy, provided funding and 
devised solutions. In this context, this thesis shows that a local council can be 
effective amidst the tensions imposed by its relationship to larger authorities and 
that in a time of crisis it can make a difference for its own community. The constant 
theme which emerges from the experience of Fremantle was that the Council chose 
deliberately to act for its own people, within the constraints of a wider 
                                                        
1 As a matter of style, I have capitalized the various councils, boards and departments following the 
usage employed within the primary documents: e.g. Local Board, Central Board, Department of 
Defence, etc. 
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administrative landscape. The result, across all three crises and spread over nearly 
forty years, was the emergence of new ideas and conceptions of ‘social policy’, 
whether in health, sanitation, education, employment or welfare. 
This thesis places Fremantle as a town and community as its core. 
‘Fremantle’, in this sense, represented multiple identities: a geographical space (e.g. 
‘the West End’), a local government entity (the town council), a vibrant self-aware 
community (captured by and represented in the myriad local newspapers), and an 
economic apparatus (the port). Fremantle, considered in this way, becomes a lens 
that allows the thesis to examine three historical events of quite different origins 
and nature: plague, war and economic depression.  
Fremantle remained very much a town apart during the first decades of the 
twentieth century. It was separated both geographically and socio-demographically 
from the larger city of Perth, yet its relationship to the capital city and the State 
authorities based there shaped and defined Fremantle’s responses to the crises of 
disease, war and poverty. This subjective distance also influenced the reciprocal 
actions and attitudes of the authorities in Perth. Fremantle and Perth were as 
distinct from each other socially and culturally as they were geographically. Prior to 
the Depression era, there was no proper road to link the two centres, making 
connection between them, even in the most basic physical sense, detached. 
Fremantle was a working port with a working class population. Perth was the 
bustling metropolis, where ‘middle-class Western Australians, in increasing 
numbers, spent their leisure in tennis, golf or yachting on the swan river’.2 In all 
three episodes, the port formed an integral link, whether as the source for the 
introduction of disease from the Eastern states, or the return of servicemen from 
Europe (again, sometimes bearing disease), or for its socio-economic importance as 
a place of employment for large sections of the community. The port provides the 
backdrop for the ‘dramas’ that played out in Fremantle—in the Council chambers, in 
the streets and business houses, and in the homes of its citizens. The town’s role as a 
                                                        
2 G. Bolton, Land of Vision and Mirage, Western Australia since 1826 (Crawley: UWA Press, 2008), p69. 
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working port, a harbour town and as ‘gateway’ to the western Australia, defined its 
demographic, social, political and economic identity.  
The focus of the thesis is ‘a community in crisis’. It examines the way action 
and policy were formed in regard to the Fremantle Council’s most significant 
relationships: the relationship between the Council and its own ratepayers; between 
the Council and the State government and bureaucracy; and, to a lesser extent, 
between the Council and the Federal government itself. In all of the crises examined 
here, the challenge faced by the Fremantle Council was to protect the interests of its 
people whilst working within the funding and administrative parameters set by 
outside governments.  
The early twentieth century decades examined in this thesis places 
Fremantle within several critical, shared moments in Australian history. The plague, 
the Great War and the Depression were all national experiences. However, this 
thesis undertakes its examination at a municipal level. I have taken a ‘case study’ 
approach to the three periods under examination—three genuine moments of crisis, 
social stress and profound dislocation. All were moments of social disruption on a 
local, state and national level. Yet they all were also crises where the role of the 
municipality was fundamental to the Fremantle experience. All were externally 
driven, emerging from beyond the town yet demanding a local response.  
The first case study examines the response of Fremantle to the crisis created 
by visitations of bubonic plague during the years 1900 to 1903.3 The Local Board of 
Health was responsible for matters of health and sanitation in Fremantle.4 However, 
the Central Board of Health, the State’s governing health ‘department’, was in charge 
of quarantine. So at the outbreak of plague, with its jurisdiction extending only to 
the edge of town, the Local Board was forced to act in concert with the Central 
                                                        
3 Outbreaks of bubonic plague occurred in 1900, 1901, 1902, 1903, 1904 and then again in 1906. 
However, this chapter concludes in 1904 because by that time, the issues linking sanitation and 
plague had been defined and solutions had been developed.  
4 Due the framework existing in 1900 in which Boards of Health had the authority and responsibility 
for maintaining and amending issues of health and sanitation within a municipality, the Fremantle 
Municipal Council itself had little administrative role during presence of the bubonic plague. 
However, members of the Local Board consisted, in the main, of Council members. Thus, as the 
public’s municipal authority on matters of health and sanitation, it is their actions which are most 
germane to investigating local responses to the bubonic plague.  
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Board for the plague’s curtailment. The complex and self-contradictory 
administrative system which underpinned a response to an outbreak of disease 
forms the focus of this chapter and is the key to understanding Fremantle’s 
response. The town’s attempts to combat the plague virus in its midst was inhibited 
on two fronts: by the lack of a locally-driven policy on health and sanitation, which 
placed the Local Board under the control of the Central Board of Health, and by the 
jurisdictional restrictions created by the variety of authorities then existing on the 
waterfront.5 This chapter also examines how the visitations of the plague between 
1900 and 1903 resulted in substantial changes to policy regarding sanitation and 
health in Fremantle and to the administration of Fremantle harbour. 
The second case study considers the impact on Fremantle of the Great War of 
1914-18. Much has been written about the Great War, in Fremantle and the rest of 
Australia, especially amidst the current centenary years. The war was a national 
crisis in which Fremantle took part. However, the essential argument here is that 
the Great War itself was not the crisis for Fremantle. The crisis was in trying to re-
settle returning soldiers into civilian life. In total over two thousand Fremantle men 
returned home after fighting in the Great War. Their return began with the arrival of 
the first hospital ships in 1916 and continued until 1919. This chapter will examine 
what part the Fremantle Council played in their local soldiers’ repatriation within 
the wider administrative and governmental arena. Writing only a few years after the 
end of the war, Ernest Scott examined the practice and meaning of ‘repatriation’. He 
writes that ‘in Australia, the word was employed to describe the difficult function of 
replacing returned men in civil employment’.6 The challenge for the Fremantle 
Council was to assist its local men to re-settle at home, within the framework of a 
national policy on repatriation. The prevailing sense of a debt of gratitude 
powerfully motivated administrative and civil action on a local, state and federal 
level during the war and in the post-war period. In this, Fremantle’s experience was 
like that of many towns and cities throughout Australia. The chapter examines, from 
                                                        
5 The wealth of information on the visitation of the Bubonic Plague in Fremantle suggests that it 
would repay further research on the plague in Perth. 
6 Ernest Scott, Official History of the War of 1914-1918. Volume XI: Australia During the War (7th 
edition, 1941) ID no: RCDIG1069950 Digitised Collection, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 
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a local point of view, how the Council and community managed, within the financial 
and administrative framework available to them, to re-establish local returning 
soldiers into civilian life. At the same time, the presence of returning troops and the 
international epidemic of pneumonic influenza introduced an old and well-
remembered entity into Fremantle: disease and the fear of disease. The threat, both 
real and imagined, now came from venereal disease and the outbreak of Spanish 
influenza 1919. As a port-town, Fremantle was once again particularly vulnerable, 
not only to the presence of disease on incoming ships, but as the first port of call for 
many returning soldiers.  
The third case study considers the turmoil and misery of the Depression era. 
Whilst the world-wide depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s was an 
economic phenomenon as well as a social one, this chapter focuses upon the latter 
aspect only. The economics of the Depression era are well covered elsewhere. 
Although the impact of the Depression was, once again, a crisis shared on a national 
level, in Fremantle it presented a particular character due to the importance of the 
port. Fremantle’s reliance on shipping and trade which diminished so considerably 
during the Depression era, made it particularly vulnerable to the onset of 
Depression conditions.From 1929 to 1931 the State government essentially left the 
‘unemployment problem’ in the hands of local governments. While there may have 
been reasonable constraints on behalf of the State and Commonwealth 
governments, in examining the crisis from a local level, the practical repercussions 
of this lack of policy magnified the misery of Depression conditions in Fremantle. 
The burden this placed on local governments informs the focus of this chapter. The 
main contention is that in the absence of State and Federal government intervention 
for the relief of Depression conditions, it fell to local governments to initiate policy 
and make decisions that would be of benefit locally, in the management of welfare 
for the unemployed.  
This thesis takes as its point of embarkation the records of the Fremantle 
Council using them to examine how the Council responded to the three times of 
crisis. The Council records for each of these periods embodied the life and livelihood 
of the people it represented. Second, I have used other relevant government 
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authorities’ records as these reflected and influenced the experience in Fremantle. 
For the plague years, the Central Board of Health records play as important a role as 
those of the Fremantle council. During the Great War, I have made use of Defence 
department and Premier’s department records. The Premiers’ department records 
were also widely consulted for the Depression era chapter. I have made extensive 
use of newspaper reports from the major local newspapers of the periods: including 
the Daily News, West Australian, Fremantle Herald, the Advertiser, the Fremantle 
Advocate and the Sunday Times. The newspaper reports of the day provide 
extremely useful statistical data, description and opinion. They are the glue that 
binds the various primary sources and the colour that brings them to life.  
There is a well-established tradition of local histories for Australian towns 
and communities. In the case of Western Australia, whilst many such histories are 
not generally academically rigorous, they have an important role to play in 
capturing Australian life and society at a ‘micro’ level.7 However, there are 
exceptions to the more sweeping, less analytical nature of the usual local history; 
Geoffrey Bolton and Jenny Gregory’s detailed History of Claremont being foremost 
among them.8 Apart from J.K. Ewers’ history of Fremantle, there is only one 
scholarly, archivally-based study of Fremantle covering the whole period of this 
thesis: Patricia Brown’s doctoral thesis, ‘The life of a maritime community: A social 
history of Fremantle 1900-1939’, as she writes: 
 takes its departure from the recognition of Fremantle’s identity as a port 
city with a close-knit fellowship of its citizens and of the sea as having a 
dynamic impact on the economy and social life of the city.9  
Brown’s thesis investigates the ‘dockworker culture’ in Fremantle and in 
examining Fremantle as a port town and the role of the harbour in that town, 
provides an excellent complement to my own study. Whilst Brown’s thesis provides 
an exploration of ‘Fremantle’s working class’, my thesis analyses the role of 
                                                        
7 For example, K. Spillman,  Identity Prized: A History of Subiaco (Subiaco: UWA Press, 1985).  
8 G. Bolton and J. Gregory, Claremont: A History (Nedlands: UWA Press, 1999); See also E. 
Tuettemann, Between River and Sea: A History of Mosman Park, W.A. (Mosman Park: Town of Mosman 
Park, 1991) and R. Marchant James, Heritage of Pines: A History of Cottesloe. (Cottesloe: Town of 
Cottesloe Council, 1977).  
9 P.M. Brown, ‘The life of a maritime community: A social history of Fremantle 1900-1939’, 
unpublished PhD thesis, University of Western Australia (1997), p3. 
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municipal action in order to examine three specific moments in Fremantle’s history.  
The waterfront and its workers play a part, but are not central to, my thesis. 
Additionally, Brown’s article on women and work in Fremantle during 1900-40 and 
Leigh Straw’s fascinating Drunks, Pests and Harlots: Criminal Women in Perth and 
Fremantle 1900-1939 both provide wonderful contextual material for understanding 
the seedy reputation of the harbor town. Whilst it was tempting to wander into the 
colourful history of Fremantle’s ‘moral’ welfare, as an understanding of that 
reputation is important in comprehending the external view of Fremantle at the 
turn of the twentieth century, the focus here has remained specifically upon the 
bubonic plague and its relationship with Fremantle’s ‘physical’ welfare, or more 
strictly speaking, the town’s sanitation. 
Almost nothing is written of the outbreak of bubonic plague in Fremantle in 
existing studies. It does not feature in any of the larger histories of Western 
Australia, such as the collection edited by Tom Stannage, A New History of Western 
Australia.10 Frank Crowley covers the subject in a single sentence, that ‘in 1900, 
1902 and 1903 there were serious outbreaks of bubonic plague’ (although he does 
not specify where).11 Those works on the period focused specifically on Fremantle, 
such as Brown’s Merchant Princes of Fremantle, Ewer’s The Western Gateway, and 
Hitchcock’s History of Fremantle, either fail to mention or only mention fleetingly 
the presence of the plague in Fremantle.12 Garrick and Jeffery’s history of Fremantle 
Hospital does provide some limited discussion of the plague, but once again it is 
mostly just an acknowledgment that outbreaks of plague did occur.13 As such, little 
comparable material is available. 
The most useful reading on the subject deals with the plague outbreak which 
occurred in Sydney during these same period. Myra Echenberg’s work on ‘plague 
ports’ is an illuminating comparative study that shines much light on the similarities 
                                                        
10 C.T. Stannage (ed) A New History of Western Australia (Nedlands: UWA Press, 1981). 
11 F.K. Crowley, Australia’s Western Third (London: Macmillon & Co, 1960), p147. 
12 P. Brown, The Merchant Princes of Fremantle (Nedlands: UWA Press, 1996); J.K. Ewers, The Western 
Gateway, A History of Fremantle (Nedlands: UWA Press, 1971); J.K. Hitchcock, The History of 
Fremantle: The Front Gate of Australia, 1829-1929 (Fremantle: City of Fremantle, 1929). 
13 P. Garrick and C. Jeffery, Fremantle Hospital: A social history to 1987 (Fremantle: Fremantle 
Hospital: 1987). 
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in civic reactions to plague at the turn of last century, throughout the world but in 
Sydney in particular.14 Grace Karsken’s archeological study of the plague in Sydney 
provided another excellent source of comparative material.15 Adele Gaskin’s 
excellent work on Public Health in Fremantle: 1896-1902, is invaluable in 
understanding the complexities of the town’s health system. Her discussion is 
limited almost entirely, however, to the water supply and drainage, and does not 
examine living conditions beyond those, or the complex system of administration 
for sanitation at the Port, both of which are pivotal in understanding the nature of 
the bubonic plague outbreak. My own previous work examining the impact of the 
plague are the only specific studies on the subject; both provide only an initial, 
limited foray into the bubonic plague in its first introduction to Fremantle.16 
On the Great War and its impact on Fremantle, Deborah Gare and Madison 
Lloyd-Jones’ book When War Came to Fremantle and Andrew Pittaway’s work 
provide the best existing studies.17 Gare and Lloyd-Jones’ important insight 
regarding the ‘war-time naivity’ in Fremantle in the first year of the war is central to 
my argument here that the war’s real impact on Fremantle only began after the 
arrival of the first hospital ship in 1916. Pittaway’s thorough statistical data is 
equally as important in understanding the demographic significance in Fremantle of 
the men who went to war. In a social context and on the subject of repatriation in 
Fremantle, once again writing on the period is limited. Both Ewers and Hitchcock, 
the two most authoritive writers of Fremantle history, gloss over the war by 
referring to it through a veneer of patriotic nostalgia.18 Ernest Scott’s massive 
contribution to the series on the Official History of the War of 1914-1918 may now be 
                                                        
14 M. Echenberg, Plague Ports: The Global Urban Impact of Bubonic Plague 1894-1901 (New York: New 
York University Press, 2010). 
15 G. Karskens, Inside the Rocks: The Archaeology of a Neighbourhood (Alexandria: Hale & Ironmonger, 
1999). 
16 Michelle Morrison, ‘A twist in the turn of the century: The bubonic plague in Fremantle 1900’ in 
Voices from the West End (Welshpool: W.A. Museum, 2012) and ‘The bubonic plague in Fremantle: 
1900’, Fremantle Studies, Vol. 5 (2007). 
17 D. Gare and M. Lloyd-Jones, When War Came to Fremantle, 1899-1945 (Fremantle: Fremantle 
Press, 2015); A. Pittaway, ‘Fremantle Anzacs’ Fremantle Studies Vol.7 (2012) and Fremantle Voices of 
the Great War: A history of Fremantle people who served in the Great War of 1914-1919 (Fremantle: 
Andrew Pittaway, 2015). 
18 Ewers,  The Western Gateway, pp 117-118;Hitchcock,  The History of Fremantle, p82. 
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considered quite dated, yet it provides perhaps the only thorough examination of 
the issue of repatriation, a subject sadly under-researched in Australian 
historiography.19 There are some specific topics however which are well covered in 
West Australian historiography of the wartime period and which therefore have not 
formed a major part of my own study, notably the cost of living and the 1917 
lumpers strike.20 More importantly, the 1919 waterside workers strike and the 
issues of conscription and recruitment fall outside of the main focus taken in this 
thesis, as they didnot make any impact on the work of the Fremantle Council.21  
The Depression era is the most comprehensively studied of the three times of 
crisis examined in this thesis. Snooks examines the Depression in two detailed 
accounts whilst Bolton, Crowley, Robertson and Alexander all contribute to the 
scholarly discussion of this topic. The most important of all books on the period is 
the authorative A Fine Country to Starve In by Geoffrey Bolton.22 This thesis relies 
very much on Bolton’s work for statistical data, comparative material and its 
historiographical approach. The text is, however, heavily Perth-oriented, with very 
little discussion on conditions in Fremantle. The same applies to Robertson’s article 
in Crowley’s New History of Australia and Alexander’s Australia since Federation, 
both of which provide excellent contextual material in examining depression 
conditions in Western Australia.23 For an examination of the economic conditions of 
the Depression Era, Snooks’ work is invaluable.24 For work pertaining directly to 
                                                        
19 Ernest Scott, Official History of the War of 1914-1918. Volume XI: Australia During the War (7th 
edition, 1941), ID no: RCDIG1069950 Digitised Collection, Australian War Memorial, Canberra.  
20 On the 1917 and 1919 waterfront disputes the authors who have provided the most 
comprehensive history are: B. Ziino, ‘Great War, Total War’ in Gare and Ritter, Making Australian 
History, pp341-344; P.M. Brown, ‘The life of a maritime community: a social history of Fremantle 
1900 – 1939’, chapters 3 and 11; Robert Bollard, ‘Fremantle in slow motion: Winning back the 
Melbourne waterfront, 1919’, Labour History, no. 97 (Nov 2009), pp123-136; and B. Oliver, ‘Disputes, 
Diggers and disillusionment: Social and industrial unrest in Perth and Kalgoorlie, 1918-24’, Studies in 
Western Australian History, no. XI (1990). 
21 I. Turner, ‘1914-1919’, in F. Crowley (ed.), A New History of Australia (Melbourne: William 
Heinemann, 1974) gives a full discussion of the cost of living crisis.  
22 G. Bolton, A Fine Country to Starve In (Perth: U.W.A Press; new edition, 1994). 
23 F. Alexander, Australia since Federation, 4th edition (West Melbourne: Thomas Nelson Australia, 
1980); J.R. Robertson, ‘1930-39’ in F. Crowley, (ed.) A New History of Australia . 
24 G.D. Snooks, Depression and Recovery in Western Australia 1928/29 – 1938/39 (Perth: U.W.A Press, 
1974) and in Stannage (ed), A New History of Western Australia, pp 237-265. 
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Fremantle, Malcolm Tull’s economic studies of the port provide very useful data.25 
Reece and Pascoe’s A Place of Consequence wanders across the Depression era and 
provides some excellent anecdotal material, but it is not the purview of that text to 
provide a close examination of any one period.26 Hitchcock began to write his 
history of Fremantle in 1929; his source material concluded in 1928 and thus the 
Depression does not enter into his history. Ewers writes of the Depression era, but 
his work does not examine the subject to any level of depth, and certainly does not 
review or consider Fremantle’s position in relation to the larger events of the time 
including its relationship to Perth or the socio-economic effects of the depression on 
the newly made city.27 J. Lunn’s unpublished thesis, ‘Unemployed protests in Central 
Perth, 1928–1934: Analysing place and occasion’ provides an excellent insight into 
the unemployed protest marches in Perth during the Depression era; unfortunately 
no comparative study has been undertaken in Fremantle.28 
In general, the authorative historiography on the Depression era, the work of 
Bolton and Robertson in particular, has tended to brush past the slowness of both 
State and Federal governments to implement real solutions to the unemployment 
caused by Depression conditions. These historians accept that governmental 
policies were the inevitable and the only way of approaching the crisis. Fred 
Alexander is essentially the only historian openly critical of the State and Federal 
governments’ response to Depression conditions. My argument in this thesis is that 
the State and Federal governments absence in such a time of crisis cannot be easily 
dismissed. 
The Fremantle examined in this thesis was a self-defined community caught 
in three great moments of crisis. Each point of time brought its own restrictions and 
                                                        
25 M. Tull ‘Blood on the cargo: Cargo-handling and working conditions on the waterfront at Fremantle 
1900-1939’, Labour History, no. 52 (May 1987), and M. Tull, A Community Enterprise: The History of 
the Port of Fremantle, 1897 to 1997 (St Johns, Newfoundland: International Maritime Economic 
History Association, 1997). 
26 R. Reece and R. Pascoe, A Place of Consequence: A Pictorial History of Fremantle (Fremantle: 
Fremantle Arts Centre Press, 1983). 
27 Ewers, J.K The Western Gateway pp 132-136 
28
 J. Lunn,  ‘Unemployed Protests in Central Perth 1928 – 1934: Analysing place and occasion’ 
(Unpublished honours thesis, Murdoch University, 2007). 
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administrative limitations, yet as the Fremantle community’s representative and 
spokesperson, the Fremantle Council considered and fought for solutions on behalf 
of its local people. On each occasion, the Council was able to respond to the 





Chapter One:  Bubonic Plague in Fremantle from 1900 to 1904 
Introduction 
In April 1900 Fremantle experienced its first outbreak of bubonic plague. Although 
the exact means of its introduction was never precisely isolated, in all likelihood it 
arrived with cargo on board trading vessels coming to Fremantle from an infected 
port. It was considered at the time that Sydney was the most likely point of origin, as 
Sydney was then itself suffering under a severe epidemic of bubonic plague and 
ships from Sydney were regularly docking at Fremantle wharves.29 This chapter 
examines the response of the Fremantle Local Board of Health to the crisis created 
by visitations of bubonic plague in Fremantle during the first years of the twentieth 
century. Outbreaks of bubonic plague occurred in 1900, 1901, 1902, 1903, 1904 and 
then again in 1906. The chapter concludes with the 1904 outbreak, as by that time 
the key issues linking sanitation and plague had been defined and solutions had 
been developed.  
The objective of this chapter is two-fold. It explores how administrative 
dysfunction during the presence of bubonic plague between 1900 and 1903 
influenced and inhibited the management of the disease in Fremantle. Fremantle’s 
attempts to combat the plague virus were impeded on two fronts: by the lack of a 
locally driven policy on health and sanitation, which placed the Local Board of 
Health under the control of and in direct conflict with the Western Australian state 
government’s own Central Board of Health; and by the jurisdictional restrictions 
created by the variety of authorities then existing on the waterfront. In addition, this 
chapter examines how the introduction of the plague had a profound effect on the 
port town, resulting in substantial administrative changes within the municipality, 
from sanitation and health to the running of the harbour itself. 
                                                        
29 The Pilbarra and Marloo, both from Sydney, were vessels whose cargo was being 




Origins: Crime and Sanitation in late Nineteenth-Century Fremantle 
Fremantle at this time was a small port town with a reputation for drunkenness and 
criminality. Newspaper articles of the period were peppered with references to the 
dissatisfaction of merchants and the ‘alleged abuses’ of the system on the jetties, 
alongside derisive descriptions of Fremantle’s ‘criminal classes’.30 In the late 
nineteenth century, Captain Shaw described Fremantle with these scathing words: 
I have been in a good many places in my time, but this is the worst dam [sic] 
hole I ever saw. The West Australian Shipping Association comprises all of 
Fremantle, and no one will do anything for you. They are half drunk all the 
time and don’t care what they do. The ship has to feed them and give them 
all the money and tobacco they want or they will make trouble. 
Any man who would come or send a ship a second time is a damned 
ass… I never was so sick of a place in my life, and may the curse of Christ rest 
on Fremantle and every son-of-a-bitch in it.  God dam [sic] them all.31  
Shaw was not alone in his condemnation of the port town. Fremantle’s notoriety had 
been well documented during the latter decades of the nineteenth century, not least 
of which was its association with the convicts who had lived and served there. As far 
back as 1870 Governor William Robinson had claimed that the Fremantle Gaol was a 
‘seaport lock-up for drunken sailors and prostitutes’.32 Indeed, offenders seen by 
Fremantle’s Resident Magistrate included a significant number of women, and 
severe penalties applied to both sexes. The local newspapers, reporting from the 
Fremantle court, show that a first-time drunk and disorderly offender, male or 
female, could easily be sentenced to six weeks’ imprisonment with hard labour.33  
                                                        
30 Liberty, 9 January 1892, p12. In regard to the working of the jetties, an article in 
1887 states that ‘almost every firm in the port, from the oldest to the most recently 
established, would unite in advocating a change’. Western Mail, 16 July 1887, p19. 
31 Fremantle City Library History Centre, Miscellany File B/SHA  
32 His Excellency the Governor to the Right Honourable The Secretary of State, 
Despatch No. 13, Australian Parliamentary Papers 1870/71-1880. Battye Library, 
Perth. 
33 For example, see West Australian, 10 April 1888, p3, on the previous day’s 
activities in the Fremantle Police Court.  See also Dr Leigh Straw’s Drunks, Pests and 
Harlots: Criminal Women in Perth and Fremantle 1900-1939 for a more 
comprehensive examination of women and crime in Fremantle during this period. 
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By 1879 the Superintendent of Police was calling urgently on the authorities 
for an ‘Inebriate Asylum’ in Fremantle,34 reinforcing the general perception that ‘the 
main activity in Fremantle itself seemed to be the consumption of grog’.35 In 1881, 
thirteen years after transportation of convicts had ended, the Superintendent of 
Police called attention to the 1,400 ex-convicts then living in Perth and Fremantle, 
describing them as ‘idle loafers, and busy rogues’ who, owing to their drunken and 
thieving propensities, required constant police supervision.36  
Yet it was not only the convicts and ex-convicts who marked Fremantle out 
as a place of notoriety. Police records reveal that violent quarrels often erupted 
among the many sailors who frequented the harbour town.37 There was no 
regulation prohibiting the presence of the sheath knives that they regularly carried 
in their belts, making their drunken conflicts potentially fatal. Saloon bars were 
open until midnight, and as gas lighting was not installed in Fremantle streets until 
1883, the dark laneways facilitated lawlessness. The Water Police were employed 
on beach and jetty duty to supervise activity in these areas and often found 
themselves escorting seamen safely to their ships, either voluntarily or 
involuntarily. Seamen deserters were commonplace, and a reward was usually given 
by the shipping company to the Water Policeman who caught one of these offenders 
and returned him to his ship.38  
 Fremantle’s reputation for its lack of sanitation equaled its reputation for 
delinquency. In May 1884, Dr, Alfred Waylen, the Colonial Surgeon, submitted his 
report on the public health of the colony which revealed that Fremantle had the 
                                                        
34 Report of the Superintendent of Police upon Criminal Statistics and the Police 
Force for the Year 1878 (1879). Battye Library, Perth. 
35 A. Bond, The Port of Fremantle: Some 19th Century Impressions, p2, Fremantle 
Local History collection LH 387.1 BON. Fremantle City Library History Centre 
36 Report of the Superintendent of Police upon Criminal Statistics and the Police Force for the Year 
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four Constables as Boats Crew day and night’. W.A. Police Department files, WAS 2126 Cons. 430 Item 
25/664, S.R.O. Perth. 
38 See McKeough, M. Rescues, Rogues & Rough Seas: A History of the Water Police in 
Western Australia (Perth: W.A. Water Police and Police Historical Society, 2001) 
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highest death rate in Western Australia. The report also showed that, due mainly to 
an epidemic of measles and to both scarlet fever and diphtheria which were 
endemic in both Perth and Fremantle, both infant mortality and the general death 
rate (of 17 per 1000) were higher than they had been for some years.39 The use of 
cesspits was one of the prevailing sanitary problems he identified in Fremantle, as 
they were frequently situated near the open wells from which the local residents 
obtained their drinking water, producing frequent cases of typhoid and other fevers. 
In an attempt to prevent typhoid’s regular recurrence, the town’s civic leaders made 
efforts to regulate the use and condition of these cesspits, of which, according to one 
of the local papers, there were 120 in the West Ward in 1893.40 Yet little progress 
was made. In April 1900, at the first outbreak of bubonic plague, the Morning Herald 
wrote that ‘a casual tour of the principal streets of the West End will convince 
anyone that Fremantle cannot claim to be even a moderately sanitary town’.41 
The most insanitary part of Fremantle was the area defined by the Municipal 
Council’s electoral boundaries as the ‘West Ward’. It is this area that will be the 
focus of this chapter—hereafter referred to as the ‘West End’.42 With a population in 
1900 of ‘2,650 souls’ the profile of the West End of Fremantle was, at the turn of the 
last century, a reflection of its function as a harbour-side town.43 Comprising the 
area closest to the harbour and its radial streets, it was the home of much of the 
town’s working population. These workers were employed at the harbour, in the 
goods sheds and railway yards, in small factories, and in the trading houses and 
warehouses that surrounded the working port. Ewers in his History of Fremantle 
writes that at the end of the nineteenth century, ‘the Fremantle merchants were the 
                                                        
39 Report by the Colonial Surgeon on Public Health for 1883, Western Australian 
Parliamentary Papers 1884, No. 9. 
40 Inquirer and Commercial News, 2 June 1893, p8. 
41 Morning Herald, 11 April 1900, p6. 
42 For a map showing the boundaries of the West Ward, please refer to Appendix A. 
Whilst this thesis uses the parameters of the municipally-defined ‘West Ward’ for its 
geographical boundaries, for purposes of clarity and to maintain consistency with 
future chapters, the term ‘West End’ is used as its reference in the narrative. 
43 The entire municipality had a population of 14,623. See Dr. Hope’s report for the 
year 1900, Fremantle Local Board of Health files WAA 612, Series 1342, Item 59, 
Minutes 1886-1902, S.R.O. Perth. 
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largest employers of labour at the port, apart from the government. In the 1890s the 
biggest occupational group comprised industrial workers. This general classification 
includes lumpers, carpenters, carters, blacksmiths, bootmakers, clerks, mariners 
and shipwrights’.44  
A significant number of the dwelling places of Fremantle’s workers included 
boarding houses or tenements that ranged in condition from poor to derelict. In 
addition, many of the shopkeepers and small traders of the West End lived above or 
behind their shop-fronts.  These residences also shared the ward’s dismal living 
conditions. Among them all, a lack of adequate sanitation prevailed. Bath water and 
other ‘slops’ were discarded into communal backyards and alleyways; drainage was 
woefully inadequate; drinking water was prone to contamination; houses were 
overcrowded and the insufficient number of ‘privies’ per household meant they 
were fetid more often than they were not. The town’s system of waste disposal, both 
human and otherwise, was inadequate. The town, following conventional standards, 
operated with what was termed a ‘single pan’ system, which meant that the ‘privies’ 
(outdoor toilets) contained a single pan which would be emptied by a contractor 
and the refuse taken away in carts to be dumped elsewhere. Households mostly 
shared their lavatory with neighbouring homes, meaning the system became 
overloaded and (as discussed further below) the resulting sanitary condition was 
deplorable. The inadequate water supply and drainage created significant health 
concerns. Attempts to improve the water supply had been a priority for successive 
administrators since Fremantle’s establishment. 
In consequence, in 1885 a commission of enquiry was initiated by the 
Governor, Sir Frederick Broome, into the sanitary conditions of Perth and 
Fremantle. One of the priorities of this select committee was the issue of water 
supply. The issues of health and sanitation provoked a scathing report. The 
committee pronounced ‘that the necessity of an immediate supply of pure water to 
the thickly populated portion of Fremantle is urgent’.45 Following the 
                                                        
44 J.K. Ewers, The Western Gateway: A History of Fremantle (UWA Press: Perth, 1971), p71. 
45 Report of the Select Committee of the Legislative Council appointed to consider The 
Report of a Commission upon the Sanitary Condition of, and as to a Water Supply for, 
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recommendations of the select committee, the Central Board of Health was 
established for the whole of Western Australia, to be supported on a local level by a 
system of subordinate, regional, local boards of health. 
Fremantle’s civic leaders responded, albeit not with haste, to the 
recommendations of the committee. In September 1886, at a meeting of the town 
council, the mayor announced that ‘the time had now arrived for improving the 
sanitation of the town’.46 On 1 December 1886, the Fremantle Local Board of Health 
was formally appointed by the governor.47 Dr, A.C. Barnett, the Medical 
Superintendent at the Lunatic Asylum, and Dr, James Hope, Fremantle’s Health 
Officer, were appointed as its medical personnel.48 Also appointed were town 
councillors William Pearse and James Lilly. George Wriford was appointed Inspector 
of Nuisances. Adele Gaskin, in her study of public health in Fremantle, succinctly 
describes the role of the local board which: 
The local boards had the power to remove nuisances; make by-laws to 
control infections, diseases and sanitation, to disinfect premises, 
distribute free medicine, secure the removal of cesspits and to levy rates 
through the agency of the local municipal council. The Central Board was 
to ensure that these responsibilities were carried out and that the 
regulations were promulgated.49  
In fact, the Central Board stated as much repeatedly during the plague years: that its 
role was to determine the regulations and that it was the role of the local boards to 
see that they were adhered to. In April 1900 a member of the Central Board told the 
West Australian that ‘people did not seem to appreciate the relative and respective 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the City of Perth and the Town of Fremantle, 1885, W.A. Parliamentary Papers, A10, 
August 1885.  
46 West Australian, 18 September 1896, p2.  
47 Municipality of Fremantle Council Minutes, Cons 1377, Series 809, Item 5, Minute 
Books 1885-1890, S.R.O. Perth. 
48 For more biographical information on Dr. James Hope, see J.H. Stubbe, Medical 
Background: Being a History of Fremantle Hospitals and Doctors (Fremantle: 
University of Western Australian Press, 1969), pp25-26, and P. Garrick and C. 
Jeffery, Fremantle Hospital: A Social History to 1987 (Fremantle: Fremantle Hospital, 
1987). 
49 A. Gaskin, Public Health in Fremantle 1886-1902 Unpublished thesis U.W.A, 
(1982), p1. 
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powers of the Central Board and the local boards of health’. Money explained that 
the powers of the Central Board were to:  
frame such regulations and orders as it might deem necessary to be carried 
out by local boards throughout the colony. After the Central Board has done 
its utmost in making these regulations, it is then the duty of the local boards 
to see that these regulations are properly carried out in their respective 
districts.50 
When it came to responding to the outbreak of bubonic plague, therefore, the Local 
Board’s response was limited by the constraints of its powers imposed by the 
Central Board. 
The development of areas of authority over health and quarantine in 
particular were strongly influenced by the fact of Fremantle’s long history as the 
entry port to the colony for foreign and interstate vessels. Matters of health and 
quarantine above all had a particular and convoluted construction. The Local Board 
relied on the Central Board of Health for guidelines and, to a large extent, funding to 
fight outbreaks of infectious diseases when they occurred if they came from vessels 
visiting the port. The Central Board set the regulations that the Local Board was 
required to follow. This meant that when an outbreak of any disease threatened 
Western Australia via its introduction at the port, the Local Board surrendered its 
responsibility for issues of health, leaving any suggestion of policy to the authority 
of the Central Board.51 This situation was further complicated by the fact that other 
government departments also had control over specific issues affecting the harbour. 
The Local Board was responsible for sanitation, but its jurisdiction extended only to 
the edge of town. It had no real power or authority on the waterfront. The Central 
Board was in charge of quarantine. The wharves and jetties were in the hands of the 
Railway Department. The river itself and shipping were under the authority of the 
Harbour Master. Furthermore, the system of establishing local boards of health 
meant that the Fremantle Municipal Council itself had no formal administrative role 
in handling the presence of the bubonic plague in the town. However, the Local 
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Board included Fremantle town councillors alongside the town’s medical officers. 
Whilst the members acted as officers of the Local Board, and not as Council 
representatives, their interests as representatives of the people of Fremantle were 
inseparable. Finally, it is likely that the members of the Central Board during these 
years would, in all likelihood, have had little personal or professional knowledge of 
their counterparts in Fremantle, and vice versa. The Central Board’s president Dr. 
Ernest Black was a well-heeled, well-travelled medical practitioner.52  In Fremantle, 
the Local Board’s most active member was Dr. James Hope, who since 1888 had 
been a tireless advocate for improvements in Fremantle and both its medical officer 
and the gaol surgeon. The boards, in practice, had very little to do with each other 
until the plague suddenly thrust them into a close working relationship that neither 
was comfortable with. This complex administrative system is key to understanding 
the pressures and conflicts that shaped how Fremantle responded to the outbreak 
of bubonic plague.  
Concerns over health, sanitation, water and drainage dominate the minutes 
of the Local Board’s meetings at the turn of the century.53 Numerous by-laws 
relating to health matters were initiated and were enforced by the Health Inspector. 
These included the prohibition of such things as expectorating on footpaths, the 
adulteration of milk, or of cattle from wandering into public streets.54 In addition, an 
‘Inspector of Nuisances’ systematically checked houses, factories, street conditions, 
the quality of the milk—in effect all matters sanitary.55 Yet this piecemeal and 
inadequate system in practice meant that Fremantle’s standards of sanitation were 
allowed to decline. In matters of communal hygiene or sanitation the Local Board 
was more often than not reactive rather than proactive.  
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The battle against typhoid and other diseases was a constant struggle. In 
1887, Wriford, the Inspector for Nuisances, informed the Council that ‘great 
difficulty arises from people having nowhere to throw their slops or dirty water, 
only the street or yard’.56  He advised that a system of drainage was necessary: 
‘yards must be drained but I am at a loss as to where the water is to run to’.57 In 
February 1899, his successor, J.H. Dunne, inaugurated a system of holding tanks to 
collect the slops and dirty water from the town’s larger establishments. These were 
positioned at the coastal edge of the West End, on the Esplanade and South Beach.58 
The conditions on the docks were equally appalling. Despite the fact that three or 
four hundred workers at a time could be employed on the South Quay there were 
absolutely no latrines for the relief of the workers or visitors. As a consequence, 
piles of human excreta were found both among the sandalwood lying on the jetties 
and in the surrounding water.59  
Improvements to drainage in the flat and sandy landscape of Fremantle 
would be difficult and costly and, as the Resident Medical Officer pointed out, ‘could 
only be done gradually’.60 Referring specifically to the West End, Hope told a 
meeting of the Local Board in February 1900 that the existing well system meant 
that residents there lived in constant danger ‘of the percolation of impurities’ 
entering the drinking water.61 Although a Health Officer regularly checked the local 
dairies to prevent milk being contaminated by tuberculosis in cattle, it was known 
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to the Local Board that typhoid contaminations of the town’s wells found its way 
into the local milk supply, as it was frequently watered-down before sale.62  
As the century neared its end, Fremantle and its Local Board of Health found 
its resources stretched to the limit, most especially in the port’s busy centre. During 
the gold rush of the 1890s the West End of Fremantle had become increasingly 
overcrowded. Bob Reece and Robert Pascoe write that during these years 
‘Fremantle bustled with newly-arrived miners so that the streets leading to the Cliff 
Street railway station had the appearance of an ant track’.63 Although a Building Act 
existed, the Council had no town planning policy with which to supervise and 
moderate the crude adaptations tacked on to existing dwellings made to cram in all 
the new arrivals. New lodging and boarding houses were being hastily constructed 
throughout the West End. Indeed, this rushed development deeply concerned one 
visitor to the town, who wrote to a local newspaper that, in the ‘hurry of 
construction for clients eagerly applying, no attempt was made to consider health 
and comfort’.64 These conditions overburdened the already straitened sanitary 
provisions of the West End. Another visitor went further in his denigration of 
Fremantle, writing that ‘on the shores of the ocean, and on the banks of the river a 
town has been built up with narrow, uninviting streets, which for the most part are 
dirty and unkempt. Of attempts to beautify them there have been none’. He 
continued by complaining of ‘the general impression of sordidness which 
everywhere prevails’.65 It was into one of these very boarding houses that 
Fremantle’s first plague victim would come from Victoria, to make his home. 
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The plague looms: 1900 
On 13 March 1900 the West Australian reported that a potent epidemic of the 
bubonic plague had attacked Sydney in New South Wales. ‘Scarcely a day has passed 
without a fresh case being reported’, declared the newspaper: 
 Of the fourteen persons attacked six have already succumbed, and so small 
is the percentage of recovery in virulent cases, that it is doubtful whether 
most of the remaining eight will not go to swell the roll of victims’.66  
Five days later, the West Australian reported that the number of plague victims in 
Sydney had risen to twenty-one.67 
The Local Board of Health in Fremantle were briefed with the latest 
knowledge on the disease by the town’s Health Officer and board member, Hope, 
who quoted from Patrick Manson’s Manual on Tropical Diseases (1898): ‘the plague 
is a specific innoculable disease and communicable epidemic, characterised by 
buboes, rapid course, high mortality, presence of specific bacteria in the lymphatic 
glands, blood and viscera’. Hope specifically urged the Local Board to take ‘all 
precautionary measures’ to prevent the introduction of the bubonic plague. Whilst 
he hoped the long voyage from infected ports to Fremantle might make its 
introduction less probable, nonetheless he said, ‘strenuous efforts must be made to 
have our surroundings as perfectly healthy as possible’.68 
The local population, however, was left to the fears of its imagination. Much 
of the Fremantle population would have known, from their school history lessons, 
something of the bubonic plague that had decimated populations and terrorised 
Europe in the Middle Ages. Suspicions aside, Fremantle residents were aware that 
there was frequent trade with ships coming from Sydney, a port which, by its 
nature, shared many geographical and demographic features with Fremantle. 
Indeed, John Ashburton Thompson, the president of the New South Wales Board of 
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Health had commented during the plague outbreak in 1900 that Sydney port’s ‘inner 
city slums’ were unfit for human habitation and ‘simply ghastly’, a stark similarity to 
the tenements of Fremantle.69  
The public apprehension was echoed in the newspapers of both Perth and 
Fremantle, which were filled with plague warnings and dire premonitions. Readers 
of the Sunday Times could absorb an explicit and petrifying account of the plague 
and its symptoms. The report describes in detail the symptoms of a plague victim: 
apart from fever, buboes and vomiting , ‘the eyes are red, the skin hot, the tongue 
black, dry and cracked, crusts form on the teeth ’. It went on, ‘if the patient survives 
long enough, he wears a dull, stupefied haggard look’.70 The West Australian 
contributed to the alarm by describing how the plague germ could lurk in the most 
seemingly benign places, suggesting that the plague could even be caught from the 
‘wall-paper’ of a house, long after the plague patient has been removed from its 
vicinity. To defend oneself against the plague, the newspaper recommended plenty 
of fresh air and sunlight, plenty of soap and water, and a maximum of personal and 
public cleanliness.71 (Habits, of course, which would have improved the lives of 
Fremantle locals regardless of the threat of plague.) The plague, the newspaper 
added ‘mainly finds its victims among the ill-fed and overworked’.72  
The knowledge that the overcrowded and often impoverished conditions in 
which they lived made them easily susceptible to this disease was brought home to 
the Fremantle community when the president of the Central Board of Health 
announced that ‘the spread of the plague has shown that the disease is due, in a 
direct proportion, to the degree of perfection or imperfection of local sanitary 
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arrangements’.73 In Fremantle, the local residents were painfully aware that 
sanitary arrangements were far from perfect.  
Contributing to the sense of general unease were the varied and 
incomprehensible responses of local authorities, the stories of which were 
published in local papers. The West Australian published the news that in 
Melbourne, in reaction to the Sydney outbreak, the railway authorities ordered ‘that 
all NSW passengers per train’ should disembark just outside of the city, and ‘put out 
their tongues for official inspection’.74 With similarly questionable logic in Western 
Australia, the harbour authorities in Albany had the livestock on board a vessel 
coming in from Adelaide unloaded into the harbour from where they had to swim 
ashore.75 In May, shortly after the outbreak of plague in Fremantle, this type of 
‘reactionary’ response was curbed in Western Australia under the direction of a new 
president of the Central Board of Health. Dr. Ernest Black was appointed to the 
position in great part owing to his previous work in the plague hospitals of 
Bombay.76  
The bubonic plague was better understood in 1900 than it had been for 
centuries past. Yet there remained gaps in the knowledge of the medical and 
scientific experts, including, most significantly, the role the rat played in the spread 
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of the disease. The Venice Convention of 1897, the first of its kind to deal exclusively 
with bubonic plague, identified the association of the rat with plague epidemics, but 
‘far from suspecting an insect vector, the Venice Conference stated that plague 
appeared to take place by means of the excretions of patients and consequently by 
contaminated linen, clothing and hands’.77 Dr. Hope told a local newspaper that ‘it 
had been a great question in the minds of authorities on plague as to whether the 
bacilli were carried on cargo’. Yet he quite correctly suggested that the disease was 
generally propagated either by rats or by men handling cargo on which rats had 
died or had deposited excreta. ‘The transmission was generally brought about by 
inoculation, meaning, by means of fleas from rats or punctures in the skin’, he 
added.78 In his focus on the rat as the main source of the plague contagion, Hope was 
following the path taken in Sydney. As a recent study of the global plague epidemic 
in the late 1800s concludes, in trying to stem the spread of plague in Sydney the 
central sanitary approach adopted was rodent control.79  
With the threat of bubonic plague looming, and its mostly likely carrier the 
rats living on board ships, Fremantle had particular reason to feel insecure. As the 
primary port of entry for all ships coming to the colony, it was most at risk. What 
was of central importance, and of greatest concern for the Fremantle Local Board, 
was the identification of responsibility for protecting the local population from 
plague. With multiple authorities on the waterfront, who was responsible for 
stopping the plague infestation from even coming ashore? And who would be 
responsible for dealing with its effects if it did spread into the town?  
The division of responsibilities between the Fremantle Municipal Council, the 
Fremantle Local Board of Health and the other agencies with authority on the 
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harbour had since 1886 been a continual source of frustration for the Local Board of 
Health. As noted above, the Local Board was responsible for sanitation within its 
jurisdiction yet this did not extend to the wharves and jetties—the precise area 
where plague-ridden rats would be found. The wharves and jetties were under the 
authority of both the Railway and Customs departments, which had no medical 
expertise and over which the Local Board had no power. The river itself and 
shipping were under the control of the Harbour Master and once again the Local 
Board could impose no demands on that body. In consequence, the Local Board had 
very limited ability to take control of the sanitation and rat menace in its own town. 
The domain of the Central Board over issues of health in Fremantle also interfered 
with the Local Board’s autonomy. Since 1886, when an infectious outbreak occurred 
that was considered to affect the State as a whole rather than a single locality, the 
Central Board had exerted authority over its containment. Yet most significantly, 
this was an implicit understanding between the local and central boards, created 
when the situation demanded. There was not a defining clause or article in the 
Public Health Act which made clear when and at what time the Central Board should 
step in to take control from a local board in a health crisis.80 For example, during the 
small-pox epidemic of April 1893, the Central Board had assumed financial 
responsibility for quarantine and vaccination, whilst the actual work was 
undertaken by the local health officers. In 1900, with the bubonic plague looming as 
a likely threat to the whole of the State, and Fremantle merely its initial entry point, 
the Fremantle Local Board quite naturally expected the Central Board’s direction 
and assistance.  
On 21 March 1900 whilst reports of the Sydney plague deaths were being 
published in the newspapers, the Fremantle Local Board addressed its concerns in a 
letter to the Central Board. The Local Board’s secretary, George Bland Humble, took 
care to remind the secretary of the Central Board of the traditional division of roles. 
                                                        
80 Public Health Act, Further Amendment Act 1895, 12 October 1895. This was made 
clear during a conference of delegates from the various local boards of health, held 
in Fremantle in January 1895, at which the powers of the Central Board to assume 
control outside of municipal boundaries was debated but dropped without a 
resolution being moved.  
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At the same time he expressed the hope that the Central Board would be able to take 
fiscal responsibility for the plague precautions. He wrote: 
This Board is desirous of carrying out as effectively as possible all the 
regulations of the Central Board of Health for the prevention of the 
Bubonic Plague in our midst. You are aware that the Local Board is 
confined to its Health Rate which was struck last December, and no 
plague was apprehended at that time, so that we are practically—so far 
as extra expenses incurred through the issue of these regulations —
without funds. Under the circumstances, I am requested to ask, if the 
additional charges will be paid by the Central Board as was done some 
years ago, when small pox was introduced into the Colony.81 
Above all, the Fremantle Local Board wanted the Central Board’s financial support. 
Indeed, the Mayor himself reflected publicly that ‘people failed to recognise the 
financial difficulties in carrying out the health improvements’.82  
Humble went on in his letter regarding the rumours spreading among the 
town’s population that the rats on the wharves were already infected with bubonic 
plague, and asked the Central Board how more of these rats were to be prevented 
from getting ashore from visiting vessels. Fumigation was at this time considered by 
the Local Board as the best first step in disease prevention, yet the town’s Health 
Officer did ‘not have the power to order vessels from the wharf for the purposes of 
fumigation’. Given the belief that the disease was spread through direct contact with 
rats and their fleas, it was essential that someone should have access to the wharves 
to prohibit the spread of the contagion. If the Local Board could not take control of 
fumigation and therefore rat destruction, then it made sense to put the 
responsibility for plague precautions into the hands of the Central Board. Bland 
concluded that, ‘we shall be glad to learn that every necessary precaution is being 
adopted to prevent the introduction of this fearful plague into this town and 
Colony’.83 
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‘Precautionary Regulations’ for keeping the plague from entering Western 
Australia were established at a special meeting of the Central Board on 1 April 
1900.84 The regulations were formalised under Section 111 of the Health Act (1898) 
as published in the Government Gazette of 3 April 1900, a copy of which was sent to 
the Fremantle Local Board with an accompanying letter stating, ‘the Central Board 
in making the regulations has done all in its power, it is for your board to do its part 
and see that they are fully complied with’.85 The Local Board’s role was implicit in 
these directions: it was powerless to take action on its own account, rather it was 
merely the ‘enforcer’ of the Central Board’s decisions. Unfortunately, it was 
specifically this conception of the division of responsibilities that would prove so 
inadequate once the plague took hold.  
Rather than providing the Local Board with more power to act, the initial 
response of the Central Board, was to place the onus of dealing with the rats on the 
harbour squarely in the hands of the various waterfront authorities. The Collector of 
Customs and the head of the Railway Department were issued with an urgent 
directive to destroy all rats in sheds and other buildings under their control.86 Yet 
with little to compel them to do so, the various departments did not act with any 
sense of haste or urgency. When the president of the Central Board personally 
visited Fremantle and performed inspections on various locations, he wrote to the 
Railway Department letting them know that their existing system for rat destruction 
was ‘practically ineffectual’.87  
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When it came to the prevention of plague, the key measure in the Central 
Board’s policy was the annihilation of rats, yet its procedure for stopping rats from 
actually coming ashore from incoming ships was similarly ineffective. The Central 
Board preferred a system of tarring the ropes that tied the ships to the wharves to 
inhibit the rats from making their way down the ropes to the shore. This was 
challenged by the Local Board who complained that the policy was inadequate. It 
had in its service men with a seafaring background and direct experience with the 
practical workings of the harbour, and so insisted adamantly ‘that rats will swim 
ashore or from one vessel to another’ so that the tarring of ropes was not sufficient 
to stop them from landing.88 The Local Board preferred a system of fumigation, 
which would kill the both the rats and the plague germ at the same time. Both 
systems were kept in place, yet despite the precautions, the bubonic plague was not 
prevented from finding its way ashore. 
The Plague arrives: April 1900  
On Thursday, 5 April 1900, a local employee of the Railways Department, William 
Campbell, complained of feeling ill. On Saturday he was admitted to Fremantle 
Hospital suffering a headache and vomiting. By Sunday he was dead of bubonic 
plague. Campbell was only nineteen years old when he became the first victim of the 
disease in Western Australia, dying at the Fremantle Hospital on 8 April. Campbell 
had migrated to Western Australia from Victoria only five or six months earlier and 
was living in a boarding house at 10 Bay Street, not far from the docks where he 
worked. He was employed at the No. 1 goods shed on Fremantle Harbour. His job 
was to unload cargo from ships arriving from the Eastern colonies. At the time that 
he was struck down, he had been unloading merchandise from the steamers 
Pilbarra and Marloo, both from Sydney.89 
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When the staff at the hospital sent a message to the district medical officer, 
Dr. Thomas Lynewolde Anderson, that ‘a suspicious case’ had died there, Anderson 
suspected plague and promptly ordered a post-mortem examination.90 He also 
ordered that both the hospital and the house where the deceased had been living 
were to be strictly isolated.91 Bubonic plague was immediately confirmed by the 
examination of cultures obtained from the organs.92 Fremantle’s methodology in 
dealing with the plague victims followed the control measures already established 
in New South Wales. In Sydney, the authorities followed ‘the two conventional 
approaches recommended by the Venice protocol of 1897: first, isolation, 
quarantine and special burial techniques and, second, incineration and the cleansing 
or demolition of property’.93 Similarly in Fremantle, contacts were inoculated with 
‘Haffkine’s anti-plague vaccine’ a prophylactic serum which was developed at the 
Haffkine Institute in Bombay by Waldemar Mordechai Haffkine during a plague 
epidemic in 1897.94 Contacts were then sent into quarantine at Woodman’s Point.95 
The question of how to dispose of the plague-infected body of William 
Campbell presented an immediate problem. There was no crematorium at the port 
of Fremantle, and as per the newly established plague regulations, infected remains 
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could not be buried in the local cemetery. The regulations stated that ‘The body of 
any person who shall die of the malignant infectious disease known as bubonic 
plague shall not be interred in any cemetery, but shall be buried with such 
precautions as shall be approved by the Central Board in an isolated place specially 
set apart for that purpose’. 96 In regard to what those precautions should be in 
practice, the matter was decided by Dr. Anderson who, in order to satisfy not only 
the regulations but the fears of the public mind, needed to get the plague victim’s 
body as far and as safely away from the population as possible.  
The body of the first patient was placed in a lined coffin and 2 cwt of iron 
placed in the coffin with the body removed by an undertaker and 
assistant, placed on the health launch and taken out 18 miles to sea, and 
after holes had been bored in the coffin, it was lowered into 19 fathoms 
of water. Each person who handled the body and coffin thoroughly 
disinfected their hands after doing so.97  
The day following William Campbell’s death, another young patient, Sydney 
Wilson, was diagnosed with the plague at 129 South Terrace. The house, including 
the attached tenement, was immediately isolated and a guard placed on duty night 
and day. The guard was employed in order to keep potential looters away and to 
keep the quarantined persons inside from leaving the building. The men employed 
to watch infected premises were engaged by the Central Board at 8 shillings per 
day.98 The patient was kept in the house and nursed by his father, sister and mother, 
under directions given by Dr. Anderson. Wilson had been employed as a storeman 
by ‘Messrs G. Wood and Son, General Merchants’, on Cantonment Street in 
Fremantle. He had suddenly taken ill at home on Sunday afternoon, 8 April 1900, 
after having been at work as usual on the Saturday. His duties as storeman included 
the loading and unloading of cargo, and in carrying out his work prior to becoming 
ill, he, like William Campbell, had likely handled cargo from the steamers Pilbarra 
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and Marloo, as goods from both those vessels had been delivered to the company’s 
warehouse. On later inspection, the Health Inspectors found the work premises to 
be kept in a state of cleanliness, due to ‘a vigorous use of disinfectants’, and free 
from rats, confirming their suspicions that the actual cargo from the ships was the 
source of the contagion.99 As a result, every passenger and each member of the 
Pilbarra’s crew was examined by the local medical officer. All their personal effects 
and luggage were placed in the hold of the ship where they were fumigated with 
sulphur for three and a half hours.100 What happened to the Marloo and its crew is 
not recorded. No further fatalities from contact with either the Pilbarra or the 
Marloo occurred. 
Sydney Wilson died at 3.30 am on 12 April, three days after his diagnosis. His 
mother, father and sister were sent on to the quarantine hospital at Woodman’s 
Point later the same evening in a horse and pauper hearse.101 The horse, hearse and 
driver were kept for the use of all plague patients and contacts, and were 
themselves also kept in isolation at Woodman’s Point. In dealing with his remains, 
the authorities chose a different course to that used for William Campbell. In the 
afternoon following Wilson’s death, Dr. Anderson had the unfortunate job of 
removing the affected gland to send it to Perth Hospital for examination. Wilson’s 
body was ‘wrapped in three sheets soaked in carbolic acid and then placed in a plain 
coffin not lined’.102 The coffin was placed in the hearse and taken to a funeral-pyre 
constructed by the Public Works Department. Dr. Anderson and Dr. Harvey, the 
acting principal medical officer for the Central Board, witnessed the burning of 
Wilson’s body. A mounted policeman was sent the following morning early and he 
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reported that the fire had completely burnt down and there was ‘nothing but ashes 
remaining’.103 The Central Board administered these precautions in order to inhibit 
any chance of the plague contagion spreading further, but also to prevent panic 
among the community. It was important to be seen to be taking extreme measures 
for the health of the population.  
However, when it became public news in Fremantle that the bubonic plague 
had indeed entered the port, a general anxiety swept the town. Both citizens and 
administrators were alike alarmed, for although there was now a preventative 
inoculation, and a chance of recovery for cases diagnosed early, the plague appeared 
in Fremantle, as it had in Europe in the Middle Ages, like a virulent and frightful 
phantom. Popular concern manifested itself in a frenzy of cleaning among Fremantle 
residents. The day following Sydney Wilson’s death, the Morning Herald reported 
that, ‘such is the demand for disinfectants caused by the outbreak that only a small 
supply exists in the wholesale houses of Perth and Fremantle, which, owing to the 
large demands received from customers, would likely be exhausted Monday next’. 
The representative from the Morning Herald was shown telegrams from Sydney, 
Melbourne and Adelaide, ‘that showed that a supply of the principal disinfectants 
could not be obtained at any price’.104 (The paper also pointed out that the lack of 
disinfectants was brought about not only by the rush of demand due to the plague 
outbreak but was aggravated by a condition of the Boer War by which the Queen 
had forbidden the exportation of carbolic and phenic acids during the continuance 
of the war.) 
When residents discovered that the authorities had buried William Campbell 
at sea, they complained vehemently to the local papers that the body could be eaten 
by fish, which would then be caught and eaten by the townspeople. A reporter from 
the Morning Herald took up this issue with Dr. Anderson, who insisted there was no 
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danger that the ‘bubonic germs’ would disseminate throughout Fremantle in that 
way.105 The practice of burial for plague victims also provoked a strong protest from 
the Inspector for Fisheries, who wrote to the Central Board: ‘I defy contradiction 
when I say that a body stricken down with bubonic plague, buried at sea and 
accessible to crustaceans and fish, will have a very serious effect on the industry’.106 
He was correct. A few days after the burial of William Campbell, the Morning Herald 
had informed its readers that:  
One result of the appearance of the plague at the port has been almost a 
cessation of fishing operations. The public took a decided objection to the 
burial at sea of the victim Campbell and has taken a decided objection to 
any fish other than the tinned article. The fact that the body of Campbell 
was wrapped in three sets of strongly disinfected sheets, and placed 
inside a lead coffin, which was enclosed in a strong jarrah coffin, the 
whole being heavily weighted so as to secure its going to the bottom of 
the sea, does not appear to have reassured the public mind.107 
Two days later the same newspaper reported that ‘A poor fisherman yesterday was 
obliged to throw away a hundred weight of fish because he could not sell it in 
Subiaco, where he has hitherto done good trade’.108 
In the days following Sydney Wilson’s funeral pyre, there were several 
newspaper articles complaining that parts of the skeleton could be seen at the site. 
Both the local and central health boards were forced to revisit the scene in order to 
quell the public mind. With almost comical diligence, the Central Board sent 
Coxswain Hopkins to dig up Wilson’s remains and ensure they were buried securely. 
He reported on 23 April that some old bones, probably the remains of a bullock or 
cow, could be seen from the roadway, but he was satisfied that the remains of 
Wilson could not have been seen by anyone, adding that it ‘would have been 
necessary to search for them amongst the ashes as they were in such small 
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particles’.109 The officer in charge of the Public Works Department who had built the 
funeral pyre and the Mounted Policeman, William Brodie, were also sent to check on 
the remains. The public works man testified to the Chief Medical Officer that nothing 
at all remains ‘to which any exception could be taken by even the most sensitive’.110 
William Brodie wrote that he had to rake through the ashes to find any sign of 
remains.111 Such was the paranoia of a frightened public unused to dealing with 
such an alarming disease.  
The fight for control: the Local Board versus the Central Board 
When the Fremantle Local Board of Health was first informed by Dr. Anderson that 
the plague had been identified in Fremantle, it immediately wrote to the Central 
Board on the matter of establishing a central authority on the harbour, urging ‘that 
there should be a Board appointed to have full control of all health matters at the 
Port whether it be jetty, wharf, railway sheds, quite irrespective of either harbour or 
railway departments’.112  
An emphasis on plague precautions and regulations was key to the Central 
Board’s initial program to inhibit the spread of the disease. It authorised Dr. 
Anderson to appoint three inspectors to supervise the fumigation of ships, as their 
preferred practice for preventing the plague from spreading from ship to shore. Dr. 
Anderson had hoped to second Coxswain Hopkins of the Water Police as his second 
in command. However, on 17 May Mr. Robert Carrick was appointed in his place at 
the rate of £3 per working week of six days. In order to defray the costs already 
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mounting to the Local Board for plague precautions, all overtime, including Sundays, 
was charged directly to the ship owners.113 One of the three inspectors was given 
the role of ‘Disinfecting Inspector’; this inspector had to work seven days a week 
and was the first to enter an infected house to fumigate it.114 Hence, these Inspectors 
were paid very little to undertake an unpleasant and potentially life-threatening job 
under stringent conditions. The same divisions of labour and reward occurred in 
Sydney: as Echenberg writes, ‘the most menial tasks of rat-catching and cleansing 
carried with them the lowest pay and the highest risk’.115  
The Central Board had one single concern when bubonic plague was 
discovered at the entry-port of the State: to isolate the disease and stop its 
contagion from spreading. Daily missives were sent from the Central Board in Perth 
to the Local Board in Fremantle, demanding strict procedures for cleansing; not only 
to the effected dwellings from which plague victims emerged, but to the town’s 
streets and shoreline.116 The boards had not yet embarked on a campaign to 
improve general hygiene or sanitation in the town. At this early stage, the focus was 
more specifically centered on the sites at which the plague contagion had been 
located, to stop it from spreading from these points outward. On the day of William 
Campbell’s death, his house in Bay Street was treated in aggressive fashion. 
Everything in the patient’s room was burnt; the walls, floors and ceilings of all 
rooms were scrubbed down with strong phenyle solution, then chloride of lime was 
sprinkled about the rooms; finally, sulphur was burnt for twelve hours. It took two 
days to complete this procedure and an inventory of all goods destroyed was kept. 
In addition, everything in the hospital that had come in contact with the plague 
patient was also burned.  
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Larger efforts were also begun to control the possible spread. Also on 8 April, 
a working party was sent to dismantle the insanitary jetties areas of the West End. It 
had long been remarked that the condition of the jetty was completely 
unsatisfactory, despite the fact that it had never been permissible for ships coming 
in to Fremantle to throw their rubbish overboard. As far back as 1853 penalties for 
this type of misdemeanour had been laid out in the Government Gazette. In January 
of that year, the penalty for ‘throwing ballast or other rubbish from a vessel in the 
precincts of a port’ was £50 (yet strangely the penalty for throwing a corpse 
overboard was only half that).117 Coxswain Hopkins led the party to clean this area, 
and in his report to the Board wrote that he had found the jetty in an ‘abominably 
filthy state’.118 All the refuse was collected from the jetty and placed in small boats 
and towed out to sea by the Health Officer’s launch Waratah and was then thrown 
overboard. Disinfection of the wharves and rocks was then started, using chlorine of 
lime, carbolic acid and other liquid disinfectants. At the same time, an incinerator for 
‘the carcasses of dead rats, cats, dogs and other dangerous matter’ being removed 
from the jetties and harbour was installed at the sewerage farm. In another sign of 
the importance placed on these measures, the Mayor asked if the Government 
would assist with the cost of the incinerator, to which the Central Board replied that 
‘the Government do not intend to spare any expense in trying to stamp out the 
plague. We must have that incinerator’.119 In an attempt to improve the sanitary 
provision of the wharves, to minimise the spread of contagion, the district medical 
officer ordered that latrines ‘should at once be erected on the river wharf and also at 
the goods sheds near the jetty, by the Railway Department’.120 Unfortunately, 
however, latrines were not installed with any great haste, which one of the newly 
appointed Inspectors was to learn to his great cost. When he needed to ‘answer a 
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call of nature’ whilst on duty on the jetty, he ‘had to move a distance from his post’, 
and it earned him his dismissal.121 
The plague precautions were slowing down the movement of cargo on the 
wharves. When work was attempted at night in order to make up for this delay, this 
also met the disapprobation of the Central Board. In August its president wrote to 
the Berthing Master at Fremantle that ‘no ship may work at night without direct 
permission from me. Please instruct the Agents to apply to me by telephone in each 
case’.122 The aim of the new regulation was the adequate inspection of cargo. Rats, 
the biggest disseminator of the plague germ, made their home amongst the cargo in 
ships, so it was vital that this potential threat was reduced as much as possible. 
Some steamers had ‘ample electric power’ whilst the inspectors and the president of 
the Central Board considered that the light from ‘flare-up’ lamps was not sufficient 
for careful inspection.123 The impact to trade was considered secondary to the 
importance of inhibiting the spread of plague, so the vessels with insufficient light 
for night-time inspections had greater delays at the docks as they sat waiting for 
daylight and their turn to be inspected. The Central Board also took the precaution 
of ordering all ships with stock to be landed at Robb’s Jetty (see map, Appendix A) 
and considered prohibiting any stock from being carried on passenger boats as ‘the 
presence of fodder on deck will attract rats and these animals are thus brought 
more closely in contact with passengers’.124  
In addition to destroying rats at the harbour’s edge, the Central Board 
instituted a program of rat-catching in the town of Fremantle. 125 It offered the 
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public a tuppence per rat, or two shillings for every dozen dead rats that were 
caught and handed in.126 Coxswain Hopkins was commandeered from his normal 
duties at the Water Police to take charge of the collection of the dead rats. He would 
then give a voucher to the rat-collector to take to the Local Board (in the person of 
the Town Clerk), who would give the collector their fee. The public however were 
loath to bring themselves into contact with the potentially plague-bearing rodents, 
and therefore did not enter into the program with much fervour.127 The president of 
the Central Board, Dr. Black, following a visit to Fremantle , expressed his 
dissatisfaction with the way the plague precautions were being carried out without 
‘any sort of sense of urgency’. Dr. Black told the Daily News that ‘he was sorry to find 
that the people of Fremantle were not sufficiently alive to the true state of affairs, 
especially in regard to the destruction of rats. He pointed out that up until that time, 
whilst offering a reward of two shillings per dozen rats, the Central Board had only 
received applications for six dozen rats.128 Whilst addressing the rat-problem was a 
sensible and reasonable initial response to the threat of plague, wider and more 
binding measures were obviously necessary.  
Immediately following the death of William Campbell, and cognisant of the 
problems that the dual authority on the waterfront presented, the Local Board 
wrote to the Central Board that: 
the Government be requested to bring in a new Quarantine Bill next 
session, enacting that all sanitary matters should be under the control of 
the central and local boards of health, as the present diversity of control 
hampered all parties in their work and caused delays. In some cases it 
prevented instead of aiding the eradication of disease. At present the 
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jetty was under the control of the Harbour Master, who would only take 
orders from his chief officer, the Premier. The wharves however, were 
under the control of the Railway Department and hence there were many 
obstacles to prompt or effective action.129 
On 16 April, a Quarantine Bill was passed in the Legislative Assembly that included 
‘Port Regulations for the control of plague in regard to shipping’ and which were put 
immediately into effect. Unfortunately, the bill did nothing to amend the 
jurisdictional chaos. Its primary precaution was to define controls to aspects of 
shipping such as the order that ‘all intercolonial boats should be considered as 
having come from an infected port even if they had not touched at Sydney’.130  
On 23 April, Dr. Anderson felt confident in reporting that, as there had been 
no fresh cases since the initial two victims, he believed the outbreak to be at an 
end.131 Both optimistically and boastfully, Dr. Black (president of the Central Board) 
told the Daily News at this time that ‘the Local Board had nothing to do with dealing 
with the outbreak of bubonic plague, it was all done by the Central Board. Neither 
the Central Board nor the Local Board stamped it out. The true explanation is that 
these were simply two isolated cases of persons who received the infection most 
probably from cargo or while on board the boat, and there was not infection in 
Fremantle at all’.132 He was wrong. Within a fortnight, another plague victim was 
found dead in his home. Arthur Malet, a Frenchman recently arrived on the S.S Gera, 
was staying in a boarding house at 35 Florence Street, South Fremantle, when he 
was discovered to be suffering from the plague. He was the only plague victim, at 
this time and over the course of all future outbreaks, from outside of the West End 
area.133  
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Following Malet’s death, the ratepayers of South Fremantle complained to 
the Fremantle Municipal Council about the delay that occurred in the removal of his 
body to Woodman’s Point quarantine hospital (where it was to be cremated). 
Malet’s body had been kept in the house in South Fremantle for about nine hours or 
more before being removed, which, they stated, had caused them ‘considerable fear 
and alarm’. After receiving this complaint from the South Fremantle residents, the 
secretary to the Local Board, G.B. Humble, wrote to the Central Board asking if they 
might be more hasty in removing dead bodies from residential areas in the future.134 
On 23 May Humble received a curt reply, the gist of which was that there was no 
unnecessary delay; the Mortuary at the Quarantine Station was not completed, so 
the body could not be taken there, and the Crematorium was not yet completed, so 
the Public Works Department had to make arrangements for a funeral pyre, which 
obviously required some time. The four ‘contacts’ from the boarding house in South 
Fremantle were removed to Woodman’s Point on 17 May following the discovery of 
Malet’s body. Likewise, the 49 passengers of the S.S Gera, were also taken to 
Woodman’s Point.135 A funeral pyre was prepared for Malet’s body, ‘about 8 feet 
away from Wilson’s grave’.136 The transport of all of the plague contacts were made 
under mounted police escort. Dr. Anderson described the cremation of Malet in his 
report to the president of the Central Board, letting the president know that he 
personally supervised the proceeding.137  
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What we learn from the procedures involved, from the time of the 
precautions being announced to the third victim dying, is how little the Fremantle 
Local Board had actually to do with dealing with the plague in its midst. The 
regulations, the instructions, the burial of the bodies, cleansing, fumigation and 
quarantine—in all these areas the Central Board had authority. At no point was the 
Local Board proactive or in control of plague prevention. The words of Councillor 
Webster, the chairman and perhaps most vocal member of the Local Board, are 
representative of its sentiments at this stage in the plague outbreak. He told a local 
newspaper that ‘owing to the laxity that was shown by Dr. Black and the other 
health authorities in Perth, the plague was brought to Fremantle, and once it came 
here it was a matter not of local concern alone but one of importance to the whole 
colony, and therefore it is only right that the Central Board of Health should now 
undertake the work of remedying the evil that it has permitted’.138 Put simply, as far 
as the Local Board were concerned, the prevention of plague spreading into 
Fremantle was taken out of its hands and was neglectfully managed by the Central 
Board, so that body should now be held responsible for the ensuing difficulties. It 
may seem a childish response, but the entire ‘plague crisis’ was dominated by this 
juxtaposition between the two boards: the paternalistic domination of the Central 
Board over a neutered and powerless Local Board. 
After Malet’s death, a lull followed in the presence of the plague in Fremantle. 
Throughout May, no new cases of the disease were reported. However, on 12 June, 
forty-two year old John Fitzpatrick, the cook at Maitland’s restaurant in Market 
Street, was diagnosed with plague. Eleven contacts from the restaurant were sent to 
the Quarantine Station.139 Two days later, the daughter of a restaurant owner, Kate 
Maitland, was also diagnosed with ‘true plague’.140 On 19 June, fourteen-year old 
Henry Scott was diagnosed with plague and he along with six contacts was also sent 
to Woodman’s Point. John Fitzpatrick and Kate Maitland died of the plague within a 
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week of their diagnosis. Young Henry Scott and all the contacts from both addresses 
were sent home free from contagion on 30 June, apparently proving that if caught 
early, the plague could be contained and was not as dire as people initially, and 
understandably, feared. 141 In fact, the very low fatality rate as plague outbreaks 
progressed had the effect on the Fremantle population of making them almost 
ambivalent to the presence of plague in their midst.  
Fremantle: The physical environment and the Local Board of Health 
We return now to the first case of plague, to examine the physical reality of having 
the bubonic plague in Fremantle’s midst. On visiting William Campbell’s house 
following his death, the Inspectors for the Central Board of Health found that the 
Bay Street house ‘contained seven persons, and was in a very dirty condition’. 
Similarly, Wilson’s house on South Terrace provided an example of the overcrowded 
and squalid living conditions that seemed to define West End accommodation at 
that time. Dr. Anderson wrote to the Central Board that ‘in all there were twenty 
persons in this one house’.142 The report following the diagnosis of young Henry 
Scott of his home at 31 Collie Street was more troubling: 
The principal defect was caused by the floors being laid slightly below 
the level of the yard at ground floor level. The house is flanked on either 
side by houses of similar design and flaw and a tenement of two rooms is 
placed above the east entrance. The latter is occupied by Mr. and Mrs. 
Kienan and three children. No. 29 contains Mr. and Mrs. Allen and 2 
children, No. 31 Mr. and Mrs. Scott and 5 children, No. 33 Mr. and Mrs. 
Kelly and 5 children. 
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The report further described how only two toilets were provided for the whole of 
the twelve adults and fifteen children living there. The toilets were described as 
being ‘in an extremely dirty condition, the seats and risers [i.e. stands] being 
saturated with offensive matter’. The natural earth floor around the toilet was also 
in an offensive state ‘and no ventilation to the conveniences was provided’.143 The 
Inspectors’ report on the Maitland restaurant in Market Street, where both John 
Fitzpatrick and Katie Maitland had been diagnosed with the plague, was just as 
condemning. Refuse of various kinds had been tossed, apparently from the bedroom 
windows, onto the road in Market Street but had rolled down into the eaves and 
gutters and stayed there; the gutters were then ‘choked up with offensive matter’.144  
Maitland’s Restaurant was not alone in being in such an insanitary state. 
There were numerous hotels and restaurants throughout the West End in which 
employees and owners lived in these overcrowded and unhygienic conditions, as a 
report from the Secretary of the Coastal Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union 
testified. The secretary wrote to the Central Board about the unsanitary condition of 
the kitchens and sleeping accommodation in ‘many of the hotels and eating houses 
in and around Fremantle’. In some cases he described the kitchen as being no larger 
than a cellar ‘with little ventilation, less sunlight, and no drainage’. In addition he 
wrote that ‘the sleeping accommodation’ consisted of ‘a bunk or several bunks 
crowded in an outhouse particularly close to the closets’.145 Maitland’s restaurant’s 
premises had been inspected by the Chief Inspector of the Central Board a 
considerable time before the outbreak of plague there and Mr. Maitland had been 
warned then that unless he made some ‘alterations in his sanitary arrangements he 
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must expect the outbreak of some serious illness’. Unfortunately the Central Board’s 
records showed that ‘nothing whatever was done’.146  
The presence of plague in these homes and businesses initiated a series of 
inspections from the health officers, which eventually led to vital, long term 
improvements in hygiene and sanitation in Fremantle. These same inspections, 
however, whilst having a profound effect on Fremantle’s general well-being, were 
generally seen by residents as an unwelcome intrusion. It was the practice at the 
time to fumigate all homes in which a plague patient had been residing. Should the 
Inspector feel that any of the furniture, bedding or any other effects was in a state of 
sanitation that might be further dangerous to the public health, he had the authority 
to burn these, without consultation with the contacts, who by that time were in 
isolation at Woodman’s Point. The Central Board did pay compensation for these 
goods, usually if they contributed to the earning of a livelihood. The case of Baileys 
and Sutherland’s restaurant in 1903 makes a valuable case in point. The owners 
were compensated £6.8.2½ for the goods which were destroyed during fumigation. 
Among these were cooked ham, corned beef, bacon, ‘1 pair fowls and 11 loaves of 
bread’.147 Yet of greatest concern for the owners were the loss of their reputation 
and the consequent loss of business. They wrote to the Central Board that ‘after 
struggling to build up a business which was a decided convenience to the people of 
this town and to visitors also we have been ostracized and ruined and we are now in 
great doubt as to whether we shall be able to carry on at all, as there is keen 
competition here, and the public will naturally go where no taint of plague has 
been’.148 The Central Board could not compensate them for their enforced removal 
to Woodman’s Point, or for their loss of business.  
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Yet like all other administrative decisions that govern this period of plague in 
Fremantle, there seems to be an arbitrary element to the policy for payment of 
compensation. James Gardner, following his contracting the plague and his stint at 
Woodman’s Point, was given compensation for ‘5 linen handkerchiefs and 1 silk 
handkerchief, 3 silk neck ties, 6 linen collars, 3 wool skull caps, some shoes, shirts 
and trousers’, totalling £2.17.6. He was then given compensation for ‘his swag of 
clothing, which was evidently taken by one of the contacts on their release’. The 
board’s recommendation explained that ‘Gardner is 55 years of age and is destitute 
and at present owing to his late illness, is unable to do any work. There is no proof 
of the existence of the missing articles, but the Board after careful enquiries feel 
satisfied making the above recommendation’.149  
Nevertheless, the Fremantle contacts still had a slightly better time of it than 
their Sydney counterparts. Grace Karskens writes in her work on Sydney that, 
following the outbreak bubonic plague in 1900:  
the official response to the outbreak was particularly hard on the people 
of the waterfront areas. Their streets were quarantined and barricaded, 
houses where plague had occurred were marked out and sometimes torn 
down. Shopkeepers went broke when their stores were boycotted, and 
people returned to their houses or businesses to find their lodgers gone, 
their tools of trade thrown out, their carpets and furniture ruined, their 
possessions ransacked and stolen by the ‘cleansing’ teams.150 
No such extreme measures, or responses, were to be seen in Fremantle, despite 
the obvious negative impact on many individuals.  
The Local Board, as we have seen, had no jurisdictional control over 
plague prevention. However in May 1900 it did take nominal control over the 
area which would have most impact on the local population: the sanitation of 
the town itself. Initially, the main role of the Local Board was in the treatment of 
plague patients’ homes. The procedures for doing so followed the 
recommendations of the District Medical Officer, Dr. Hope, following procedures 
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established in plague conditions during the previous decade in India. It was Dr. 
Hope’s contention that in cases where the house had not been disinfected, a 
fresh outbreak could occur as many as thirty-four days after the first case. Dr. 
Hope’s opinion was that if the house were thoroughly disinfected immediately 
and then left unoccupied for one month, it would be perfectly safe. However, ‘the 
house would need to have the walls, floors and ceilings thoroughly washed again 
and cleansed and all woodwork repainted’.151 These procedures were time-
consuming and costly, and left to the owners to carry out, which was not a 
reliable way to ensure they were done. 
The boarding house of the Martinelli’s in Bay Street remained 
unoccupied for five weeks before the Health Inspector considered it safe. As a 
boarding house, it is probable that the Martinelli’s income depended on having 
boarders in residence and paying rent, so this five-week period would have had 
a significant impact on their income. In addition, many personal and sentimental 
items were destroyed in the act of disinfecting the house. The list of articles 
which M.S. Solomon, the Disinfecting Supervisor, deemed ‘necessary to burn for 
the proper disinfection of house in Bay Street’ as they were ‘very dirty and full of 
vermin’ included all the stretchers and bedding, a box with wedding cake 
ornaments, a photo album and photos and clothing. There is no record of where 
the Martinelli family moved following their release from Woodman’s Point; it is 
only recorded that ‘the key of the house has been handed over to the agent of 
the house, H. Smith, Rialto Chambers, High St’.152  
The occupants of the house in South Terrace fared much better than 
those of Bay Street, losing nothing of significance from their possessions and 
being able to return in a much shorter time. Only ten days after their removal to 
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Woodman’s Point, Disinfecting Inspector Solomon wrote to the Central Board 
that the house was disinfected and ready for habitation, although he added that 
‘the downstairs room in which the patient took ill is not a fit place for anyone to 
sleep in and is infested with rats, there being no less than about 30 holes’.153 The 
disinfection of the house at 28 Florence Street (which had been occupied by the 
plague victim Arthur Malet) took fifteen days to complete. Maitland’s restaurant 
in the Imperial Buildings on Market Street was declared safe to be reoccupied on 
4 July, only three weeks after it had been vacated, and the restaurant reopened 
for business on 6 July. However, the Central Board gave the owners of the 
restaurant and of Nos. 29, 31 and 33 Collie Street a list of fairly dramatic 
improvements that were required to be made, including additional toilets with 
adequate ventilation and the removal and reconstruction of the drains, among 
other items of improvement.154 
In early October 1900, four months after the appearance of the plague among 
the families in the Collie Street tenements, Dr. Anderson wrote to the President of 
the Central Board that he had ‘twice visited Collie Street to see what progress was 
being done and on each occasion warned him that he was not complying with the 
necessary conditions’.155 Dr. Anderson then sent the Central Board’s inspector to 
Collie Street to make a formal report. Inspector Walker reported that none of the 
improvements had been made, including the requirement to ‘provide a separate 
earth closet for each tenement, and also for Aerated Water Factory, four in all’.156 He 
also noted that there had been no change to the ‘manure and refuse pit’, or to the 
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stormwater and other drainage. In other words, the twelve adults and fifteen 
children continued to share a toilet in a yard where manure, rain and storm water 
gathered with the leaking effluent from the single toilet. 
In May 1900 four special inspectors, besides the Inspector of Nuisances, were 
appointed to go from house to house with the object of examining the sanitary 
arrangements of householders and business people. 157 The Local Board was 
expected to pay the salaries of the inspectors even while their reports were sent 
directly to the Central Board for action. The inspectors, armed with instructions 
from the Mayor to give the occupiers of dwellings and other buildings one hour’s 
notice to cleanse their surroundings, systematically made house-to-house 
inspections throughout Fremantle, beginning in the West End. Any 
recommendations of the inspectors were enforceable under the Health Act, not 
under the local by-laws which were the domain of the Local Board. This discrepancy 
caused further misunderstanding and conflict when it came to the enforcement of 
the reports; in other words, in making the owners actually carry out the required 
changes to their premises. The Local Board had no power to act under its own by-
laws to enforce the regulations of the Central Board.  
The continued separation of powers put the Local Board at ever greater 
variance with the Central Board. On 30 May, less than two months after the plague 
had taken its first victim, Fremantle’s Medical Officer, Dr. Hope, expressed his 
frustration with the Central Board in a letter to the Local Board. He accused the 
president of the Central Board of denouncing the Local Board to the newspapers 
and condemning the Local Board for ‘inaction and neglect’. Dr. Hope said Dr. Black 
had done this ‘before any word had been sent to the Local Board of Health, notifying 
its derelictions’. Hope railed against the number of regulations sent to Fremantle by 
the Central Board, regulations which had ‘been hurriedly framed, impracticable and 
arbitrary’.158 The Local Board itself also reacted strongly to Black’s criticisms, only 
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here the outrage was expressed on the subject of funding. Since the first outbreak, 
the Local Board had been engaged in disputation with the Central Board over the 
payment of the work of plague precautions, such as the additional inspectors, 
cleaning teams, and so on. This structural conflict over the struggle for funding was 
integral to how the Fremantle Local Board responded to the plague and it was 
linked intrinsically to the way funding for health was set up in the early years of last 
century. 
The Fremantle Local Board of Health, like all other health boards across 
Western Australia, charged a ‘health rate’ worked out at a certain amount per 
rateable pound. In Fremantle’s case from 1900 to 1903 this rate was set at ‘1½ 
pence in the pound’.159 In levying a health rate, the board was prohibited by Act of 
Parliament from providing for ‘special matters’, meaning they could not set aside a 
sum for some unforeseen event, they could only charge a rate which would cover 
the costs of their pre-determined health programs. In Fremantle at this time this 
was mostly drainage and rubbish removal. The Local Board’s ability to levy funds 
was controlled by a Health Act which forbade it: first, to levy at the beginning of the 
year a rate which would provide for more than its ordinary sanitary work or, to 
afterwards levy a special rate for a special purpose; second, to borrow from the 
general municipal rate for health work; and third, to overdraw its health banking 
account and repay the overdraft by increasing the health rate the following year. 160 
We see here how unable the Fremantle Local Board was to pay for the increased 
expense brought on by the additional plague precautions. With regard to such a 
special matter as the appearance of bubonic plague, the board felt quite justified in 
looking to the Central Board of Health to pay the cost of eradicating a disease which 
had obtained a foothold in the colony, arguably through no fault of Fremantle’s own 
doing.  
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The chairman of the Local Board made reference to the financial burden that 
plague conditions were imposing on Fremantle in May, telling a local newspaper 
that ‘considering the limited power which they possessed and the inadequate means 
at their disposal’, the Local Board ‘had done a great deal toward cleansing the town’. 
Councillor Webster also told the newspaper that Mayor Solomon had an assurance 
from the Premier that any extra expense the Fremantle Local Board of Health had to 
bear on account of the introduction of the plague would be refunded by the 
government.161 Yet when the Local Board had made its application for money to 
cover the cost of work undertaken solely on account of the Central Board, the Daily 
News reported the Mayor as complaining that ‘the [Central] Board disclaims all 
responsibility with regard to the expenditure that we incurred on its account and 
the Colonial Secretary declines to pay us anything’.162 The minutes of the Local 
Board’s meeting following the initial plague outbreak substantiate Webster’s 
statement. There, on 12 April 1900, the Mayor reported to the board ‘that the 
Government had agreed to bear the additional cost entailed in carrying out the 
regulations’.163 Yet only some reimbursement, some of the time, was in fact made to 
the Local Board from either the Central Board or the Colonial Secretary. Once again, 
with rather repetitive occurrence, there remained no cohesive or defined policy for 
financial arrangements between the boards. This more than anything else shaped 
the way the Local Board responded as the plague crisis continued over the following 
years. 
The plague returns: 1901-1902 
In early March 1901, before the plague returned to Fremantle, Dr. Anderson warned 
a meeting of the Fremantle Local Board of Health that as Perth was now having 
‘serious trouble’ with the plague, it was likely that Fremantle would again too.164 
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Sadly, he was soon proved correct. At the outbreak of a new bout of bubonic plague 
in March 1901, Fremantle’s sanitary condition became the focus of public attention. 
Whilst during the initial outbreak in 1900 the response was to isolate the disease 
and stop it from spreading, at this second outbreak questions were asked as to why 
Fremantle was experiencing the disease again. The first place people looked was 
toward the insanitary condition of the port itself.  
At this time and for at least another year or so, in many of the steamers and 
sailing vessels, no proper ‘shoot’ was provided in which to carry the contents of 
latrines down into the water, causing ‘a considerable amount of filth’ to be deposited 
around Victoria Quay.165 The Local Board made a request to the Harbour Master to 
‘compel vessels to provide shoots or screens on the side nearest to the wharf when 
in Port, in order to carry the contents of latrines down to the water’.166 Further on 
the subject of the condition of the wharves, the Sunday Times reported that ‘the 
terrors of the plague are treated with startling levity by that hide-bound 
monopolistic fraternity known as the Federated Steamship Owners’ Association. To 
them the plague is a mere trade nuisance, and regulations to prevent its spread are 
treated as they treat the resolutions of hostile unions – to be ignored, defied, 
ridiculed and resisted’.167 In early April 1901 the Central Board acknowledged to the 
Local Board that despite the harbour regulations and the health by-laws, the 
departments were failing to do their job in both prohibiting the discharge of garbage 
from ships and dealing with the destruction of rats on and around the harbour.  
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The Central Board had to resort to employing the use of an Order-in-Council 
in order to give it the power to serve notices for the enforcement of the regulations 
upon the responsible officials.168 When the responsible departments neglected to 
clean up the wharves and jetties this was not just a concern in regard to sanitation 
and plague, it was a reflection on Fremantle as a town; and when Fremantle 
appeared insanitary, the blame went immediately to the Local Board. That body, 
once again emphasising the need to have one authority with control over the port, 
advocated that the whole of the harbour area ‘should be included in the jurisdiction 
of the Central Board of Health, when the Inspectors could see the regulations 
properly enforced’.169 The reason that this surrender of their own power (such as it 
was) was being discussed was two-fold: the continued battle with the controlling 
authorities on the wharf to do their part in carrying out the sanitary regulations was 
obviously significant, but it was the financial burden on the Local Board of carrying 
out these same regulations that was really the primary motivation for its wish to 
have the Central Board take control.  
The Local Board’s position was that the costs in overseeing plague 
precautions, when those precautions were directed toward the wharves and 
shipping from whence the plague was likely to come, should not be borne by them 
alone. Yet Dr. Anderson, attending a Council meeting himself to explain the Central 
Board’s position, suggested the Local Board spend some money on cleansing, such 
as rat scavenging and rubbish removal: £1000 ‘well spent now’, he suggested, might 
prevent the necessity for expending £20,000 or £30,000 later on. With reference to 
the cost of doing this, Dr. Anderson informed the Local Board that Dr. Black, the 
president of the Central Board, had made it clear that his board’s financial 
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responsibility was simply for the quarantine station and that all other expense had 
to be borne by the Local Board.170 
Yet the lack of authority possessed by the Local Board was equally evident in 
several symbolic exchanges. Being at this stage free of plague, when the Perth 
patients and their contacts were being transported through Fremantle town to the 
station at Woodman’s Point, the local population and health board were concerned 
about contagion. The Local Board wrote that it took the greatest exception to the 
practice, ‘no matter whether the medical officers consider it safe or otherwise’. The 
board suggested that patients and contacts might be conveyed direct by sea to the 
Quarantine Station, ‘but whatever method is adopted this Board absolutely objects 
to the route through the town being resorted to’. The secretary of the Local Board 
wrote to the Central Board that ‘there appears to be a nervous dread amongst some 
of the ratepayers in the town, that the passing of the conveyance carrying the plague 
patients through the town to the Quarantine Station may cause the introduction and 
the spread of the disease in our midst’.171 In response the Central Board wrote that 
‘the public might be somewhat pacified by the fact that it is the intention of this 
board in the future by to convey patients by rail’, which was duly introduced that 
same year.172 Throughout, it was clear which body was in charge. 
Despite the conflict over who was responsible for what, the Fremantle health 
authorities were active in making improvements to the sanitary condition of its 
town. At this point the Local Board had five inspectors and fifteen drivers and drays 
dedicated to sanitary improvements, and much of their focus was the removal of 
rubbish.173 (The board also had fifteen men and four boys employed ‘scavenging’ for 
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rats around the West End area, so their financial commitment was considerable.174) 
The sanitary contractors Laudehr and Gillespie were in charge of the removal of 
night soil and to assist the board with the removal of rubbish from the back-yards of 
town.175 The procedure for the removal of the night-soil was in itself controversial. 
It was carted each night to the foot of Cliff Street, to four box-drains which 
‘projected out seawards for some twenty or thirty yards and there expelled into the 
harbour’.176 The issues of hygiene caused as result of this practice were that the 
waste was then carried by the sea on to the piles of rotten seaweed lying on the 
beach next to the Esplanade. The whole method was unsatisfactory not only to the 
standards of sanitation that the Local Board was trying to establish at the time, but 
to the sensitivities of the locals who had to bear the offensive sight and smell. One of 
the Fremantle papers declared that ‘the foreshore for about a quarter of a mile is a 
seething mass of putrified corruption’.177  
When the plague reappeared into this insanitary state in Fremantle in March 
1901, the first new victim was Charles Sydney Jones, who at only twelve years of age 
was a carter in the employ of Messrs. Ross and Co, wholesale confectioners and 
sauce-manufacturers on Mandurah Road, South Fremantle. When he became sick on 
28 March, Dr. Anderson was called and he took cultures from the boy’s swellings 
and confirmed that it was plague.178 Jones lived at 34 Bay Street with his parents, 
not far from the tenement in which Fremantle’s first plague victim, William 
Campbell, had lived in 1900. Just prior to his illness Jones had been making trips to 
Perth for his work, where the plague had been present for most of the month 
previously. Hence the Central Board did not quarantine his workplace (where he 
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only worked outside the building), but they inoculated all the workers there and 
took their names and addresses, so that if they did not turn up for work they could 
be visited to ‘ascertain the cause of their absence’.179 The second victim of 1901 was 
Alice Cox, aged twenty-three, who was a wardsmaid in the Fremantle Hospital. She 
was diagnosed with the plague on 29 April; the Central Board immediately placed 
the whole hospital under quarantine whilst Cox was removed to Woodman’s 
Point.180 The cause of Cox’s infection, like that of Jones, remained undiagnosed. Alice 
Cox survived but unfortunately Charles Jones died during his convalescence at 
Woodman’s Point.  
On 5 February 1902 due to ‘the virulent existence of Plague in the other 
States’, an Order-in-Council was made for a renewal of plague regulations.181 The 
existence of plague prompted the Local Board to resume fumigation of passengers’ 
luggage, even though it was not considered necessary by the Central Board. Dr. 
Hope reported stubbornly: ‘Notwithstanding the instructions of the Principal 
Medical Officer, and the refusal of the Central Board of Health to undertake this 
work, it is being done. I ordered it to be done when vessels reach Port, and the 
Water Police are carrying out the work under my instructions’.182 
Nearly a year later, the plague struck Fremantle again, this time with more 
force. It was at this point, and for a full year following, that the true horrors of the 
plague impacted Fremantle. On 22 May 1902, John McLure of Essex Street died in 
the private hospital where he had been mistakenly under treatment for typhoid. He 
had been living in a tenement next to the Port Flour Mill where he worked. The 
following day Dr. Hope wrote to the Local Board that a second occupant of the Essex 
street house was also ill with bubonic plague, with the house placed in quarantine 
pending the decision of the Central Board. The second victim living in the house in 
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Essex Street, a twenty-four year old man named Edward Punch, was also working at 
the flour-mill next door. Punch died on 26 May. The house and the mill and grain 
store were quarantined, and for the first time, yellow posters declaring the premises 
to be infected were pasted on both the flour-mill and McClure’s house.183 The house 
was later condemned as ‘unfit for habitation’.184 The reason for mistaking John 
McClure’s symptoms for typhoid was due to the fact that Fremantle was at the time 
also enduring a regular outbreak of that disease. The initial symptoms of both were 
recognized as high fever, lethargy and stomach ache.185 The health inspectors in 
Fremantle were occupied with this typhoid outbreak, which was endemic to 
Fremantle and therefore strictly a local issue. Stretching its resources to the limit, 
the Local Board was nonetheless still required to assist the Central Board regarding 
plague precautions.  
That the Fremantle Local Board was struggling with the financial burden of 
the extra costs of plague precautions is evidenced in their applying to the Premier’s 
Department for financial assistance. Immediately on the recurrence of plague in the 
town, the Local Board had come under fire from the Central Board once again 
regarding ‘the insanitary condition’ of Fremantle. It accused the Local Board of not 
carrying out a number of their regulations and further ordered that if it did not 
carry them out within forty-eight hours, the Central Board would ‘appoint some 
person or persons to perform such duties’.186 In response to the order, the Local 
Board wrote to the Premier requesting the sum of ₤500 ‘to carry out the 
instructions of the Central Board, in the matter of cleansing the town’. The funds 
were allocated, and the Local Board was able to inform the Premier that the money 
had been spent on ‘five extra men, two carts, one Ganger, one extra Clerk issuing 
                                                        
183 Fremantle Local Board of Health Files, Cons: 2790, WAS: 1153, Item1902/032, Outbreak of Plague 
– Cleansing of Fremantle, S.R.O. Perth. 
184 Central Board of Health Files, AN 120/4, Cons 1003, Item 1902/0806, Fremantle 
plague inspections. 
185 West Australian, 1 August 1902, p2. 
186 Secretary Campbell, Central Board of Health, to G.B. Humble, 27 May 1902, 
Fremantle Local Board of Health files, Cons: 2790, WAS: 1153, Item 1902/032, 
Outbreak of Plague – Cleansing of Fremantle, S.R.O. Perth. 
 64 
notices and one inspector employed by the Local Board’.187 The work required was 
extensive. The task of overhauling and cleansing the evacuated houses within the 
infected area of Essex Street commenced two days after Edward Punch’s death and 
was undertaken by a gang of twenty men under the direction of Dr. Anderson and 
Inspectors Lockwood and Walker, of the Central Board. A day later, ten more men 
were employed, with a couple of drays, to remove all the rubbish.188  
On 2 June, Dr. Anderson wrote to the Local Board that a rat caught in a trap in 
Essex Street was found to be suffering from plague. In view of this discovery, it was 
considered that the outbreak of plague had assumed a far more serious aspect. What 
the infected rat suggested was that the contagion had not been brought into port 
from abroad, but had remained, most likely in the soil, from the very first plague 
contagion of 1900 (hence its re-appearance in Essex street). The level of precautions 
was immediately increased, as the two boards decided it would be safest to offer 
public inoculations. These were to be carried out by Dr. Anderson in the ‘Supper 
Room’ on the ground floor of the Town Hall. The other impacts were also worrying. 
It was understood by all that any outbreak of plague in Fremantle would affect the 
commercial well-being of the State as a whole. The secretary of the Central Board 
voiced as much in a letter to the Local Board, writing that not only the Fremantle 
community would suffer, ‘but also our trade in an astonishing degree’.189 Yet the 
consequences were paradoxical. As far as the long fought battle of financial 
responsibility for plague precautions was affected, establishing that the plague 
bacillus was endemic to Fremantle in fact meant that the onus for paying for its 
containment and eradication could be put squarely on the shoulders of the 
Fremantle Local Board. 
Despite the presence of the plague-ridden rat, it was a full month before 
another plague case was reported. On 7 July, Dr. Anderson reported to the Local 
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Board that a case of bubonic plague has occurred on the premises of C.H. Warley & 
Co, Imperial Buildings, 41-43 Market Street, Fremantle. The patient, Charles Lai, was 
employed and living on the premises. He was thirty-two years old and his condition 
was critical. Fourteen contacts, all also residing at the premises, were removed to 
quarantine.190 As a result of this new case, the Central Board declared an emergency 
to exist under the provisions of section 10 of the Health Act of 1898. This was done, 
according to the Central Board, ‘in order to facilitate the general cleansing of the 
town’; in practice, it allowed the Local Board to take further steps in improving the 
sanitary condition of the town.191 The Western Mail seemed to support that view, 
reporting that ‘for months the health authorities have been improving the condition 
of affairs in Fremantle’.192 In addition, when Mayor Alexander was asked by a rate-
payer what the Council proposed to do to improve the town, he replied that not only 
was the Local Board committed to the betterment of Fremantle but also appealed ‘to 
every ratepayer and householder of Fremantle to clean up their premises and so co-
operate with the governing body in making the town better’.193  
A more vigorous response: The plague in 1903 
It was not until 1903 that the plague returned once again to Fremantle. On 26 
January, Dr. Anderson reported to the Central Board that a victim of bubonic plague 
had been taken to Woodman’s Point and that nine contacts would be removed there 
the following day. The victim, nineteen year-old Hugh Murray, was employed as a 
waiter at ‘Bailey & Sutherland’s Fish & Eating Shop’ on the corner of Market and 
Bannister streets, where he also lived. It was Dr. Anderson’s opinion that ‘the virus 
must have been kept alive and active by rodents since last case of plague in July last 
year’.194  
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This new outbreak, some six months after the previous case, was seen as an 
indictment of both Fremantle and its Local Board of Health. The renewal of plague 
immediately caused Fremantle trade some hardship. Overseas ports declared 
Fremantle an infected port and all vessels leaving Fremantle were required to be 
quarantined until ten days after their departure. Closer to home, in a new regulation 
announced by the Central Board, all vessels and lighters coming to Perth from 
Fremantle were held off the wharves until they had been inspected by an official of 
the Central Board.195 Certainly, despite its efforts towards improvement, the 
sanitary condition of Fremantle was a threat to the local people. The Sunday Times 
offered a sharp rebuke, saying: ‘A more hopelessly imbecile and negligent board of 
health does not exist in the commonwealth of Australia’. The newspaper provided a 
vivid description of Fremantle’s drains. ‘Drainage of back-yards’, it wrote, was ‘by 
means of open box-drains down the middle of the right-of-ways, and are choked 
with filth and offal of every description’.196 From the infamous Bay Street, one 
resident complained to the Local Board, calling its attention to: 
the condition of the street drain in Bay Street between Point and Market 
Streets. This is in a disgraceful condition, the water and other matter is 
stagnant and the stench is at times unbearable, there has been [sic] five 
cases of typhoid in our immediate neighbourhood within two months, my 
daughter is now attacked with this dreadful scourge and I am satisfied 
that she has contracted it owing to the condition of the drain.197 
Dr. Anderson suggested that the entire block ‘bounded by Market, Bannister, 
Packenham and High Streets’, should be reviewed by health inspectors.198  
On 27 January, two more cases were declared. The day following Hugh 
Murray’s diagnosis, his workmate and fellow resident, twenty-year-old Nicholas 
Bucich, was diagnosed with plague. A waitress at the restaurant, Lucy Butterworth, 
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who lived nearby in Arundel Street, was also identified as being infected.199 Bucich’s 
death was registered three days later. Then on 12 February a fifteen year old girl, 
Rosemary Smales, became the third victim in matter of weeks. She lived out of town, 
in East Fremantle, but was a ‘tailoress’ employed at ‘Batger, Tailor, High Street’. In 
the common yards at back of the tailors’ shop in High Street, ten infected rats had 
been found in the two weeks prior to Smales’ illness. In fact, Dr. Anderson, following 
the reports of the health inspectors, said ‘practically the whole of the central portion 
of the town’ were confirmed to have plague-infested rats.200 
This rat menace was an absolute nightmare for Fremantle’s Health Officer, 
Dr. James Hope. He wrote an impassioned plea to his Local Board, in which he 
stressed that the outbreak Fremantle was facing was serious and needed immediate 
action—and that the solution was a commitment to getting rid of the rats: 
‘WITHOUT RATS, WE WILL PROBABLY BE WITHOUT PLAGUE’, he wrote. ‘No 
spasmodic effort will effect this, but it must be one DETERMINED AND 
PROLONGUED CRUSADE against—and to the utter extermination of—rats’. Hope 
urged that if the board spent money immediately on getting rid of the rats in the 
town, it would stop future outbreaks of plague, would save lives and prevent panic 
and, of not least importance, would stop ‘the disorganisation of commerce which 
result from continued outbreaks of plague’. In recognition of the difficulty he could 
foresee in the Local Board being able to pay for the rat-extermination program 
necessary to the town, he recommended that it approach the Government for 
financial aid in this moment of crisis.201  
In the same long and fervent letter, Dr. Hope admonished the Fremantle 
population, writing that 
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past experience has gone to show that there is an UTTER DISREGARD of self-
preservation with the public, for they are strangely indifferent to their duties 
in assisting local authorities in dealing with any outbreak or sickness, which 
necessitates combined action, even where no expense is necessary, but only 
the expenditure of a little labour.202  
The ‘little labour’ to which he referred was the continuing lacklustre response to the 
rat-catching program in Fremantle. His other complaint, that the Fremantle public 
were ‘strangely indifferent’ to reporting illness in their community, had long been a 
cause of complaint among health officials in the town. In 1887 the Inspector of 
Nuisances had pointed to the problem that many households either delayed or 
avoided reporting the presence of serious diseases. This often prevented him from 
locating the cause of the infection and ensuring that the proper precautions were 
carried out to minimise the danger to other occupants of the house. He wrote in his 
report in that year ‘the public seem to think that it is my duty to find out for myself 
all the nuisances in the town not for them to tell me any they know of so in many 
cases it leaves me in the dark’.203 
The continuing disinclination of Fremantle residents to contact the 
authorities could be attributed to the costly changes they were required to make 
following one of these inspections, but it could also be attributed to the kind of 
‘moral judgements’ that accompanied the visit of a health inspector. Such an 
occurrence publicly announced to one’s neighbours that the home was unsafe, 
unhygienic and inferior. Yet, strangely and considering the disdain with which 
Fremantle had been historically described in the newspapers of the period, there is 
little condemnation during the plague years directed toward the residents of the 
homes and tenements that came under attack, even though there had been a 
precedent for this sort of ‘class bias’. Dr. Hope himself had written a scathing report 
on Fremantle mothers in his report for 1897. Reporting on the terrible infant 
mortality in the town, which in 1897 made up 39 per cent of total deaths, Hope said 
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‘this is a serious reflection upon the mothers in our midst. It is a growing habit of 
this class to give up the maternal nourishing of their children and when sickness 
follows this neglect of children they are too indifferent to nurse, they are equally 
indifferent as to their fate’.204 His pejorative reference to ‘this class’ of mother left no 
doubt to which social and economic group he felt was to blame. Likewise, the 
Inspector of Schools during the 1903 outbreak wrote to the Central Board asking if 
children could be kept in school during the plague outbreak, as the schools were 
‘good, sanitary places’ and the children would be much better there than at home 
and ‘in gutters and other unsavoury places’.205 Presumably this was where such 
children would otherwise be left to roam by their thoughtless parents.  
Yet in the myriad letters, exchanges and newspaper articles among the 
participants on the subject of plague in Fremantle at this time, apart from Dr. Hope’s 
occasional outburst, there was a distinct absence of social judgment or criticism. 
This stands in contrast to the example of Sydney. Grace Karskens writes on this 
subject that:  
In retrospect, the outbreak of plague can be seen as a catalyst which drew 
together all those longstanding, increasingly hysterical ‘slumland’ 
stereotypes, the fears of working people, of Irish and Chinese, seamen and 
foreigners. It was an opportunity seized by the government, with the 
sanction of public opinion, to both control and reshape the city’s wharves 
and to purge the city of its perceived moral, physical and social ills.206  
Yet despite the ‘indifference’ of the Fremantle public, the Central Board were 
determined that drastic action needed to be taken. Its secretary wrote in his letter to 
the Local Board that ‘my board can arrive at no other conclusion than that much of 
the soil of Fremantle, and particularly the back-yards of the business portion of the 
town must be infected, as rats infected with plague have been found in various 
portions’.207  
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There was some discussion in the papers and among the health authorities 
on the occasion of the 1903 outbreak, as to whether the virus had ‘in some manner 
been preserved since the last outbreak at Fremantle’.208 In other words, whether the 
disease was actually endemic. The significance of this must be emphasized. The way 
the disease would be stamped out or controlled would depend on the conclusions of 
the health officials, yet no conclusion was officially determined or announced. If the 
bacillus was proved to be in the soil of Fremantle, then the health risk would be 
considered to be specific to Fremantle. An endemic disease would be purely a 
matter for the Local Board, which would then be free to take action as it saw fit but 
then would be unable to call on the Central Board for assistance with funding. The 
Central Board, as its previous behavior had demonstrated, would certainly feel no 
obligation to financially assist a town that it had bluntly accused of dereliction of its 
duty for the past two years. Strangely, and considering the importance of 
Fremantle’s strategic position as the entry-port of the State, the prospect of endemic 
bubonic plague was given no further consideration by the health authorities. Yet at 
this time, on the other side of Australia, Ashburton Thompson was building a case in 
Sydney that ‘the plague organism did not live in the soil surrounding humans’.209 
On 14 February, twenty-seven year old Percy Cartwright was diagnosed with 
plague at the end of his working day as a ‘yardman’. Cartwright worked and lived at 
‘His Lordships Larder’ on the corner of Mouatt and Phillimore streets. He was 
removed to quarantine on 16 February along with fifteen contacts who had all been 
inoculated. Dr. Anderson noted in his report that ‘two infected rats were obtained 
from the yard adjoining this place’.210 Percy Cartwright died on 18 February, four 
days following his diagnosis. The same day Percy Cartwright died, Norman 
Rovenstrunk was diagnosed with plague. Norman was a fifteen year old who lived in 
Bellevue Terrace but worked at Sandover & Co, which was situated on the corner of 
Mouatt and High Street, the corner immediately south of Percy Cartwright’s 
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residence.211 Seven of Rovenstrunk’s contacts were inoculated and removed to 
Woodman’s Point. Sandover & Co, one of Fremantle’s major business houses, was 
closed down. Six days after his diagnosis, young Rovenstrunk died.212 
The Central Board had already informed the Mayor that it intended to 
distribute leaflets dealing with plague precaution in Fremantle and, critically, that 
Haffkine’s prophylactic would be issued to all medical practitioners free of charge, 
‘provided that returns are forwarded by those gentlemen for Statistical purposes, 
giving the date of inoculation, name, age, dose administered, and result, if 
possible’.213 Following this second set of cases in the new year, there was a rush 
among the public to take up these inoculations, with Dr. Anderson administering 
them to 500 people in one day.214 The President of the Central Board, whose letters 
at this time seem to indicate a new sense of appreciation for the efforts of the Local 
Board, wrote to the Under Secretary that the local body was doing everything 
possible ‘with a view of awakening the people of Fremantle to the necessity of 
cleansing their town thoroughly and placing their premises in such a condition as 
will minimize the spread of the disease’.215 Noting that the special medical officer Dr. 
Anderson was personally supervising the work in Fremantle the President conceded 
that the ‘Fremantle Health Authorities are, I think, endeavouring to do their best to 
co-operate in this, but we do not expect much from their efforts—infected rats are 
still being found’.216 The president noted here that the Central Board were also 
‘considering the advisability of declaring all premises infected from which infected 
rats have been found’, however this did not occur.217  
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On 24 February, two more case of plague were reported. One was Victor 
Hague, an employee of the sanitary contractors, Laudehr & Gillespie, who was 
engaged on night-service in the infected area and diagnosed at his home in Duoro 
Road, South Fremantle. The Daily News reported that the victim was one of the 
company’s employees who had refused to be inoculated (though this was not 
recorded in the official minutes at any point). The second was James Gardner, a fifty-
two year old retired ships steward who lived at 103 Phillimore Street, in the West 
End. In Gardner’s case twenty-eight contacts were also quarantined.218 In Victor 
Hague’s case, only his wife and child were quarantined. That week, Dr. Anderson 
wrote to the Central Board that he had ‘performed 1104 public inoculations - this 
includes contacts and Sandover’s employees’.219 Victor Hague died on 28 February. 
Happily, James Gardner survived and was discharged on 24 March along with Rosie 
Smales.  
The place where James Gardner lived in Phillimore Street, with twenty-eight 
contacts, was typical of the delinquent tenements for which Fremantle was known. 
The Chief Inspector described the premises as ‘three straggling four-roomed 
cottages’ to which fourteen other rooms had been added. Some of the additions 
were made by enclosing verandahs, some were detached from the main part of the 
house, and some were ‘erected in any convenient part of the back yards of the 
original cottages’ with walls and ceilings ‘under six feet in height’. The chief 
inspector continued that  
it is utterly impossible to suggest any practicable method of improving such a 
wretched congery [sic] of hovels, and as every part of the buildings is quite 
unfit for human habitation, I have no hesitation in respectfully 
recommending that an order should be made for their immediate 
demolition.220  
Following this spate of plague cases in one small area, two demolition orders were 
written and four residences on Phillimore Street were required to destroy their 
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privies and build new ones. Regarding the Phillimore street tenements permitted to 
stand, the West Australian reported that ‘it is understood that the whole of the 
premises will be thoroughly cleansed and fumigated. All the material found to be 
unburnable will be taken out to sea on a barge and thrown overboard’.221  
At this point, the Central Board introduced new plague regulations, 
deliberately targeting the destruction of rats.222 The Local Board had charge of 
ensuring all houses and businesses in Fremantle deposited all refuse into bins and 
kept them covered and secured so as not to allow rats access to the contents. It also 
had to destroy rats in sewers, drains, culverts and other places under their control 
and ‘take steps to compel owners and occupiers’ to do the same. Owners and 
occupiers of all houses and buildings had to take responsibility for destroying ‘all 
rats therein’, using ‘methods as approved by an inspector of the Central Board, or as 
directed by an inspector of the Central Board’.223 The Local Board was also to 
maintain a free distribution of phosphorous rat poison, provided by the Central 
Board, to house-holders.224 Rats in all the buildings under the control of the Railway 
and Harbour departments had to be destroyed by methods approved by an 
inspector of the Central Board. The president of the Central Board wrote at this time 
that ‘the Board are considering the advisability of quarantining all blocks of the 
town at one time. This necessarily would be an extreme measure, but from the 
present outlook the extreme measures are necessary’.225 To this end the Central 
Board sent an enquiry to the Commissioner of Police in February suggesting that, if 
quarantining of any one block was necessary, thirty-six special constables would 
need to be engaged (to provide for three shifts of twelve men each).226 Nothing is 
recorded in the extent correspondence as to why the constables were considered 
necessary, but it is reasonable to assume that the Central Board expected some 
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resistance from residents. Nevertheless, when the blocks were indeed quarantined a 
short time later, no constables were required. 
The renewed effort toward paving the back-yards of the West End became a 
most urgent step in plague prevention in light of the concern that the plague bacillus 
could have made a home in the soil of Fremantle’s most insanitary area. The Central 
Board was prepared to compel the Fremantle traders to commit to paving their 
yards. It distributed a public notice in Fremantle in late February advising that yards 
‘of the business portion of the town’ were to be paved ‘with impervious material’ 
(meaning tar was required, rather than wood) and whole blocks would be declared 
infected and placed under quarantine.227 It added that the very serious commercial 
aspect of such a step should be considered and hoped, as reported in the 
newspapers, ‘that the hearty and cordial co-operations of the public in this direction 
will render extreme measures unnecessary.’228 Hearing of this drastic measure, the 
Fremantle District Traders Association met almost immediately and wrote to the 
Local Board denouncing the concept of quarantining whole blocks, advising the 
‘grave injustice that such a course would inflict upon the majority, and perhaps the 
whole, of the business people in and around High street’.229 The move was seen 
among the business community as an imposition on their trade. A sense of the 
health risk to the community was not the prevalent consideration; the general 
feeling was that the plague was more of a nuisance and commercial impediment 
than a thing of terror. 
Regrettably for the district traders association, Dr. Hope, Fremantle’s long-
standing medical authority, agreed that more stringent measures should be taken. 
Hope advocated that a block at a time should be chosen in the West Ward, where all 
the premises could be fumigated in order to destroy the rats. At the time of 
fumigation, a group of men should surround each block, to kill any rats attempting 
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to escape. Then the onerous job of cleansing the yards could be undertaken.230 Dr. 
Hope explained the necessity for the work to the municipal council: 
in the central parts of the town many of the backyards were in a highly 
unsanitary condition. For years waste and filthy water had been thrown 
into these yards, until the sand had become thoroughly saturated and 
made ripe beds for breeding disease. It is no use merely cleaning the 
surface of these yards. The sand should be scraped off for a depth of 
some inches and carted away, and the yards should be cemented over or 
concreted.231  
This, Dr. Hope recommended, ‘should be done block by block until the whole of the 
West Ward has been subjected to the same treatment’.232  
The Local Board agreed with Dr. Hope on the necessity for paving the yards 
of the West End and took upon itself the commitment to pave the yards of entire 
blocks. Newspaper reports carry much of the dialogue that is not recorded in the 
minutes of the Local Board’s meetings. A report in the West Australian on 20 
February, following the previous day’s meeting, noted that the chairman of the Local 
Board had told the members ‘he hoped they would support him in compelling the 
owners of property to pave their yards with impervious material’. In an amusing but 
revealing exchange, the secretary George Bland Humble told the board that it was 
his understanding that ‘if the Central Board does this work they will make the Local 
Board pay for it’, to which the Mayor replied ‘they can’t get blood out of a stone’. As 
the meeting continued the board all agreed that it was necessary work, with 
councillor Laurie declaring that ‘the man who would not clean up his yard at a 
juncture like the present deserved no leniency’. Dr. Hope reminded the board that 
the question of tar-paving yards had been before them for the last three years but it 
had always been allowed to lapse, even though the ‘soil of the central portion of 
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Fremantle had been a receptacle for disease germs for the last sixty years’. ‘The 
committee got completely on board’, wrote the newspaper.233  
On 25 March, following the identification of two new cases of plague, a 
special meeting of the Central Board was held. In what can only be described as a 
surprising move, considering the cordial relationship between the boards for the 
past month, it decided to write to the Under Secretary, Walter Kingsmill, advising 
him that the Fremantle Local Board of Health were not carrying out their duties for 
the extermination of the plague and that the board wished to make an order on 
Fremantle ‘to enforce the performance of their duties forthwith, failing which the 
Central Board will step in, and undertake the functions of the Local Board 
themselves’. It was an aggressive step. The Central Board wanted to ascertain, 
before the order was given, that the Government would be prepared to provide the 
necessary funds should action be taken.234 What it revealed was that the issue of 
funding was also pivotal to the Central Board, not just the Local Board. The belief 
that the Fremantle health authorities, put simply, were not doing their job seems to 
have derived primarily from Dr. Anderson’s personal dissatisfaction with their 
performance. Anderson told the Central Board that he considered the Local Board to 
be derelict in its duty: ‘the rubbish removal, inspection of houses, supervision and 
registration of common lodging houses and the destruction of rats have all been 
most inadequately performed’, he wrote. It was his suggestion that the Central 
Board therefore consider taking control over the work of the Local Board. The 
Under Secretary responded that the government recognised the necessity for firm 
action in connection with the outbreak of plague and was willing to give the 
necessary financial assistance. On 4 March, the Order was made on the Fremantle 
Local Board of Health requiring it to enforce the provisions of the Health Act.235 
Disputation between the two boards was not always financial. When in 
March 1903 the Local Board had required the Anglican Church to construct 
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‘outhouse accommodation’ in the grounds of one of its local churches, the 
archdeacon had written directly to the Central Board that in the opinion of the 
church authorities, the ‘accommodation ordered by the Local Board was 
unnecessary’. Astonishingly given their vehemence elsewhere on such matters, the 
Central Board wrote to Fremantle that ‘the communication received from the Ven. 
Archdeacon Watkins was sufficient to show that the accommodation ordered was 
not required’.236 The Local Board was understandably furious at this slight to their 
authority and at its fortnightly meeting there were ‘some strong remarks’ by Mayor 
Smith and members. The Mayor thought it was scandalous that the Central Board, 
which had urged the Local Board to adopt measures to improve the sanitary 
conditions of the town, should practically countermand an order for accommodation 
that the Local Board deemed to be absolutely necessary. The Mayor said ‘it was 
impossible to reconcile the attitude of the Central Board in this matter with the 
policy that body was endeavouring to follow in connection with the improvements 
to the sanitary condition of the town’. These remarks were endorsed by the 
members of the board, and finally a resolution was carried that the whole of the 
correspondence in connection with the matter be submitted to the Colonial 
Secretary, so that he could see for himself ‘the way in which the Local Board in 
efforts to improve the sanitary conditions of the town were being hampered by the 
attitude of the Central Board’.237 
The Local Board, the Council, and obviously the business community of 
Fremantle appeared to be working towards an improvement of Fremantle’s 
sanitation and cleanliness. However on 25 May, the West Australian reported that 
‘the efforts which were being made by the mercantile community of Fremantle to 
have the stigma of being plague-infected removed from the port have been rendered 
futile by the discovery yesterday of a fresh case of the disease in the centre of the 
town’.238 A woman named Emily Carey, 52 years of age, had been diagnosed with 
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plague on 24 May. Carey was a nurse who for about ten days had been in attendance 
on an ‘accouchement’ case at 25 Essex Street, two doors from the old Port Flour Mill 
(and exactly twelve months since second plague patient from there had died). 
Carey’s home was described by the inspector as ‘five tenements which have only 
three privies for their use’.239 Happily, it seems that Emily Carey had recovered by 
mid-June.  
But the disputes over authority, as represented by practical assertions over 
which party had control over the purse-strings, continued. On 13 July, as reported in 
the press, ‘the Colonial Treasurer succeeded in startling the members of the Town 
Council of Fremantle by the announcement that out of the subsidy due to the 
council, the sum of £300 had been deducted to reimburse the government for 
expenditure incurred in stamping out the plague in the Fremantle’.240 The 
newspaper suggested that the Mayor sent an emphatic protest writing that plague 
had been brought to Fremantle by shipping and it was wrong for the government to 
‘arrogate a right which it did not possess by taking £300 out of money which 
Parliament had voted to Fremantle’.241 Nothing is mentioned in Council minutes as 
to whether the funds were paid out to the government or to Fremantle, but this 
incident once again highlights the imperfect financial arrangements for dealing with 
plague, and Fremantle’s vulnerable state in its curtailment. 
The plague’s last gasp: 1904 
From July 1903 for an entire year, Fremantle was plague-free. In July 1904, it struck 
again. On 4 July, sixteen-year-old Phillip Dubois died of plague, having been in 
Woodman’s Point with the contagion for only three days. That month three other 
patients were diagnosed, but then discharged as cured. No notes are extant in the 
files regarding these cases. There is however, a significant amount of paperwork in 
the records regarding the next case of bubonic plague to strike Fremantle. On 26 
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August two cases of plague were reported from Cliff Street in the heart of the West 
End. Both lived at the Exchange Dining Rooms on the corner of Cliff and High streets. 
One was twenty-seven year old John William Perry who worked as a Shop Assistant 
at ‘W. Watsons Dairy Produce Store’ on the corner of Mouatt and High streets. The 
Daily News reported that Perry had only arrived in the State by the S.S. Perth on 10 
August. Nine days later, according to the Daily News, ‘he thought he had strained 
himself by rolling a cask. He went to see a chemist for some liniment which he 
rubbed on the swellings on his groin, but did not feel really ill until the day before 
yesterday, when he became very feverish’.242 The second victim was Miss M. Currie 
who ran the Dining Rooms. The owner of both residences was one of Fremantle’s 
most esteemed citizens, Mr. Michael Samson, of Ellen Street. 
At a special meeting of the Fremantle Local Board held on 29 August the 
members considered the report of Dr. Anderson including the portion that dealt 
with the condemnation of the Exchange Dining rooms. The minutes of the meeting 
were published in the Daily News the following day. At the meeting, Councillor 
Holmes expressed his opinion that there was too much fuss over the plague 
business altogether and ‘he doubted very much if the man had the plague at all’. 
Councillor Jones spoke in the same strain, suggesting ‘the walls of the house where 
Perry had lived were just as good as those in the Town Hall yet it was condemned 
simply because some fellow had a swelling in his groin’. Councillor Jones suggested 
that before the house was condemned more information should be obtained about 
the premises; indeed, he argued, it was time the wholesale condemnation of 
buildings should cease. He pointed to the contradictory nature of the instructions 
from the Central Board. ‘Only a short time ago the Central Board of Health 
authorities had reported that there was nothing for them to do in Fremantle, and 
now it was so filthy that additional inspectors were said to be required’.243 
Councillor Lynn asked if the Central Board had power to condemn the buildings 
without first consulting the local boards, to which the Mayor answered ‘certainly’. 
The Health Inspector said that the new part of the building was in good order but 
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the old building was generally in a somewhat dilapidated condition and should be 
condemned. Councillor Jones put forward a motion ‘that the board takes no action in 
the matter’ which was passed, as was the question of appointing additional 
inspectors to which the members resolved to make no appointments ‘either 
temporarily or permanently’.244 Considering that Michael Samson was a favourite 
son, a member of one of Fremantle’s oldest and most prestigious families, it seems 
very likely that the councillors were reluctant (or perhaps afraid) to enforce such a 
costly, and possibly humiliating, exercise.  
In an ironic reversal of roles from the earlier case affecting the Anglican 
Church, two days later the secretary of the Local Board received a letter from the 
Central Board written by the president himself, his choler obvious, asking for an 
explanation by return post as to why, after they received notice from Dr. Anderson 
that Exchange Dining Rooms were unfit for human habitation, that ‘your Board had 
decided to take no steps in the matter’.245 Receiving no response from the Local 
Board, the Central Board took it upon itself to notify Michael Samson directly that 
the list of requirements, made by its health inspector, were enforceable under the 
plague regulations and must be complied with before the Exchange Dining Rooms 
could be released from quarantine. In addition, the Central Board informed Samson 
that it was  
given to understand that the Local Board have decided not to take any steps 
in respect to the certificate forwarded to them, by Dr. Anderson our Special 
Medical Officer, in relation to these premises, and if they persist in abiding by 
that decision, it is the intention of the Central Board to enforce the 
performance of the Local Board in this matter.246  
On 5 September the Central Board duly served an Order on the Fremantle Local 
Board of Health to demolish the building within seven days. On 12 September, one 
week after serving the Order to Demolish, the Central Board’s secretary must have 
                                                        
244 Fremantle Local Board of Health files, Acc 1377, Series 1342, Minutes Item 59, 
1886-1902, S.R.O. Perth. 
245 Secretary FLBH from CBH 31 August, 1904 Central Board of Health Files, AN 
120/4, Cons 1003, Item 1904/0654, Bubonic Plague S.R.O. Perth. 
246 CBH to William and Michael Samson 2 September, 1904 Central Board of Health 
Files, AN 120/4, Cons 1003, Item 1904/0654, Bubonic Plague S.R.O. Perth. 
 81 
been stunned to receive from the acting secretary of the Fremantle Local Board the 
following statement: ‘That this Board refuse to carry out the order served upon it by 
the Central Board of Health’.247 On 15 September, the Central Board notified the 
Under Secretary, keeping him abreast of the situation, that they had received a letter 
from Michael Samson himself, and that he ‘had signified his intention of fully 
complying with the order of the Central Board’, making the action of the Local Board 
‘under the circumstances, the more inexplicable’.248 Not only was the Local Board’s 
stance inexplicable, it was futile. The Central Board simply notified them that it had 
appointed Mr. Francis Day Lockwood ‘as the person to carry out the duties of the 
Fremantle Local Board of Health, in respect to the default made by them, in relation 
to the premises of the Exchange Dining Rooms’.249 Lockwood reported on 16 
September that the work was being executed and would be complete within seven 
days. The most obvious reading of the situation is that the Local Board did not have 
an issue with the work that was required. It had been robust in its inspection of 
homes and boarding houses and the continuation of tar paving the yards of the West 
End.250 The Local Board, at long last, simply wanted to stand its ground against the 
Central Board.  
Conclusion: The plague as bringer of conflict and progress 
By the end of the last outbreak of bubonic plague in 1904, a total of eleven people 
had died of the disease in Fremantle. While such deaths were tragic, the most 
significant impact of the plague was thus not on the mortality of the population, but 
on two other areas: the living conditions of its residents and the control and 
management of the waterfront. With one exception, every person who contracted or 
died of the plague either lived or worked in the West End—and the exception, 
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Arthur Malet, had contracted the disease almost immediately after landing at the 
Fremantle harbour. The wealthy elite had long moved their residences away from 
that part of town, and many of the residents of the West End at the turn of the 
twentieth century were living in substandard conditions, in old and ailing shacks 
and houses that were described by the Fremantle Courier in 1902 as ‘erected in 
times gone by which are still used, although modern ideas are altogether opposed to 
such places being occupied by human beings’.251 The coming of the bubonic plague 
paradoxically provided Fremantle with an opportunity to amend and improve those 
living conditions that had made the West End so vulnerable to such an outbreak in 
the first place. 
From the time the first case of bubonic plague was discovered at the entry-
port of the State, the Central and Local boards of health had a common single 
concern: to isolate the disease and stop its contagion from spreading. The conflict 
arose between them over what course to take in ensuring such outcomes, and in 
whose hands the final decision-making powers rested. Daily missives were sent 
from the Central Board in Perth to the Local Board in Fremantle, demanding strict 
procedures for cleansing—not only to the effected dwellings from which plague 
victims emerged, but on the town’s streets and shoreline. Whilst aware of the 
potential crisis before them, when the first instructions for prevention of the plague 
were handed down from above, the Fremantle health authorities were still unclear 
as to what powers they had to control areas of shipping and quarantine, which were 
so vital to the prevention of diseases being introduced to Fremantle. The lines of 
demarcation between the various authorities on the waterfront were a source of 
confusion and greatly hindered the introduction of safety measures to prohibit the 
plague. The Local Board was responsible for sanitation, but its jurisdiction extended 
only to the edge of town; it could do nothing to compel to improvements to 
sanitation in the harbor and jetties area itself.  
Yet this ‘jurisdictional’ conflict determined much of the relationship between 
the two boards of health. Between 1900 and 1904, the battle over the demarcation 
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of responsibility for the response to the bubonic plague was fought through the pens 
of their secretaries. Over the course of these few years, the Local Board continued to 
resist bearing the responsibility, both fiscal and jurisdictional, of fighting a disease 
that the Board saw as threatening on a State, and not merely a local, level. The 
existing health policy, defined in the Health Act of 1895, prohibited increased rates 
to charge for unforeseen health emergencies. When the bubonic plague came to 
Fremantle this was one such unforeseen event, leaving the Local Board with no 
financial means of paying for the resultant necessities, the biggest element of which 
was increased numbers of staff. The Central Board’s reluctance (indeed, it outright 
refusal in most cases) to fund the requirements for plague precautions inhibited the 
Fremantle Local Board’s ability act.  
For four years the two boards battled over jurisdiction, financial 
responsibilities, and methodologies. The authority of the Central Board ranged 
between avuncular and despotic, whilst the position of the Local Board varied 
between objectivity and petulance. Rarely did the two bodies see eye to eye on the 
prevention or treatment of plague in Fremantle. Local health boards, like road 
boards, were semi-autonomous bodies with little requirement for central authority. 
Whilst there had been previous occasions for the Central Board of Health to become 
involved in Fremantle affairs, such as during occasions for shipping quarantine, 
Fremantle had for years enjoyed relative independence. Now the plague was forcing 
them to collaborate, in a situation of crisis, without having in place any common 
understandings regarding communication, powers of decision, responsibilities or 
accountabilities. The tensions were there for all to see, in both private 
correspondence and public meetings.  
Yet despite these difficulties, a sweep of improvements to sanitation and 
housing were the practical outcome of the series of bubonic plague outbreaks that 
were visited upon Fremantle between 1900 and 1904. These improvements were 
detailed in the minutes of the Council meeting of 2 April 1902, when the Council 
proposed a deputation of Council and Members to approach the Premier to request 
funding for works: 
To ask for free water for street flushing; 
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To ask a Grant of £3000 for Park Improvements; 
To request extension of Esplanade from Mouatt Street; 
To request a grant of £5000 for Drainage improvements, in addition to 
the amount of £2,000 already promised.252 
The Local Board, under the encouragement of Dr. Hope, Fremantle’s long-serving 
(and indeed, long-suffering) medical officer, made its first inquiries into the septic-
tank system of sewage treatment in August 1900 following the first plague 
epidemic. Then in 1901, contractors were hired to install this more efficient and 
hygienic system, starting at the West End and moving to the outer suburbs.253  
The inadequate drainage system in Fremantle, long a source of despair to the 
medical authorities, was also improved as a result of the visitation of plague. Taking 
advantage of the attention which was being given to improving the sanitation of the 
town, the Town Engineer in 1902 made the point that ‘a great many of the 
obnoxious smells with which Fremantle is credited is due [sic] to the saturation of 
the wooden drains with filth and the renewal of the drains will effect a great 
sanitary improvement in the town’. 254 The same year, the Fremantle Municipal 
Council obtained from the Government a promise of £7000 for improving the 
drainage system in Fremantle.255 The main feature of the scheme was the removal of 
the noxious wooden drains and their replacement by concrete drains, both 
underground and on the surface. The West End was of course the place in which 
these improvements began, as they comprised ‘the most congested and worst 
drained parts of the town’.256  
In 1902 a rubbish service was instituted in Fremantle, also as a direct result 
of the plague. It began with an order from the Central Board to ‘remove two cubic 
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feet of rubbish twice weekly from every tenement in the Town’.257 In 1903 the Local 
Board brought a daily refuse service into use in the West End. Initially, this service 
was simply a plague precaution to be carried out until the destruction of rats had 
sufficiently advanced to justify the discontinuance of the extra service. However, it 
soon became a regular service and was brought under the auspices of the 
municipality by 1904. In fact, in 1903 at a Council meeting, the defeat of Councillor 
Llewellyn’s motion for delay in the municipalisation of the rubbish service indicated 
to a local newspaper how much the Council was ‘wedded to that principle’.258 
On 21 October 1902, Mayor Alexander, accompanied by the Town Engineer 
and the Assistant Town Clerk, met with the Minister of Works to discuss the 
extension of the Esplanade. The Engineer-in-Chief, who was present at the 
interview, informed them that he was then preparing the contract ‘for the extension 
of the Esplanade as far as South Street, which will include the reclamation of the 
Bay, drawing an almost direct line from the shore end of the small jetty to the North 
side of the existing Baths’. He noted that it took 110 men three days to clean up the 
effluent and the carcasses of dead animals from the Esplanade beach in 1900.259 
Following this, the Local Board applied to the State government for a grant to 
reclaim the Esplanade beach, which was approved and carried out by 1903, to 
create the popular park still in use today. 
During the second half of 1902 the Health Inspector had completed his 
reports on all buildings in the West End. The inspectors had undertaken a thorough 
inspection of all working parts in all rooms and yards, ground level, roof, and so on, 
throughout the West End.260 Due to the visits of the Town Engineer and the Health 
Inspector to every dwelling and business in the West End during the plague years, 
some vital improvements were introduced including, most importantly, a building 
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code stipulating that the granting of building licenses be properly enforced. A 
testimony to the efficaciousness of the new building requirements was an 
advertisement in 1902 for the rebuilding of the National Hotel on the corner of High 
and Market streets, which proclaimed that the new hotel, among its other 
improvements, would have an ‘asphalted and well-drained yard’ and ‘excellent 
sanitary arrangements’.261 In 1903 a register for boarding and common lodging 
houses was also established.  
It was after the third outbreak in 1902, with the continued chaos of authority 
on the waterfront highlighting the need for a more unified authority at the port, that 
Fremantle decided to follow the example of the Sydney port authorities. In 1901, in 
reaction to the plague outbreak and at the instigation of its own Central Board of 
Health, the State government of New South Wales had initiated a ‘Sydney Harbour 
Trust’ in order to take more control of the wharves and harbour activities.262 
Likewise, in 1902, following Fremantle’s third attack of bubonic plague and much 
discussion at the tables of the Fremantle town council, the Fremantle Harbour Trust 
was finally established. Since the first outbreak in 1901, the Fremantle Local Board 
of Health had been urging the formation of a singular body of authority on the 
wharves to handle issues of quarantine more efficiently. The Fremantle Harbour 
Trust was established by an act of parliament in 1902 and took control of the 
harbour on 1 January 1903. Consisting of five commissioners, it took control over all 
aspects of the harbour, from the port and its facilities to the hiring of labour and 
piloting—all formerly controlled by five different authorities.263 Finally the singular 
authority of a Harbour Trust was realised, an achievement through adversity. That 
the harbour remained outside the Local Board’s jurisdiction was of no consequence. 
The board had been striving for a ‘sole authority’ on the waterfront since the 
outbreak of plague had focused outside attention on Fremantle. The chaos then 
existing had made improvements to the wharves next to impossible, with one 
authority passing off responsibility to another. The new authority, borne of a time of 
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crisis was a stabilising body that responded to the time in which it was conceived, 
improving and maintaining its jetties and facilities. 
The plague crisis was obviously an unwelcome, testing time for Fremantle, 
and particularly for its Local Board of Health. Yet the changes it forced upon the 
town’s sanitation and living conditions were of lasting benefit to the Fremantle 
community. The conflict between Fremantle and Perth authorities had been severe, 
but despite all the heat of disagreement, progress had resulted nonetheless. Perhaps 
the final irony of the conflict—or indeed the sign that progress had triumphed at 
last—was that in 1909 the indefatigable Dr. James Hope of the Fremantle Local 





Chapter Two: Fremantle and the Great War, 1914 to 1919 
Introduction 
Of the men from Fremantle who fought in the Great War of 1914-18, Andrew 
Pittaway writes that ‘three thousand of the best and brightest Fremantle could offer 
left these shores to serve in the war and eight-hundred and forty-two sons of 
Fremantle lost their lives’.264 But what of the men who returned? How did over two 
thousand men re-settle into a civil life, despite being irrevocably altered by the war 
they had endured? How did their civil leaders respond to their ‘first physical and 
emotional experience of modern warfare’, as Crowley so succinctly described it?265 
This chapter will examine the challenges faced by the soldiers as they sought to 
return to their lives in the port town, looking at the role played by the Fremantle 
Municipal Council within the wider landscape of administrative and governmental 
organizations dealing with the task of repatriation (including the WA State 
government, the Repatriation department, the Department of Defence and the 
Federal government). 
When war was declared in Europe on 6 August 1914 there was an 
immediate, yet transient, reaction in Fremantle. Reserves were mobilized; there was 
a rush to enlist; a war relief fund for soldiers and their families was almost 
immediately established.266 According to J.K. Ewers, the first Municipal Council 
meeting after the declaration of war, held on 12 August 1914, included a ‘formal 
resolution of support sent to the King, carried with acclamation and the singing of 
the national anthem’. Writing in 1971, Ewers believed that ‘when the nation is 
engaged in a life and death struggle, local governing bodies must needs halt the 
natural, evolutionary processes of development’. As a result, he argued that 
following the declaration of war, in Fremantle ‘municipal activity was of secondary 
consideration’.267 Yet a close examination of the papers of the Fremantle Council 
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show that this was simply not the case. After the first exhilarating whirlwind of 
activity, Fremantle rapidly settled back in to the ordinary movement of life and 
indeed remained relatively undisturbed by the war. This ‘war-time naivety’, as 
Deborah Gare so aptly describes it, persisted until 1915 when the first troopship of 
wounded soldiers arrived in the harbour.268 Then, with unrelenting steadiness, 
Fremantle began to feel the real effect of war. Wounded soldiers filled the base 
hospital and rested on specially-built seats around the streets of the town; heartfelt 
bereavement letters were sent to lamenting families; meanwhile disease, 
unemployment and uncertainty cast their shadows over all. In the midst of the 
emotional hardship caused by the war, by 1916 the cost of living had become an 
additional burden. In March 1917 the West Australian reported that some 
commodities in Western Australia had risen in price as much as sixty or seventy per 
cent since the outbreak of war and that ‘exploiters were putting prices up to such an 
extent that it was impossible to get the necessaries of life’.269 To make matters 
worse, as Crowley notes, ‘Although the average cost of food and groceries increased 
by about 70 per cent there was not a corresponding increase in wages’.270 The high 
cost of living, a burden shared throughout Western Australia, presented its worst 
features in Fremantle when it contributed to a lumpers’ (wharf labourers) strike in 
1917.  
Worst of all were the maimed men, whose plight caused a broad rethinking 
of civilian life. From 1916 the repatriation of returning soldiers focused on their re-
education and training, with special emphasis on maimed men. The Fremantle 
Council were aware that just as important as their physical well-being, the returning 
soldiers needed a means to re-assimilate into society. The Council, along with the 
returned soldiers associations, believed that the provision of employment would 
enable this re-settlement most effectively. By 1919, with thousands of returning 
soldiers to consider, repatriation became focused on ensuring preference was given 
to returned soldiers in the workplace. This is consistent with the valorization of the 
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soldier-hero that weaves a discernible thread among the extant documents. On their 
departure and during their absence, Fremantle’s soldiers, consistent with all 
Australian soldiers, were seen as brave and dutiful patriots by those they left 
behind. Writing only a decade after the end of the Great War, J.K. Hitchcock echoes 
this theme, boasting that ‘Fremantle nobly played its part in the great drama’.271 Bill 
Gammage similarly writes that  
very few Australians learnt, then or later, what their soldiers did on that 
stage, and not many ever acquired more than a vague notion of their 
country’s part in the Great War. But what happened was irrelevant. The 
praise and the success were what mattered, for they made Australia a nation, 
and a partner to Empire. Australians could walk among men.272 
More than pride, it was a sense of owing a debt of gratitude that formed the vital 
sentiment driving administrative and civil action on a local, state and federal level 
during the war and the post-war period. The administrative architecture of civil 
society responded—in terms of language, policies and practical schemes of 
assistance—to the return of men they viewed as soldier-heroes. Contrary to Ewers’ 
belief, therefore, the need to respond to such challenges meant that municipal 
activity was very much at the centre of all of Fremantle’s responses to the war 
overseas.  
The first year: August 1914 to June 1915 
In the weeks before the declaration of war in 1914, day-to-day life in Fremantle 
rolled along at its usual pace. On 20 July when Mayor Frederick McLaren presided 
over an ordinary meeting of Council, it is hardly surprising that there was no 
mention of the gathering tensions in Europe or the impact they might have upon 
Britain’s empire. Instead, the minutes show that the councillors discussed ‘orange 
peel on footpaths’ and other routine issues, primary among which was the 
macadamising of the roads.273 Yet within twenty-four hours of the declaration of 
war, the Citizen Reserves were mobilized and the 86th Infantry was installed on 
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Fremantle Park.274 The installation of these soldiers, garrisoned on Fremantle Park, 
meant that around 250 men within the space of just a few weeks were on duty in 
and around Fremantle. This sudden profusion of military men caused the Sunday 
Times to comment that, ‘with so many soldiers in our midst Fremantle is getting the 
appearance of a real live garrison town’.275 Indeed, this military presence gave the 
Council some headaches. In January 1915, the Town Clerk complained to the Officer 
Commanding Military Forces of ‘the wanton destruction of portions of the fence 
surrounding Fremantle Park. During the recent encampment the fence was torn 
down by members of the force and used as firewood’.276 
On 23 September, 1914, the West Australian published, over two large pages, 
a feature titled ‘The Expeditionary Force Personnel of the Western Australian 
quota’. The newspaper provided a list of the men of ‘rank and file’ who comprised 
the first Western Australian quota of the expeditionary force. It included each man’s 
regimental number, his name, his age, whether married or single, his trade or 
calling, and lastly the town, country or State in which he was born. This list provided 
very real evidence of the exodus of the town’s men and boys into war.277 Despite the 
fears of many, the socialist parties in Australia (as was the case in Europe) had 
responded patriotically to the call of national duty when war broke out. This was 
equally the case in Fremantle—borne out by the speeches made at a large meeting 
of the Trades Hall Association on 18 August 1914.278 The Sunday Times wrote in 
September 1915 that: 
The exact number of men who have answered the Empire’s call from the 
Port is not known, but one gets an idea of the number that have gone 
from the fact that no fewer than 200 out of a membership of 700 have 
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gone out of the ranks of the Lumpers’ Union, and there are a lot of others 
ready to go.279  
 For the town, once the men had sailed, the influence of the war overseas 
became much less direct. Thoughts turned to supporting those at home who were 
suffering due to changes brought on by the conflict and the absence of family 
members. In August 1914, also with thoughts of domestic unemployment in mind, 
the Colonial Secretary had introduced a Special War Levy throughout Western 
Australia to which employees and independent citizens could contribute. A Patriotic 
Fund already existed, but that was limited to granting relief to ‘members of the 
Expeditionary Force, reservists and their dependents’. The State government also 
recognized that a second fund should be established ‘to provide for unemployment 
and distress arising out of the present war’.280 The same necessity was recognized in 
Fremantle by the leading funding bodies in the town. The Fremantle Municipal 
Council traditionally maintained a ‘Fremantle Municipal Unemployment and 
Distress Fund’ and the Fremantle Trades Hall had its own ‘Distress Fund’ for 
members. Put together these two organisations, the civic authority and the trades 
hall, effectively embodied the leadership of the town. In October 1914, 
comprehending that the War Levy would probably not be sufficient for alleviating 
‘prospective local distress’, the two bodies were unwilling to surrender the care of 
their own unemployed to a fund managed from the capital city. Significantly, it was 
the opinion of both the secretary of the Trades Hall, R. McCutcheon, and the 
secretary of the Fremantle Municipal Council, James Shepherd, that once the money 
collected in the Fremantle district reached Perth, there was ‘very little chance of any 
of it being returned to Fremantle’ to relieve local cases of distress.281 Thus the two 
bodies decided to amalgamate their respective relief funds. Shepherd wrote of the 
merger to the secretary of the Harbour Trust, during November 1914, urging the 
employees there to consider the claims of the newly-formed, combined local fund as 
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against the Perth central fund (the ‘War and Unemployment Distress Relief Fund’). 
He enclosed a copy of a letter received from the Perth fund’s secretary, Mr A.O. 
Neville, which, he noted dryly, ‘speaks for itself’.282 Neville’s letter did indeed convey 
a clear-enough message:  
The Central Committee is empowered to distribute relief throughout the 
State and naturally Fremantle district will receive consideration with 
others. This is, of course, on the assumption that your committee intend 
to work in conjunction with the Central Committee, and forward any 
collections made in your district to the Fund. Should your committee 
decide to distribute the funds collected without co-operating with the 
Central Committee it is probable that my committee would not continue 
to afford relief to cases within your district. I may add that I have just 
received a letter from Mr. E. Whittome, Wright St, South Fremantle 
asking for help from the fund. This will be afforded pending the decision 
of your committee referred to in the foregoing.283 
Despite the intimidating tactics of the Perth committee, McCutcheon and the 
Municipal Council were determined to have Fremantle distress relief entirely in the 
hands of their own residents.284 The Fremantle Harbour Trust agreed and decided 
to give their money to the local fund in order to better provide relief to local families 
in need. The proceedings of the staff meeting were reported in a memorandum in 
which the members ‘strongly objected to Perth having anything to say to Fremantle 
collection’.285 The Council and the Trades Hall had reason to be protective of their 
own unemployed. Already in January 1915, Frank Rowe, secretary of the lumpers’ 
union, declared that unemployment in Fremantle was on the increase. ‘It does not 
come very quickly to the surface’, he told a local newspaper, ‘people are prone to 
hide their poverty. But we know from the books. And we know this now, that unless 
some effective measures are taken very shortly, hundreds of families in Fremantle 
will be reduced to the verge of starvation, or the acceptance of charity’.286 
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Fortunately, the Fremantle Council was proactive enough that the prospect of 
unemployment was more a threat than a reality in the first year of the war. In June 
1914 the Council had secured a £40,000 loan from the Federal government for 
street improvements.287 The increase in expenditure, spent on sewerage and road-
works, provided a useful boost to employment during the first year of war. The 
extant Council documents do not indicate precisely who and how many were 
employed by the Council via this loan; however the mayor subsequently credited 
the loan money with providing important assistance during these months. He told a 
local paper that ‘this large amount of money in the town has helped to tide our 
work-people over a difficult time when without it the unemployed trouble would 
have been accentuated’.288  
Certainly, the number of families requiring assistance from the fund in the 
first year of war was not alarming (although it would increase in later years). In 
October 1914 the Fremantle fund provided assistance to just 8 families; by 
November that number had jumped to 18. By April 1915, sixty local families were 
receiving assistance from the combined fund, the highest figure for the year. The 
number of families needing assistance then dropped down to forty-nine in July 
1915.289 
Municipal life in Fremantle, although now undeniably shadowed by war, 
continued in its traditional routine. The function of the town, the condition of its 
streets and houses, the health of its inhabitants, the employment of its workers—all 
the essentials of the town’s life had to be met. This was borne out in the mayor’s 
annual report in November 1915, in which the war played no more than a passing 
role. Instead, the mayor announced that ‘during the past year the Council has 
revived a policy of tree planting and with the interest and assistance of residents the 
work will be comparatively easy and the streets made beautiful’. He also noted that, 
during the year, ‘South Beach – this favorite health resort has received much 
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attention and with fair treatment … there will be no more beautiful and popular 
promenade in the metropolitan area’. And in the matter of the budget, he was able to 
report that the finances of Fremantle were actually in much better shape than they 
had expected at the start of the war: ‘A year ago we had some misgivings as to how 
the war and general depression which threatened would affect our municipal 
finances, but whatever fears prevailed they were groundless.’290 The war seemed far 
away. At the end of his term as Mayor in 1918, William Wray would reflect back on 
these months and recall that in that first year of war, ‘its effect was little felt by us, 
living in comparative security and feeling quite sure that we had no cause for 
alarm’.291 
The war comes home: July to December 1915 
Deborah Gare and Madison Lloyd-Jones, in their study When War Came to 
Fremantle, write of the conceived notion among West Australians of the ‘imperial 
adventure’ being played out overseas, arguing that this ‘wartime naivety quickly 
died however, with the arrival in Fremantle of the first of Gallipoli’s wounded’.292 
This is precisely what Fremantle and its Municipal Council encountered. The first of 
the ships carrying wounded soldiers arrived less than a year after the first troopship 
departed for war. Almost five hundred men were returned to Australia on the 
hospital ship Kyarra in July 1915. Most of the wounded passengers remained on 
board, ultimately to be returned to their homes in the eastern states. But not all: 
‘Quietly the crowd observed thirty-one “sick, shell-shorn and bullet pierced” 
western Australians disembark to meet the governor’.293  
In this first wave of wounded soldiers, the mayor did everything in his power 
to ensure the returned servicemen were properly welcomed by his Council, 
organizing the councillors to be ‘present on the wharf on Saturday morning at 
8.30am to meet returning wounded soldiers’. The mayor also wrote to Military 
Headquarters in Perth, asking permission for the councillors to be present within 
                                                        
290 Daily News, 24 November 1915, p2.  
291 Address by Mayor William Wray, 17 November 1918, Fremantle Municipal Council Files, Cons 
1377, AN 217/3, Box 57, Item 4, SRO, Perth. 
292 Gare and Lloyd-Jones, When War Came to Fremantle, p37. 
293 Gare and Lloyd-Jones, When War Came to Fremantle, pp37-38. 
 96 
the private official enclosure on the wharf—though strangely this request was 
denied.294 Yet with each troopship, the mayor renewed his efforts to welcome the 
soldiers to Fremantle. Later in September, the Town Clerk, Henry Haynes, wrote to 
the secretary of the State Implements Works Brass Band, ‘to ask whether you will be 
good enough to arrange with as many members of your band as can be spared to 
assist in the welcome to the wounded soldiers coming by troopship expected to 
arrive on Thursday around 10am’. The Town Clerk was able to assure the secretary 
that the mayor himself had ‘been in communication with Mr. Shaw, the Acting 
Manager, and has obtained his consent for leave of absence for the members of the 
band’. The mayor also went to the trouble of writing to Major Ralph at the Military 
Headquarters asking him to pay the account from the State Implement Works Brass 
Band, ‘so that members of the band will not be inconvenienced by short wages on 
Friday’.295  
His attention to returning soldiers, especially the care of the sick and 
wounded, was a matter of pride for William Wray, who considered it his ‘duty as 
Mayor of Fremantle to devote a large amount of time to work in connection with the 
Red Cross movement’.296 In his annual report in November 1915 he mentioned the 
importance of having ‘the No. 8 Australian Base Hospital located in our town’ which, 
he believed, placed the work of landing and caring for the sick and wounded soldiers 
into his hands:  
And although it is to be fervently hoped that the end of this terrible 
world-struggle of war may be speedily in sight, there will be work to be 
done in the interests of our wounded heroes for a considerable time, 
even after the blessing of peace has been declared.297 
Whilst Wray actively promoted the welfare of the returned soldiers, it was also the 
sad duty of the Council to write to the local families whose sons, husbands and 
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fathers were not to come home. The first of these was written by the Town Clerk, 
Henry Haynes, to the parents of Lieutenant K.L Anderson, killed in action at the 
Dardanelles on May 9th, 1915: 
Mention was made at the last meeting of the council that your son, 
Lieutenant K.L. Anderson had been killed in action. I am writing by 
unanimous vote of Council to convey its deep and sincere sympathy. Your 
son was well-known to several members of the Council by whom he was 
highly esteemed, and in the midst of all the sorrow we cannot help feeling 
glad that our Australia has produced so many young men of such noble 
and heroic character that they are willing to sacrifice all for the sake of 
the Empire; at the same time we deeply sympathise with you in your 
personal loss.298 
Within a day after writing to the Anderson family, Henry Haynes had to send out 
two more letters of bereavement to Fremantle families for the death of their sons. 
Once again, reflecting the small size of Fremantle and the closeness of the 
community, in both these cases the son was well known to several members of the 
Council ‘by whom he was highly esteemed’. These letters were sent to the parents of 
Lance Corporal Elgar Hale and to the Curlewis family, who had lost their son, Lieut. 
G.L. Curlewis.299 Mr. Curlewis, although he must have been grieving deeply, took the 
time to reply in thanks, whilst letting the Council know the family had, within the 
space of just ten days, suffered another such tragedy: 
He was indeed a son any parents should be proud of, a perfect son, 
brother, husband and friend. Since receiving your kind letter you will no 
doubt have heard or read that our second dear son Corp. S.L. Curlewis 
was killed in action and our 3rd kind son Sec. Lieutenant G.C. Curlewis, 
wounded. They were all equally as dear to us and as good and noble as 
our eldest. We all feel the loss of our brave and good sons terribly, the 
mother almost heartbroken, but we cannot help feeling proud of their 
noble and heroic deaths.300 
Aside from the obvious misery embedded in such letters, the salient notion 
expressed is the valorization of the soldier-hero. The letter written by the father of 
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Lieut. Curlewis supports the notion that ‘anxiety, bereavement and questioning 
were personal experiences that both challenged and confirmed commitment’ to the 
war. Grieving family members, in the majority, relied on the notion of the heroism of 
their loved ones and the worthiness of the cause in which they died for their 
comfort and consolation.301 Whilst emotional reactions are by no means universal, 
the most common response thus evoked the dead as soldier-heroes—their 
meaningless deaths would have been intolerable.302 On this subject, Walter 
Murdoch published an intelligent and moving article in the Western Mail’s Christmas 
edition in 1915 which must have given some comfort to the families just as their 
absence and the reality of the war was beginning to be felt in earnest. ‘In the 
presence of real things, of suffering and loss and sorrow’, the only consolation, he 
suggested, was the justness of their cause. ‘From the essential greatness of the cause 
for which we are fighting, we must endeavor to draw sustainment for our efforts 
and consolations for our losses’.303 
The cost of living: Lumpers and strikers 
Amidst the strain and grief of loss, those who remained and continued the ordinary 
undertakings of life did so under conditions made worse by the general economy. 
The increased cost of living was a heavy burden. Jean Beadle, one of Western 
Australia’s most tireless advocates for women and families’ interests, reported that 
‘bed clothes had gone up and she knew of many poor families that could not buy 
blankets owing to their increased price’ and that many children had to go without 
boots.304 The secretary of the Education department likewise reported that ‘owing 
to the economic stress prevailing at the present time the numbers of pupils in the 8th 
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classes is diminishing from day to day’.305 E.L Driver, whose job it was to investigate 
the cost of living for a royal commission in 1917-1918 declared that families were 
living under lower standards than ‘convicts in the Fremantle gaol’.306  
In Fremantle, the strain came to a head in the strike of May 1917, when 
Fremantle lumpers refused to load flour for export to the Dutch East Indies on the 
grounds that they were not satisfied that the flour was going to its nominal 
destination. The lumpers ostensibly feared that the flour was being diverted into the 
hands of the enemy; the more meaningful basis of their complaint, however, was 
that this was apparently happening ‘whilst their boys in the trenches were going 
short of food and whilst in Australia, living was excessively costly’. The lumpers 
consequently went on strike to appeal to the State government ‘to take whatever 
action was necessary to regulate the price of foodstuffs and bring them within 
reasonable reach of the working man’.307  
Yet while the strike of 1917 was something that without doubt must have 
been discussed among the Councilors and the mayor, it is a subject that is almost 
entirely absent from the Council files. Apart from the mayor’s informal meeting with 
the union secretary, there was no business with the Council ensuing from the strike, 
and thus no place for it in the minutes or correspondence. In this way, the opinion, 
reactions and thoughts of the Council are completely silent on such a critical 
moment in Fremantle’s social and cultural life. 
In stark contrast, the local papers were full of invective against the lumpers, 
who were seen as anti-patriotic for going on strike in a time of war. One contributor 
wrote that ‘Patience ceases to be a virtue when these lawless lumpers go on strike 
against the Empire in its dire necessity. Inaction is criminal when this pampered and 
arrogant union holds up wheat ships which stand between the British people and 
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starvation – for the Mother Country is short of food’.308 In the same vein, the Daily 
News printed a letter to the editor signed ‘another soldier’s wife’: ‘the bare idea of 
ships being held up at a time like this ought to be enough to make the heads of 
affairs ashamed to walk the streets. Are our men at the front to be short of food 
because our politicians have not sufficient courage to deal with a few unreasoning 
men?309 The secretary of the lumpers’ union rebuffed these attacks on the workers, 
saying that although the loyalty of the lumpers had been called into question, ‘there 
was no section of the community more patriotic than the unions. The soldiers had 
come from the working classes and there were hundreds of lumpers and lumpers’ 
sons fighting in the trenches that very day’.310 The charge of disloyalty was one 
which struck hard at the lumpers who took pride in their commitment to the war 
effort and their patriotism. Frank Rowe, secretary of the Lumpers’ Union, reminded 
the public in early 1918 that ‘about 275 have enlisted, another 113 have been 
rejected as being unfit for service, 53 have returned, while 23 have made the 
supreme sacrifice, which is not a bad record for an organization composed of about 
800 men’.311 
The strike continued until August 1917. In that month, a delegation in 
defence of the lumpers, consisting of representatives from the other major 
Fremantle harbourside unions, visited the Premier.312 The delegation insisted that 
‘it was the duty of the government to so see that the working classes were not 
exploited in the way they were being at the present time’. The Premier was asked by 
the delegation to regulate prices and bring them ‘within reasonable distance of 
working men’. They also noted their desire ‘to avoid anything in this State in the 
nature of a general cessation of work’. A general strike, the subject of considerable 
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historical attention, was indeed happening in the eastern states at the same time.313 
The Fremantle lumpers were being drawn into the spiraling political vortex that 
labour unionism was undergoing during these war years and after. While the 
political nature of the strike is not within the scope of this thesis, the effect of the 
strike on the Fremantle lumpers and their families requires some consideration. 
This is not only because the resulting unemployment of so many local men directly 
affected the municipality—in the non-payment of rates and in the living conditions 
of its rate payers—but also because of how striking was the contrast between the 
perception of the situation experienced by the lumpers and that of the returned 
soldiers. 
Ultimately, the issues concerning the destination of the flour, and the cost of 
living, fell by the wayside in the court of public opinion. The most significant 
difficulty for the Fremantle lumpers was the public perception of their connection to 
the massive wharf strike simultaneously occurring in Victoria and NSW. Certainly 
they were judged to be doing so by the local newspapers. On 22 August, the West 
Australian suggested that the Fremantle lumpers were waiting advice or 
instructions, ‘from their comrades in the Eastern States’.314 Regardless of the 
disparagement of the press, or perhaps because of it, the lumpers themselves 
displayed their community-mindedness by allowing the Horse Drivers’ Union to 
load cargo which had been removed from the ships’ holds to the sheds before the 
strike commenced, on to their lorries for removal to stores. This work, usually 
performed by the lumpers, enabled the local merchants to get in stocks of much 
needed produce. However, whilst enabling the cargo to be made available for their 
local community, the lumpers continued to refuse to move into the shed sidings the 
train loads of wheat and flour which were on rails before the strike took place and 
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that which was still coming into the harbour on a daily basis. As a result the 
Fremantle Harbour Trust had to advertise for thirty men to carry out this very 
urgent work to keep the grain out of the weather. The obvious waste symbolized by 
this wheat pile, plus the considered link to the crippling Victorian strike in a time 
when public emotion was so attuned to the war, created an anxious environment for 
the Fremantle community and the state government.  
Premier Lefroy stated firmly that the interference with shipping ‘must 
directly and indirectly interfere with the performance of our Imperial duties and our 
obligations to our Australian soldiers’ adding that the strike ‘cannot be permitted to 
continue’.315 Proclaiming that ‘no other section of the community has contributed 
more patriotically to our fighting forces’, the Premier appealed to the workers to 
resume their duties, ‘the continued suspension of which must mean loss and 
discomfort to many and dishonor to all’.316 
State politicians meanwhile were quite prepared to take control of the 
situation by way of instituting a volunteer group that would take the lumpers’ place 
on the wharves and get the harbour operational again. The import of this for the 
lumpers and their families was that, in order to defeat the strike, the government 
appealed to country workers to come to Fremantle and act as strike-breakers. By 
early September the volunteers were established on the wharves doing the lumpers’ 
work; the Sunday Times reported that there were 3009 members of a newly formed 
National Waterside Workers’ Federation registered for work on the wharves.317 By 
the end of November, ‘after a hundred days’ idleness’ as the local press termed it, 
the Fremantle lumpers attempted to return to work.318The consequence of the 
strike now made its way into the municipal record, where letters to the Council 
reveal that despite the theoretical return to work, many lumpers remained 
unemployed as employers gave their favour to non-union labour on the wharves. 
The repercussions were that many of them were forced to leave Fremantle for 
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country areas to find work.319 Alex McCallum, popular and long-standing Labour 
member for South Fremantle as well as the general secretary of the A.L.F., railed 
against the discrimination of the State government, telling the West Australian: 
it is a glorious policy that brings the country workers to the Port to defeat 
a union, and then practically allows the wives and children of those 
unionists to starve by refusing them relief unless they go into the 
country. If the country districts are in need of workers let the 
Government send the strike-breakers back and allow the lumpers to 
resume their old places on the wharves.320 
This new unemployment situation directly affected the Council by way of unpaid 
rates. The mayor indicated in his annual report in November that 86 per cent of the 
319 ratepayers whose rates were unpaid on 31 October 1917 were waterside 
workers. Wray also acknowledged that the amount of rates outstanding was about 
double the amount of the previous year.  
One of the resulting consequences of the unemployment brought about 
by the recent and regrettable industrial upheaval, was that many of our 
citizens, in addition to their own personal privations, were unable to pay 
their contribution to the general revenue of the town, in addition to 
which, it may be mentioned, the many complaints of a considerable 
diminution in general business, so that the suffering and loss has been 
very widely distributed and borne by many who were in no way 
productive of the cause.321 
The harsh reality of the strike in Fremantle was unemployment and loss of income. 
Fremantle lumpers and their families paid the price of the highly unionized nature 
of their work. Many of their families did not recover economically even a year or 
more after the strike had ended.322 The distress fund formed two years earlier for 
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unemployment relief became a source of support as lumpers moved in and out of 
employment over the next two years. Yet the Fremantle Council, whilst doing what 
they could to relieve the burden of the lumpers, had its returning soldiers to 
consider and on these they felt compelled by a debt of gratitude to focus their 
assistance.  
Repatriation and employment: The need for training 
From 1916 the question of employment for returning servicemen became a high 
priority, in Fremantle and the rest of Australia. To promote this task, the federal 
government established War Councils in each state.323 The Western Australian 
government’s ‘War Council’ put in succinct form the key difficulty facing the former 
soldiers: ‘that many of the men in question are physically unfit for hard work’.324 In 
consequence, it was recognized also that there would be a significant amount of re-
training required in order for them to return to work. The War Council identified 
the importance of the issue in a memorandum to the Premier, noting that re-
education and training of maimed men ‘will probably turn out to be the most 
important function devolving upon the authorities’ in the repatriation of returning 
soldiers.325 It was a second challenge, and one which was steadily growing. In 
February 1917, the secretary of the War Council informed the Premier that since 
November 1916 the approximate number of men who had returned to Western 
Australia and been discharged was 1,450. Of that number, 847 had applied through 
the War Council for employment or training and, of those, 710 had been found 
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employment. Already the most significant difficulty was seen to be that ‘practically 
the whole of the men discharged are unfit for hard work, and a percentage of these, 
by reason of disablement through loss of limbs or otherwise, will be unable, even 
when their general health has returned, to follow their former employment’.326 This 
was particularly the case for those men whose previous jobs had involved hard 
physical labour.  
 The precise numbers of men involved is a subject of some uncertainty. 
Andrew Pittaway writes that 3000 men from Fremantle went to war, of whom 842 
were killed.327 Crowley, by contrast, puts the figures of all returning injured Western 
Australians by 1919 at ‘twelve thousand wounded’.328 Turner meanwhile writes 
that, ‘of the 270,000 men returning home to Western Australia, about a third of 
them [i.e. 90,000] were wounded or incapacitated’.329 Alternatively, in August 1919 
Dr. James Hope included the following returns in his correspondence with the 
Premier, James Mitchell: ‘The state of return of the men from abroad on 31 July 
1919 was  
Total enrolments 32,244 
Killed or died 6,007 
Returned 17,571 
Yet to return 8,671.330 
Whilst exact figures for Fremantle and indeed for the state as a whole are thus 
difficult to pin down, what is clear from all is that the numbers were substantial and 
the resultant challenges were large. These twin problems of employment and 
training would come to dominate the policies of local and State government policies 
for the employment for returning soldiers.  
For returned soldiers from rural districts, it was the intention of the State 
government to send them back, as far as possible, to the areas from which they had 
originally enlisted. A number of country towns had ‘the matter well in hand’ and 
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were looking after their own men to the fullest possible extent. However in many 
cases the government was having great difficulty in persuading applicants to return 
to the country, as most had ‘a strong preference for town employment which is 
gradually becoming scarcer’. It made perfect sense that the injured country soldiers 
were reluctant to return to rural districts, where the work was so physical in its 
nature. Possibly the soldiers felt their presence would place a burden on their 
community, and indeed be an embarrassment to themselves. The War Council thus 
recognized that probably the most suitable employment for these men would be 
‘light work’ in the towns, but as employment was already in a problematic state due 
to the war, it became increasingly difficult to find a place for returned men in the 
metropolitan area. Still, through 1916 at least, the need to place men was limited as 
less than half the number of discharged soldiers had actually applied for assistance, 
but it was already recognised that ‘the difficulties so far experienced will be very 
much accentuated when larger numbers of men return’.331  
Arrangements were made meanwhile to give each man free medical care, if 
suffering from wounds or illness contracted whilst on service or from the results of 
his service.332 The soldiers were allowed, within the repatriation scheme, to be 
given medical treatment at home but the Department of Repatriation expressed its 
preference for soldiers to go into a military hospital, which was ‘equipped with all 
the latest surgical and medical requirements’. The department also established 
convalescent homes for those ‘where there is little hope of the patient regaining 
ability to earn his living’.333 Whilst these men were at home or at the military 
hospitals recuperating, they were given a sustenance wage. This sustenance then 
continued during whatever training they were able to take up to move them 
towards employment.  
Efforts at training schemes began right away. The War Council advocated 
that one hundred limbless soldiers should be selected for training at the Lord 
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Roberts Memorial workshops in England, with the object of ultimately utilizing the 
services of these men as instructors on their return to Australia. The Council’s 
strongest argument was that ‘until effective action is taken to put the re-education 
and training of maimed men upon a scientific footing, the national obligation to our 
returned soldiers will fall lamentably short at its most vital point’.334 At this early 
stage of the scheme for re-training, the War Council had two officers solely 
employed on the work of looking after returned soldiers, both of whom were 
themselves returned A.I.F. non-commissioned officers. The role of these men was to 
get in touch with employers, visit hospitals and bring to the attention of the 
returned men the facilities offered for tuition and for finding employment. To fund 
its commitment to the training program, the War Council attempted to ‘influence the 
majority of the public appeals’ to be made in favour of the repatriation fund. Classes 
in ‘educational subjects and book-keeping’ were also established at the Fremantle 
technical school situated near the Base Hospital on South Terrace—though the 
Council lamented that ‘the men show some enthusiasm at first but soon drop off’—
while additional provision had been made with the Blind Asylum to train blinded 
soldiers, ‘but fortunately, we have not had to make use of this institution yet’.335  
In dealing with re-employment of returned soldiers, the Fremantle 
authorities had to consider both issues of responsibility and cost: who was to set the 
policy for employment of former soldiers, and who was to foot the bill? In early 
1919 a report of the Fremantle Works Committee revealed that ‘twenty returned 
soldiers have been employed for short periods in order that the work may be 
distributed as far as possible’.336 The expense had thus far been covered by 
municipal funds, but when the town council applied to the State for reimbursement, 
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the War Council replied that it was unable to do so as it had not yet received its own 
funds money from the Commonwealth. The Works Committee, which had employed 
the men, recommended nonetheless that ‘in the interests of the returned soldiers 
the employment be continued and the Council will settle with the department 
later’.337 In practice, therefore, the Fremantle Council was prepared to incur a debt 
in order to provide work for their local returning men.  
Many men of course did not wish to fall back on the government for direct 
assistance; instead, they sought to find their own opportunities for work and only 
asked for aid in smoothing out the necessary permissions. The first example of the 
intentions, and plight, of such soldiers was contained in a letter received by the 
Fremantle Council in December 1916, in which two returned soldiers described 
their situation: 
We the undersigned returned soldiers, late of the Tenth Light Horse 
A.I.F., respectfully apply for permission to have a stall for the purpose of 
selling fruit, outside the entrance of the Fremantle Railway station. We 
have received injuries on Active Service in Gallipoli which render us 
incapable of doing any hard work. Any guarantees or references you may 
require we will be pleased to supply.338 
A note beneath, signed by the Officer in Charge, Light Horse Reinforcement, assured 
the Council that both of the men ‘have excellent character and clean discharges, and 
are in every way respectable reputable citizens’.339 The quandry of these two 
soldiers, the earliest in the records of Council, would be repeated many times over 
during the coming months and years. The West Australian Worker in May 1918 
declared that ‘for some weeks we have been silent regarding the growing scandal of 
discharged soldiers’ unemployment. Here in western Australia, the State War 
Council is vainly trying to find 250 employers for 250 returned men’.340 The stop-
gap reliance on local welfare was all-too-clearly an insufficient program for handling 
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the expanding numbers of cases; a more formalized approach, from a level of 
authority higher than the municipality, was required.  
Early in 1918, the federal government stepped into the role of providing of 
work for returning soldiers, much to the relief of Fremantle and no doubt municipal 
authorities throughout the nation. In April 1918 a ‘Department of Repatriation’ was 
established by the Commonwealth government specifically for the purpose of 
repatriating Australian soldiers. Two of its central responsibilities were placing 
returning men into suitable employment and the payment of a sustenance 
allowance to the soldiers, their wives and families whilst they awaited 
employment.341 The scheme as set out by the Federal government covered every 
person who had enlisted in the imperial forces in any part of the empire, as long as 
the person was a resident of Australia and had seen service abroad. It also provided 
for nurses and those who had ‘taken positions of value outside of the combatant 
class’.342 The structure of the federal board consisted of a central executive in each 
state which was responsible to the Minister for Repatriation. The aim of the board 
was that each central executive would be aided by local councils, of which one 
would be created in every district. Perth and Fremantle were the first two such 
bodies in Western Australia to be appointed.  
The department very quickly attempted to devolve some of its administrative 
and funding responsibilities onto the smaller local governments it had nominated 
through its scheme. In its first month of existence the Commonwealth government 
arranged for repatriation projects to be both subsidised and administered in local 
areas. The comptroller of the Department of Repatriation announced that it was 
‘essential that the department should have the assistance and co-operation of all 
sections of the community in its endeavor to re-establish the returned men in civil 
life’. The federal government clearly intended to rely heavily on the local 
committees.343 The department acknowledged that the question of financing the 
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scheme was significant, and undertook that the Federal government would be the 
main financial support, but conceded the department ‘looked on all sections of the 
community to help and this would be one of the duties of the local committees’.344 In 
practice, the repatriation committees, in a structure that would be echoed later 
during the Depression years, were almost immediately required to oversee both the 
funding and the administration of local employment schemes and the provision of 
any charitable assistance that was required for the returning soldiers. It took almost 
a year for a comprehensive scheme for the employment of all returned soldiers to be 
introduced and, as discussed further below, in the end it was the State government 
that initiated a formal repatriation policy for employment.  
By mid-1918, training for returned soldiers was administered by the newly-
formed Department of Repatriation, working with the assistance of the Department 
of Education. Under a formalised ‘repatriation scheme’ the policy was ‘to re-educate 
those soldiers whose injuries are such as to prevent them from following their usual 
occupations’.345 At this time a vocational training committee was formed in order to 
superintend arrangements for training returned soldiers. The Chairman was the 
Director of Technical Education and the classes were under the general 
superintendence and control of the Education department. All returned soldiers 
who were under 20 years of age at the time of enrolment were eligible. Classes were 
started at the technical school in Perth as well as in Fremantle; the men were 
drafted into the classes after consideration of their disabilities and also of their 
previous careers and their personal wishes. Certain classes (e.g. boot-repairing) 
were reserved for those who were seriously disabled and were incapacitated for 
more strenuous forms of work.346 In March 1919, following some enquiries by 
returned soldiers who wished to further their prospects, the possibility of returned 
men already in employment being given the opportunity to attend evening classes 
was considered. The secretary of the Department of Repatriation, keeping in mind 
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the commitment of the government to do all in its power to further the interests of 
soldiers, wrote to the Education department that his own department was certainly 
agreeable to the concept. ‘A ruling from headquarters on this subject’, he wrote, is 
‘that where an applicant desires to increase his efficiency in his present calling or to 
qualify for another, a State Board may pay such fee and expenses as will enable him 
to complete the necessary course of training’. The two subjects most generally 
requested were, interestingly, clerical training to enable students to pass the 
Commonwealth and State Public Service Examinations and ‘accountancy in all its 
stages’. If these courses could be arranged, he indicated, there were already sixty 
returned soldiers, thirty for each, eager to take them up.347 By mid-1919, over 270 
returned soldiers were studying bookkeeping and accountancy while nearly ninety 
more were preparing for clerical work or teaching. An additional thirty were taking 
science and professional courses. Further, the trades classes contained nearly 600 
men, ‘the largest class being that for motor mechanics’. Other classes were training 
men as saddlers, harness makers, woodworking machinists, cabinet makers, French 
polishers, upholsterers, house painters, carpenters, coopers, blacksmiths, 
bricklayers, plasterers, plumbers, fitters and turners, electricians, body builders, 
trimmers and painters, watch repairers and wool classers.348 
The Minister for Education, Hal Colebatch, noted in his annual report that the 
majority of the students entered into their class work ‘in a most exemplary spirit. 
They have shown themselves eager to make full use of the opportunities afforded 
and generally speaking they have made good progress’.349 Yet despite the eagerness 
of the returning soldiers for this training, the system itself was fraught with 
particular difficulties. The director of the Education department wrote in March 
1919 that the soldier students were ‘extremely sensitive’ and could become 
disheartened and drop out. That month he had admitted two students who could 
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neither read nor write. Indeed, in almost all cases, the students had poor literacy: ‘it 
is the exception to find one who has read fairly’.350 These returned soldiers, with 
their associated physical, mental and emotional difficulties, often needed extensive 
sick leave from their studies. Some of them were clearly distinctly unqualified for 
the studies they wished to undertake, as the director indicated in October 1919: ‘of 
the eleven candidates for the October examination nearly all left school at about the 
age of 14 and have done very little since in the way of study’. There were many 
successes, however; as the director himself noted, ‘many of them then go on to the 
teacher’s college to work as school teachers’.351 An article in the West Australian at 
this time lauded the ‘employment of teachers who have lost an arm or a leg in war 
service’, declaring that ‘the day is past when the teacher carried out his duties 
comfortably ensconced in his chair’.352 The training program in Fremantle was 
enthusiastically supported by the local community. At the end of 1919 there were 
549 returned soldiers in attendance at the Fremantle technical school as well as a 
number of returned soldiers in evening classes in clerical subjects and wool-classing 
in Fremantle.353  
Yet the difficulty of the training program was the lack of positions available 
in which to place the trained men. It was considered that students after a nine- or 
twelve-months’ course of training ‘during which they would have reached a forty 
per cent efficiency’, would be placed out as trainees with private firms, which would 
both enable further training and ease the financial burden on the State. This would 
also open up positions for the newly returned soldiers. In the eastern states ‘where 
the many secondary industries are able to absorb the men’, this system worked well, 
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but in Western Australia where the factories and workshops were comparatively 
few, ‘the students cannot be drafted into private establishments as rapidly as is the 
case in the eastern states’.354 Examining this period, Crowley writes that ‘the four 
years of war did not increase the number of factories, as the goods most in demand 
were wheat, wool and fruit’. The consequence, he notes, was that ‘there was a 
decline in industrial employment from 1914 until 1918’.355 For the re-trained 
soldiers, this decline had a material disadvantage. It was found necessary to retain 
some of the returned soldiers in the classes for longer periods and bring them up to 
higher rates of efficiency before they could be placed into positions in industry. The 
minister reported that ‘the expectation that on the completion of the war and the 
return of the soldiers there would be a revival in trade leading to an increased 
attendance of trade students was not realized’. To improve the effectiveness of the 
training program, the department decided that ‘day instruction in trade subjects is 
required at Fremantle to improve the status of those engaged in industry and it is 
proposed to make an endeavor to induce employers to allow their employees to 
attend classes on one or two afternoons each week’.356 
Yet despite the good intentions of both State and Federal government, the 
legacy of injured servicemen on the community was widespread and lasting. Despite 
the edict that ‘if a man suffers disadvantage due to his war work, it is right that the 
public should recognize that to the extent of finding him suitable work, wherever 
possible’, training schemes and good intentions could not of themselves create 
enough employment for the number of injured returned men.357 Gare and Lloyd-
Jones write that, Australia-wide, in 1920 some 90,000 Great War veterans received 
a commonwealth disability pension.358 In Fremantle in 1921 the Council gave work 
to a number of ‘wingies and stumpies’ as gate keepers at the local football 
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matches.359 A deputation which visited the Premier on 17 August 1922 was still 
urging for preference in the workplace for injured returned soldiers, stating ‘there 
were 70 wingies and stumpies’, the most injured of all the injured soldiers, who 
were out of work in the Perth area.360 In 1926, eight years after the end of the war, 
the Western Australian ‘returned maimed & limbless men’s association’ still had a 
membership of 480, which included 270 amputees.361  
Repatriation and employment: State and local policy 
In September 1919 the Premier of Western Australia sent a circular to all 
government departments. The circular defined the State government’s new policy 
for the employment of returned soldiers. This was, in its essence, that ‘if a man 
suffers disadvantage due to his war work, it is right that the public should recognize 
that to the extent of finding him suitable work, wherever possible’. The corollary of 
this was a dedicated policy of providing government work to returned soldiers, but 
in particular, to injured returned soldiers: ‘no matter how efficient a man with one 
leg may be, he may not get outside employment as readily as a sound man’.362  
The circular sent by the Premier had three key aspects. First, the State 
Cabinet had decided that in making appointments to the public service, ‘active 
military service must be the first consideration’, though efficiency was not to be 
disregarded in making a selection from among the soldiers themselves. If employers 
were in doubt, they were encouraged to give the soldier a trial. Returned soldiers 
asked simply for opportunity; after that, they ‘must deserve continuous employment 
by honest effort’. Yet the policy also recognized that it would be impossible in some 
instances to find soldiers to fill professional positions or those needing special 
training and experience. The Premier’s answer to this was that ‘the soldier is also a 
citizen and as such, is as much concerned as anyone else in the good Government of 
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the State’. In other words, the soldier’s own sense of civic duty would be the 
determining factor when considering whether he was capable of taking on a 
particular position.363  
The second aspect to the circular was the Premier’s edict that, knowing there 
were thousands of soldiers still to be repatriated, ‘appointments must be temporary. 
No permanent appointments should be made until all the soldiers return’. The 
policy dictated that returned soldiers who were employed in the Government 
service prior to the war must on their return be provided with positions at least 
equal to those they filled before enlistment. However, even these soldiers could not 
be employed on a permanent basis until all soldiers returned.364 On the return of 
each soldier formerly employed in the public service, a letter was sent from the 
Department of Repatriation to the relevant government office requesting that they 
inform the department  
at the earliest possible moment, whether you are prepared to reinstate him 
in the position he vacated on his enlistment. Should it happen that his 
physical condition on discharge prevents him from resuming his previous 
employment, would you be good enough to say whether you can employ him 
in any other capacity, and if so, what terms? It is unnecessary, I feel sure, to 
stress the obligation which rests upon all employers to co-operate with the 
Government in re-establishing in civil life, on the best terms possible, the 
men who have risked so much, at the call of their country.365 
The third aspect of the Premier’s policy could potentially have created particular 
hardship among the civilian population. It stated that those men hired into the 
public service in the time since the outbreak of war in August 1914 were to be ‘put 
off’ (that is, let go) when necessary to make room for returned soldiers who had 
enlisted from the public service.366 The Premier attempted to reduce the 
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‘inconvenience’ of those thereby lost their job by offering transfers ‘should positions 
be available in any department which cannot be filled by returned soldiers’.367 
Considering the considerable upheaval and social and financial difficulty this could 
potentially have given a number of civilian employees, there are no records of 
complaints against this policy in the files of the Fremantle Municipal Council or 
appearing in the local newspapers at the time. No record of employees being put off 
is extant, whilst the record for those Council employees returning from the war 
confirms that they were returned indeed to their former positions.368  
Whilst the Commonwealth and state governments were evolving their 
policies for repatriation from 1918 to 1919, the Fremantle Council attempted to 
create local employment where it could. It approached the Commonwealth 
Government in March 1919 for a loan of £10,000, ‘to be expended in road and street 
improvement and in the further development of South Beach’.369 The Prime 
Minister’s office queried the application with the State Premier’s office, writing that 
‘an intimation was recently conveyed to the various state governments that the 
commonwealth government was prepared to make advances by way of a loan to 
enable local government bodies to carry out necessary public works upon which 
returned soldiers would be employed’.370 The Fremantle council took up the federal 
government’s ‘intimation’ with alacrity and made the application on the 
understanding ‘that the only persons employed in the execution of the works be 
returned soldiers who, on the date of their enlistment, were bona fide residents 
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within the Municipality of Fremantle’.371 When the prospect of this loan was 
announced in the local papers, it provoked mixed feelings and a revealing response. 
A letter from one of Fremantle’s residents showed that the returned soldiers were 
not all perceived as standing on an equal footing in terms of need. It was wrong, the 
author insisted, not to give preference to returned soldiers who were married men 
with families to support:  
I notice that it is the intention of the Fremantle Council to raise a loan of 
£10,000, understanding that the money so raised is to be expended for 
the employment of returned soldiers exclusively. If that means married 
soldiers there would be no objection to giving them preference over 
others, but when it comes to giving preference to single men unless they 
have dependents on them it would be most unfair. [Recently] at Elder 
Smith & Co, married men who had large families depending on them 
were put off work and single soldiers put in their places. I am sure our 
brave returned boys have no wish to make women and children suffer 
hunger and want…372  
The Town Clerk responded to the author, Mr. Mitchell, writing that ‘I quite agree 
with you that preference should be given to married men who have families 
depending upon them, also to single men who have Mothers or young relatives who 
are depending on them, and you may be quite sure that every care will be taken to 
see that no injustice is done.’373  
By May 1919, having heard nothing regarding the loan application, the issue 
of employment for returned soldiers had become a still greater concern for the 
Fremantle Council. This was reflected in a letter from the Town Clerk to the 
Commonwealth government’s Minister for Repatriation asking for an early decision 
in the matter, ‘because unemployment in this part is becoming somewhat acute and 
there is a very great feeling of unrest developing’.374 In the meantime, while waiting 
on the loan, funding was found elsewhere for minor, stop-gap jobs. For example, in 
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March the Council made an application to the Repatriation department (and through 
it, the Department of Works and Trading Concerns) for £220 for work for the 
unemployed, to be ‘commenced and finished within six months from the 31st 
March’.375 This amount was granted, following which the Council wrote to the 
Railway department that the Council proposed ‘to spend the money, as far as it will 
go, in clearing away the heap of sand on the South Fremantle Recreation Reserve’. 
Highlighting the motivation for undertaking the work, the Town Clerk pointed out 
that the removal of the sand ‘is first of all to provide a means of employment for 
Returned Soldiers’ and only secondly was ‘to remove the nuisance of drift’.376 The 
Works Department, while willing to provide the loan, also kept a tight rein on the 
money. The department’s undersecretary wrote to the Council at the cessation of 
the work that of the £220 required by the Council, £200 was to pay wages to 
returned soldiers and £20 was for the hire of rails and trucks. He pointed out that 
‘any money granted by the Commonwealth Government must be spent solely in 
employment of and the payment of wages of returned soldiers’. Consequently he 
recommended that the Repatriation Board grant the sum of £200 only; the 
municipality was left to find the remaining £20 from its own coffers.377 
In June the Council prepared a schedule of public works on which returned 
soldiers could be employed in anticipation of the federal loan.378 The Premier 
meanwhile supported the Fremantle authorities by writing to the Prime Minister on 
the subject of the larger loan for £10,000. He confirmed the money would be spent 
‘to a proportion of about 60% on wages, the Council having their own materials, and 
it is proposed to restrict employment practically to returned soldiers only’. Due to 
the nature of the work, the Premier asked the Prime Minister to consider the Council 
request that a low rate of interest be fixed: ‘owing to the wounds and other 
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disabilities of the soldiers the Council anticipate that the work would cost more than 
it otherwise would as men are not very strong yet’.379 As their approach supported 
the policy set out by both the federal and state governments the previous year in 
their repatriation schemes, the town council clearly felt justified asking for the loan 
to be made on favourable terms. Finally, after seven months of waiting, the loan was 
granted in July 1919. Yet it was nonetheless offered on terms the Fremantle Council 
could not accept, with an interest rate set at 5¼ per cent over thirty years. In 
frustration, the Town Clerk, Henry Haynes, wrote to Senator Reginald Burchell, 
Fremantle’s Member of Parliament, that ‘in view of the high rate of interest and 
taking into consideration the fact that the primary object of the loan was to provide 
work for returned soldiers the Council regrets that it is unable to proceed further 
with the matter’. Haynes indignantly pointed out that the ‘Melville Road Board 
obtained a loan quite recently through the Commonwealth Bank on considerably 
better terms’.380 Showing the extent of his frustration, Haynes also wrote to the 
Premier, reiterating the Council’s position that the interest rate was ‘much in excess 
of what they were led to believe it would be’. Having been Town Clerk for the past 
eight years, Haynes obviously felt comfortable expressing his own opinion to such a 
senior figure: 
Personally I think it is a great pity, seeing the large number of 
unemployed there are about the Fremantle district who are willing and 
anxious to work and the fact that the proposal of the Council would 
greatly assist the repatriation movement and the money advanced would 
ultimately be returned to the Federal Government, that the Council’s 
offer has not been availed of.381  
 There was another issue raised in Haynes letter to the Premier, invoking a 
sentiment that would reappear over a decade later when the Depression came to 
Fremantle. Haynes explained that it had come to the knowledge of the Fremantle 
Council ‘that a considerable number of returned soldiers in Fremantle had a decided 
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objection to taking sustenance money which appeared to be purely charitable and 
would much prefer to earn their living by working’.382 It was crucial, therefore, that 
the Council provide genuine work that would relieve the soldiers from any sense of 
having to accept the burden of charity. Yet their capacity to offer the traditional type 
of long-term employment to which many returning soldiers had been accustomed 
before the war, was now much more limited.383 With restricted funds in an economy 
naturally subdued by war, and in a port reliant on shipping which had been 
substantially decreased due to the war, the Council’s limitations for providing 
employment were considerable. 
With minimal funds to create its own employment schemes for returned 
soldiers, the Council was aware that it must seek ways for local men to be self-
sustaining. One avenue was through offering these men the opportunity to run 
street-barrows. Barrows and stalls operated in Fremantle, as they did throughout 
Australia, as a means, more often than not, for new immigrants to earn a living, 
predominantly selling fruit, vegetables or fish. With the return of injured soldiers, 
the role of these carts and stalls expanded in the port town. In reply to an enquiry 
from the secretary of the State War Council in Perth as to what his town council was 
doing for the returned servicemen, Haynes noted in this regard that ‘preference is 
always given to returned soldiers in the matter of fruit stall licenses’.384 With the 
new licenses being granted to soldiers, the stalls and barrows offered coffee, books 
and nuts as well as the traditional fare. For example, one returned soldier, A.H. 
Keaton, was given a license to sell his ‘patent razor sharpener, after being injured in 
AIF’ in 1918. Similarly, Mrs. E. Cookson, whose husband was ‘doing his little bit in 
the old country’ and who was ‘trying to keep things going in his absence’, was 
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granted a license to run a railway bookstall, near the overhead bridge and wharf in 
May 1918.385 Another ‘discharged soldier having enlisted from Fremantle and 
served 2 years, 27 days active service’, applied to have the stand at the corner of 
Market and Leake streets as a ‘pie and coffee’ stall. Yet another returned soldier 
wrote to the Council asking to run a portable coffee stall outside the Railway Station:  
I am a returned Soldier carrying a good discharge and have a wife and family 
to support, and I am seeking employment. I can supply you with references 
as to my integrity and character and if you, Gentlemen, will favourably 
consider this application, you will be doing good to one who has served his 
Country and is anxious to earn an honest livelihood.386  
In the few years immediately following the war the streets of the West End became 
populated with these barrows. The Council also offered the returned soldiers a 
reduced rate on their fees. Most barrow licenses were 25 shillings per month, whilst 
the returned soldiers, for the most part, had only to pay 10 shillings. In an effort to 
reduce competition between the barrow-men and the existing shopkeepers, a clear 
source of potential tension in town, the Council carefully mapped out the areas in 
which the barrows could operate. In 1919 it ‘granted the right to vend fruit from 
“move-on” barrows in the streets lying to the south of Essex street and Henderson 
street or north of Queen street and point street’. However the Council ‘could not 
allow them in the principal business streets’.387 
Other approaches were also sought to make local returned servicemen self-
sustaining: one such initiative in late 1916 was a scheme to settle soldiers on rural 
land where they could restart their lives. It seemed to be an idea whose time had 
come. Geoff Bolton writes that ‘from the parliamentary back benches Mitchell 
scolded the Lefroy government for failing to press forward with plans for soldier 
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settlement’.388 In December, meanwhile, the Secretary of the Western Australia AIF 
RSA wrote to Mayor Wray, demanding progress on local repatriation schemes, and 
complaining that while much had been said, little had been done: ‘the men are 
beginning to think that the promises that were made in the early stages of the war, 
were of the pie-crust order’.389 The basis of the plan was for the State government to 
supply the land and the Federal government to supply the funds, through loans to 
the State from the agricultural bank. A board appointed by the State government 
would select suitable applicants from among the returned soldiers, while interest on 
the soldiers’ loans would be kept to a minimum. The returned soldiers were also to 
be allowed to make private purchase of properties and, if they required assistance 
to work the property, it could be valued and approved by government-appointed 
valuers.390  
A few weeks later, in January 1917, the Western Mail reported that a 
delegation including the mayor and Fremantle councilors, Governor Sir Harry 
Barron and M.J. Mitchell, the Minister for Industries, had paid an inspection visit to a 
parcel of some 250 acres of endowment land belonging to the town of Fremantle ‘in 
the vicinity of Bibra Lake’. It reported that ‘it is the intention of the Council should 
the repatriation committee deem the land suitable, to cut it up into 10 acre lots for 
the purpose of poultry farming’. Pig farming as well as the cultivation of orchard and 
vineyards, were also considered suitable for the designated land.391 In May 1917, 
the Council made the formal offer of the land near Bibra Lake to the State’s War 
Council ‘for the purpose of settlement of returned soldiers’. It noted that the land ‘is 
capable of growing grapes, raisins, figs, apricots, peaches, nectarines, almonds, 
mulberries, loquarts, rhubarb, cape gooseberries, onions and peas successfully’.392 
Whilst urging the acceptance of this land, the Council provided a list of conditions 
                                                        
388 Bolton, Land of Vision and Mirage, p105. 
389 Fremantle Municipal Council Files, ACC 1377, AN 217/3, Box 54, Item 7, Mayors Correspondence. 
SRO, Perth 
390 Premiers Department files, AN 2/1, Acc 1496, Item 106, 1916, Repatriation Fund, formation of. 
SRO, Perth 
391 Western Mail, 19 January 1917, p2. 
392 Fremantle Municipal Council Correspondence Files, 1917-1919, Acc: 1377, AN 217/2, Box 58, 
Item 1. SRO, Perth 
 123 
regarding the leases on it. The Council intended that the land could be leased only to 
bona fide returned soldiers having a good character discharge, could not be sold or 
passed on to anyone other than another returned soldier, and that the land had to 
be put into use or the lease would lapse. 
The extreme value of the endowment lands to the Citizens of Fremantle 
in years to come is also recognised, and it is desired to protect these 
interests against land speculation, while at the same time giving the 
greatest possible facility to the utilisation of the land by returned 
soldiers.393 
However the Land Settlement Committee of the War Council, with the Under-
Secretary for Lands, turned down the offer. They were influenced by a report from 
the District Surveyor that ‘water could not probably be secured at a less depth than 
100 to 130 feet, and that the land could not otherwise be profitably utilized except 
by the drainage of Bibra Lake’.394 The Council was disheartened by the rejection of 
what was considered a positive scheme for the repatriation of its local men. The 
Town Clerk, on the Council’s behalf, then wrote to the Minister for Lands suggesting 
he approach the Agricultural Bank, on behalf of whom the Minister responded:  
I would not like myself to start growing grapes, raisins, figs, apricots etc 
on leasehold land, and having that view I cannot advise another man to 
do so. A further difficulty is that while the Agricultural Bank may make 
advances on Crown Leases, it cannot do so on leases from private 
individuals or Companies. The Fremantle Council, of course, may start a 
scheme of its own, but they cannot expect an advance from the 
Agricultural Bank.395 
The land offer was never taken up by any of the repatriation or returned soldiers’ 
groups. The matter was finally seen to be put to rest in November 1918, as seen in 
an article published by the West Australian: 
it has been fully proved that the great majority of returned men are 
physically unfitted to pioneer virgin country, and the present 
Government has, perforce, been compelled to review the policy laid down 
by its predecessors. A big proportion of the applicants were more or less 
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incapacitated from doing hard work and in almost all cases the demand 
has been for improved farms. Unimproved blocks of must be of a certain 
standard and must be within nine miles of a railway station.396 
In June 1919, the Premier was informed that the Commonwealth Government had 
decided not to support the State government in a state-federal cooperation 
arrangement for soldier’s housing.397 While the great efforts made ultimately came 
to nothing, the initiative was an excellent example of the efforts being made to 
accommodate and support the returning servicemen in practical and sustainable 
ways. 
Despite the efforts of the town Council, the number of soldiers who were in 
1919 unable to resume their former positions or to obtain new ones was significant. 
This is clear from the volume of newspaper articles and advertisements aimed at 
locating employment for returned men. In June 1919, the deputy comptroller of 
repatriation placed an advertisement in the West Australian showing a schedule of 
the professions and trades of returned soldiers who were seeking employment 
through the Repatriation department. The news was not good: ‘At present it will be 
noted that 702 men comprising amongst them branches of almost every trade are 
available and urgently awaiting positions’.398 Scott writes that across Australia by 
the end of 1919, ‘74,343 soldiers applied for training and efficiency courses and 
27,696 completed their training’ but that the greatest problem was to find a 
sufficient number of ‘light labour positions to serve as an introduction to more 
strenuous labour later on’.399 This monumental task reflected the key goal of the 
administration at this time, on a national, state and local level, which was ‘to 
reinstate in civil life all those who are capable of such reinstatement’.400  
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The threat of moral panic: Venereal disease and influenza, 1918-1919 
In the midst of this struggle to find employment for former soldiers came another 
set of concerns for their health and recovery: the insidious shadow of disease. The 
men returning from abroad brought with them venereal disease, mostly in the forms 
of gonorrhea and syphilis. In early 1918 the Commissioner of Public Health, Dr. 
Everitt Atkinson, published his concerns about the threat posed by venereal disease. 
He insisted that ‘there is no doubt whatever that the prevalence of venereal disease 
is such as to cause grave alarm and to constitute a serious menace to the life of the 
state’.401 Atkinson was using the first available war-time statistical returns from 
December 1916 to support his views. These showed that for the period 9 June to 31 
December 1916, no fewer than 1,183 cases of venereal disease had been notified by 
medical practitioners in Western Australia.402 By 1918 without having the exact 
figures available, it was simply a matter of venereal disease existing, even in its 
limited form, that provoked concern. Specimen booklets were issued by the 
Department of Public Health on the subject of Venereal Diseases. Commissioner 
Atkinson took it upon himself to write to the Town Clerk at Fremantle, asking him to 
‘distribute these as widely as possible. Not only should these booklets be kept on the 
public counter at the Town Hall, but they should be made available at any other 
public place or at frequented private premises’. (By ‘frequented private premises’, 
the commissioner was clearly referring to the hotels, brothels and working men’s 
clubs which were such a large feature of life in the port town.) The Commissioner 
continued; ‘I am sending a further circular to all local authorities, but thought it well 
to address this letter to your Council because of the importance of your district’.403 
The importance of Fremantle in the fight against venereal disease was not 
only its aforementioned character, but (just as had been the case with the arrival 
into Western Australia of the bubonic plague) that it was also the first site of 
                                                        
401 Commissioner for Public Health report, quoted in Daily News, 8 February 1918, p1. 
402 Commissioner for Public Health report, quoted in Daily News, 8 February 1918, p1.  
403 Commissioner of Public Health to Town Clerk, 14 May 1918, Fremantle Muncipal Council 
Correspondence Files, 1917-1919, Acc: 1377, AN 217/2 Box 58 Item 6. If they wished to be more 
informed on the subject, Fremantle residents could attend a ‘Syllabus of Special Lectures’ from the 
‘W.A. Council for Combating Venereal Disease’ at the Fremantle Town Hall. In September 1919, there 
were ‘five lectures to be given on successive Mondays, the first two of which are illustrated’! 
 126 
disembarkation for the returning soldiers as well as housing a military base camp 
and auxiliary hospital. The returning soldiers, more than ever sailors had been in 
the past, were now seen as the biggest threat in the introduction of venereal disease. 
This was enough of a threat to spread alarm throughout the populace and the 
legislature, although the presence of venereal disease was certainly not new in the 
state. Garrick and Jeffery write that ‘there was probably no time when the colony 
had not had sufferers of gonorrhea and syphillis’.404 In March 1918 the Legislative 
Council drew up a bill to amend the existing Health Act of 1915. The amendment 
addressed the concern that bearers of venereal disease could avoid coming forward 
and would need to be compelled to do so. The existing bill, passed in 1915, provided 
that the public health commission might compel a person suspected of being 
infected with venereal disease to undergo medical examination only on a sworn 
statement by the informant. Dr. Atkinson, the commissioner of the Public Health 
department, and the authors of the amendment bill, wanted to remove this 
restriction. The concerns of Dr. Atkinson were based on his assessment of the 1916 
figures. As he explained, ‘of the 747 cases of gonorrhoea recorded, 685 occurred in 
males and 62 in females, a proportion of almost 11 to 1. It is very difficult to believe 
that this proportion represents the true state of affairs, so that one is forced to the 
further conclusion that there are probably a very large number of females not under 
treatment by medical practitioners’.405 The amendment, prompted by Atkinson’s 
advice, intended to give the Public Health department the power to proceed on the 
unsigned statement of an informant who could remain anonymous. This step, 
argued the bill’s opponents, ‘opens the door to the gravest of grave abuses’.406 On its 
first reading in the Assembly on 13 March, according to the press, ‘the formal 
motion that the Bill should be read a first time was received with cries of “NO” from 
the opposition benches. When the second reading was made an order of the day for 
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the next sitting, the leader of the opposition interjected: “That is as far as you will 
get with it”.’407  
In Fremantle, the opposition to the Health Act Amending Bill was just as 
strong. In April a public meeting opposing the amendment was ‘largely attended’ 
but more significantly was presided over by the mayor, ‘who expressed himself as 
being heartily in accord with the promoters of the meeting’. At the meeting one of 
the Fremantle Labour representatives on the Legislative Council, W.C. Angwin, 
informed the group that ‘from June 1916 no fewer than 2400 cases had been 
reported by notification’. His argument was that the figures showed clearly that the 
1915 Act was working and that sufficient provision was made in the existing 
legislation to ensure people suffering from venereal disease were receiving medical 
treatment. Angwin denounced the implications of acting on secret testimony, saying 
that ‘any person maliciously inclined’ could lay the charge against an innocent 
person. The Rev. Corly Butler of the Methodist church in Fremantle moved that the 
meeting register ‘its indignant protest’ against the government proposals to allow 
the Commissioner of Public Health to take action on ‘secret evidence’. It was indeed 
the secrecy and protection of the informant that most bothered those in opposition 
to the act. Bessie Rischbieth, also at the meeting understood the significance of this 
type of clandestine testimony on the women it would target. If it became law, 
Rischbieth told the meeting, ‘the large circle of women who were opposing it would 
hold every member of the government responsible for whatever happened under 
it’.408 This was no idle fear. Phyl Garrick and Chris Jeffery write on the experience of 
women who were compelled to undergo treatment: ‘Women endured washouts and 
swabbings and the painting and cauterizing of their cervix’.409 The amendment did 
not pass, although the alarm surrounding the threat of venereal disease continued. 
Ultimately, and with the historian’s gift of informed hindsight, it is clear that 
the presence of venereal disease in the state did not justify the alarm which 
surrounded it. The actual statistics, unavailable to Dr. Atkinson at the time, were a 
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lot less frightening than claimed. The total number of men returned to Australia by 
31 July 1918 was 72,264, out of which the total number of men returned owing to 
venereal disease was 1,433. In Western Australia the total number of returned 
soldiers who were examined by their district medical officer was 5850, and of that 
number only 53 had gonorrhea and 38 syphilis. Closer to home, the figures for 
Fremantle showed that, of the 250 returned soldiers who were examined, only 15 
had gonorrhea and 10 had syphilis. Still, of all the districts which submitted returns 
to the Commonwealth Medical Officer, Fremantle had the highest figures on the list. 
Kalgoorlie followed with 15 gonorrhea and 6 syphilis cases; even Perth, with 675 
examined, only had 6 gonorrhea and 5 syphilis cases. Of the twenty-seven other 
centres in which soldiers were examined, the number of cases of venereal disease 
was minimal or non-existent.410  
Similarly, at the ‘Rockingham Military Camp Hospital (V.D)’ near Fremantle, 
figures reveal that the incidence of venereal disease was not as large as the public 
imaginings. The number of patients in camp on 30 June 1917 was 57—of whom 51 
were suffering from gonorrhea, 3 from gonorrhea and syphilis, and 3 from syphilis 
alone. The number remaining on 1 June 1918 was 12—of whom 6 were suffering 
from gonorrhea, 1 from gonorrhea and syphilis, and 5 from syphilis alone. The 
Principal Medical Officer’s annual report did, however, note that 17.39% of the 
admissions were married men.411 The concern here was an obvious one: that the 
wives of these men would soon be among the sufferers.  
Table: Admission and discharge figures for Rockingham Camp, 1917-18412 
Date Number admitted Number discharged 
1917   
July 21 32 
August 18 16 
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September 15 22 
October 24 21 
November 15 27 
December 14 23 
1918   
January 16 15 
February 9 6 
March 13 19 
April 8 14 
May 8 12 
The records of the military authorities showed that the total number of men in 
venereal camps Australia-wide on 31 August 1918 was only 383 and the total 
number of cases admitted to venereal camps in Australia in the four years since 
outbreak of war was 13,038.413 
In October 1918, however, the sentiments were still those of moral panic. 
Amidst all the dire warnings, posters and protests, the Daily News reported that the 
Venereal Diseases camp at Rockingham was to be abolished and that the patients 
were to be allowed their freedom on the condition that they wear a blue arm band 
(!) and gave their word of honour to take precautions against the spreading of the 
disease.414 The Fremantle Council naturally had feelings on the matter and wrote to 
the Department of Defence to ascertain the facts.415 The reply on stated that ‘while 
the V.D. Camp may be removed from Rockingham it is not proposed to dispense 
with a camp of this nature and no alterations are proposed in the method of dealing 
with the patients’.416 In other words, it was not to be left to the returned soldiers to 
give their ‘word of honour’ not to spread this disease. 
Nonetheless, once the war was over, the military authorities absolved 
themselves of any further responsibility for the infected men. As early as December 
1918 the Deputy Director-General of the Department of Defence wrote to the Prime 
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Minister that, ‘with reference to the venereal diseases camps which have been 
maintained by the Defence department, I am directed to inform you that the need 
for these camps has now almost completely passed as the patients will not again be 
required for service’. Responsibility for these particular soldiers was now to be 
placed squarely in the hands of the civil authorities: ‘as the men have become 
infected through their own default, this department has no responsibility except 
such as is assumed for the protection of the general public’.417 The disease had 
heretofore been treated in the military forces solely ‘in order to render those 
infected fit for service again’. As this was no longer requisite, it was not justifiable to 
impose enforced segregation or treatment upon men who had voluntarily enlisted 
and were now essentially civilians.418  
As far as the military was concerned, the various state and local health 
departments could now take over that role. With Billy Hughes in Europe for the 
Paris peace conference, the acting prime minister, William Watt, having discussed 
the issue with the Minister for Defence, then wrote to all State premiers that ‘the 
question of the continued maintenance of camps set apart in Australia for the 
treatment of cases of venereal disease amongst the troops is now receiving 
attention’. Watt suggested the states might wish to make use of these camps for 
general public health purposes.419 The Western Australian government for its part 
did not choose to take over the running of the camps. Night clinics were established 
at Perth, Fremantle and Kalgoorlie; ‘12 male and 12 female beds provided at the 
Perth Public Hospital for cases requiring isolation or intern treatment’; and a ‘room 
at the Fremantle Hospital was set up as a “V.D Clinique”’.420 The perceived threat of 
an epidemic of venereal disease was essentially at an end. However something far 
more threatening in real terms to Fremantle and Western Australia was on the 
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horizon: influenza. 
On 9 December 1918, Fremantle’s new Mayor, William Montgomery, sent an 
urgent letter to South Fremantle’s representative on the Legislative Assembly, 
Samuel Rocke, alerting him to the probability that in the next day or so a troopship 
would arrive carrying more than 200 people suffering from ‘Pneumonic Influenza’. 
The thought of the virulent ‘Spanish flu’, already causing wide-spread devastation in 
Europe, coming into the port of Fremantle was as worrying to the mayor and 
population of Fremantle as the imminent threat of plague had been eighteen years 
earlier. The mayor’s concern was ‘the fact that it seems utterly impossible to 
maintain a strict quarantine at Woodman’s Point’, which meant the landing of men 
there would create ‘great danger to the general public’.421 The concern was spawned 
by a recent incident in which ‘soldiers returning on a hospital ship did break away 
from the ship at Fremantle and evade quarantine regulations’.422 Mayor 
Montgomery asked Rocke to treat the matter as urgent, and to press upon the 
Premier the advisability of taking steps to prohibit the landing on the mainland of 
any patients suffering from influenza ‘until freedom from the disease is assured’.423 
Rocke responded by immediately meeting with the Premier on the subject, who 
assured him that the government was doing all in its power ‘to meet with the wishes 
of the people of Fremantle’. He asked Rocke to assure the mayor ‘that no contact 
able to break quarantine will be landed at Woodman’s Point’.424 Unconvinced, on 10 
December the Council wired their federal representative in Melbourne, Senator 
Buzacott, to request ‘the Federal Government to isolate at Rottnest all infected cases 
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of influenza and contacts expected to arrive at Fremantle’. With no hesitation in 
emphasizing that the State was in jeopardy, not just Fremantle, the wire concluded: 
‘Prompt action is absolutely necessary in the interests of the lives of the people of 
Western Australia’.425  
At the same time, in an effort to keep the quarantine zone at Rottnest rather 
than Woodman’s Point, the mayor held a special meeting of the Council on 10 
December 1918, addressed by the Medical Officer in Fremantle. The Town Clerk 
then sent the Medical Officer’s remarks directly to the Commissioner of Public 
Health. The Medical Officer was firm in his opinion on the subject of quarantine: 
I have had experience of soldiers in quarantine at Woodman’s Point and I 
know of the difficulty of maintaining efficient quarantine. The thing is so 
ludicrous as to verge on the region of comic opera. Rottnest can be made 
efficient, thoroughly efficient and I do not think either patients or 
contacts would suffer by being treated there. The contacts would be 
perfectly happy and comfortable and the patients would certainly be as 
well and probably better treated by open-air methods than they would 
be in houses.426 
All this activity had happened within the space of two days. On the third day, 12 
December, however, the federal Director of Quarantine informed the Fremantle 
Council that ‘isolation of the quarantined persons arriving from South Africa at 
Rottnest Island is impracticable, and that adequate precautions against the spread 
of infection from the Quarantine Station have been taken’.427 
The incoming ship which had started the wave of anxious activity did indeed 
arrive in dock with influenza victims aboard. But its handling on arrival was 
unexpected and, as far as the Fremantle public was concerned, unforgivable. On 16 
December, another wire was sent to Senator Buzacott, from Mayor Montgomery: 
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Indignation meeting called Tuesday night by citizens of Fremantle to 
protest against treatment meted out to influenza soldier contacts by their 
detention on infected ship stop Please ascertain and advise me policy of 
Government with regard to disposal of contacts on each ship as it arrives 
stop428 
What had raised the fury of the Fremantle populace was not their own personal 
safety but the confinement of hundreds of healthy returning soldiers on the 
troopship SS Boonah. All passengers were forced to remain on board, the healthy 
with the sick, in danger of their lives from influenza. Having survived the war, their 
homecoming could literally kill them. The Fremantle citizens were horrified by this 
treatment of their heroes. The protest meeting, the mayor reported, resolved to  
demand the Federal Government take immediate steps to establish a 
quarantine station on Garden Island with all possible speed in order to be 
ready to receive plague-stricken or infected troops that may be expected to 
arrive in future and in order to avoid any repetition of the dreary 
wretchedness and frightful suspense to which the troops on the infected 
troopship ‘Boonah’ have been subject during the past week.429 
As for the safety of the locals, the Commissioner of Public Health sent the Council ‘a 
number of posters regarding Influenza with a request that they be posted about the 
town and placed in the trams’.430  
For a good six months the disease was kept at bay. Initially the cases were 
slow to develop—two here, three there. By June 1919, the number of cases began to 
increase, rising to figures of nine and thirteen at a time. Initially, the old military 
camp at Blackboy Hill was used as a hospital for influenza patients, and part of 
Fremantle Hospital was also put aside. But the disease had clearly now taken hold 
on the mainland. On 13 June, the Premier received notification from the Prime 
Minister that ‘action will now be taken under Quarantine Act to declare State of 
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Western Australia infected with influenza’.431 On 30 July, the Health Inspector’s 
report shows an alarming jump in the number of cases: ‘During the past fortnight 48 
cases have been reported. 36 houses have been quarantined and the majority of 
these premises have been visited twice daily’.432 By 2 August the situation had 
become grave enough that a special meeting of Council was called by the mayor ‘to 
consider and deal with the problem of the large increase in the number of cases 
suffering from influenza in Fremantle’. At the conclusion of the meeting it was 
resolved to create a fund for the relief of necessitous cases and for voluntary 
workers to do domestic work.433 By 18 August, 75 cases of pneumonic influenza had 
been reported in Fremantle; ‘63 new premises quarantined, 253 patients in 50 
premises have been supplied with food. Cases have been removed in the 
ambulances from Rockingham, North Fremantle, Cottesloe, and Cottesloe Beach to 
the Fremantle Hospital and Blackboy Hill’. 434 As the burden on Fremantle Hospital 
already exceeded its capacity, and for the safety of the patients there, the Alma St 
School in the heart of town was established as a Pneumonic Influenza Hospital.435 
Fortunately for the Fremantle Council there would be no concern over funding, as 
‘the whole cost of the carrying on of the hospital was defrayed by the Public Health 
Department’.436 On 1 September 1919, the Health Inspector revealed that ‘The 
disease has now been raging for 11 weeks and during that period 223 cases have 
been reported’. Birmingham also reported that there had been 58 cases reported 
during the previous fortnight and 14 deaths, and that ‘Alma St. hospital is now 
full’.437  
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Fremantle had been through the worst of it, however, and by 24 September 
the Alma Street hospital had closed down.438 Ewers writes that ‘the epidemic had 
been savage while it lasted, but the precautionary measures taken by the board of 
health under the guidance and personal supervision of Dr. Birmingham greatly 
lessened its incidence in Fremantle’.439 The next extant report, dated 29 October, 
showed how the epidemic had subsided: simply a note in the report to Council that 
the health inspectors would no longer receive their special allowance of 10 shillings 
per week.440 The mayor’s report for November 1919 summarised the toll in 
Fremantle: a total of 274 cases since 11 June, resulting in 60 deaths.441 
Conclusion: Fremantle post-war and recovery 
Prime Minister William Hughes announced to the nation in mid-1918 that  
we owe it to those who have borne the brunt of battle more than the nation 
can ever adequately repay. But we can at least make certain that the maimed 
are not left to struggle on unaided. There must be no room for criticism in the 
future. The commonwealth government undertakes the full responsibility for 
the welfare of the returned soldiers.442 
This guided so much of the response across the country as a whole, including in 
Fremantle. The country owed their soldiers a debt; this had to be repaid in terms of 
safeguarding their return to employment and to health. That thousands of men 
returned was something to be celebrated. The description of their home-coming in 
the words of the mayor, William Wray, who had stayed in office only until he could 
hoist the flags of victory from the town hall, are worth repeating: 
I feel, fellow citizens, at the close of this dreadful war and as I lay down 
my robe of office, that this is a peculiarly fitting time to urge upon 
ourselves the wisdom of a broad and courageous outlook – that given a 
fair chance, Australia will become the home of millions of desirable 
people who feel cramped in other lands and who long for the freedom 
which we have always enjoyed. With the coming of these people the 
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untold hidden wealth of our country will be developed, and with that 
development will come an added security and an increased personal 
comfort to every steady and industrious person.443  
Wray’s words acknowledged that it was only with the return of the wounded that 
the knowledge of war was really experienced in Fremantle. The dead, for their part, 
remained overseas where they fell.444  
That the people of Fremantle belied that the war was now behind them can 
be seen in the record of a town meeting, hosted by the newly inaugurated Mayor 
Montgomery, held on 9 December 1918, ‘for the purpose of considering what steps 
could be taken to bring about the opening of the wharves, to the free access of the 
public’.445 The Returned Soldier’s Association rallied to the cause, and the meeting of 
returned soldiers and citizens emphatically protested ‘against the continuation of 
the blockade on the Fremantle Wharf and called on the Government to have it 
removed without delay’.446 The Council approached Senator Buzacott on the matter, 
reporting that ‘the public meeting was a very full and representative one and it is 
considered a hardship that freedom is not given to the wharves in Fremantle and it 
is difficult for local people to understand why any effort should be made to retain 
the restrictions on their use’.447 Being a port town, and having had the wharf closed 
to them for four years under the War Precautions Act, the reopening of the wharves 
would provide both the most symbolic and equally most tangible signal of the end of 
war. Certainly, the people of Fremantle would have appreciated the symbolism at 
this stage. Having felt the joy of armistice and victory, there remained grave 
reminders of the experience of war in Fremantle, as in the rest of Australia. In 
December 1919, in the Perth metropolitan area there were 850 returned soldiers 
drawing sustenance; men of ‘almost every trade and calling’ looking for 
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employment.448 In Fremantle in 1920 the list sent out to the Council from the 
Returned Maimed and Limbless Men’s Association included seven Fremantle men 
who had lost a limb and were seeking employment in the town.449 In addition, the 
high cost of living continued. Snooks writes that ‘the main period of price increase 
was during and immediately following the First World War, with annual increases 
reaching double figures in 1918/19 and 1919/20’.450 In addition to this, the activity 
at the harbour remained depressed. Tull reports that ‘by 1917-1918 shipping 
tonnage and cargo throughput had plummeted by about sixty percent’.451 
The mayor’s reports at the close of the war and beyond are perhaps the best 
means of assessing how these external factors affected Fremantle during this time. 
In November 1917 the mayor, William Wray had declared in his end of year address 
that ‘it is needless for me to remind you that however optimistic a people may be 
naturally, the stressful times and national anxiety in which we are all experienced, 
must have a depressing effect even upon municipal administration’.452 Coming from 
a man whose reports and speeches were usually glowingly optimistic, these words 
reflect the sobering effect of the year 1917 on the town of Fremantle. The financial 
effect on the administration was that rates outstanding for 1917 were double what 
they were in the previous year. Two years later, that the town was still struggling to 
recover financially is reflected in the mayor’s annual report for 1919. Mayor 
Montgomery told his ratepayers that he had ‘made every effort to get in a larger 
percentage of rates, and even went so far as to have distress warrants prepared, but 
I am glad to say I did not consider it in the best interests of the town to have them 
executed’. In fact, rather than harass its ratepayers for unpaid rates, the Council 
stepped in with financial assistance for its overburdened people. ‘In order to assist 
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the outside employees and the lower paid officials to meet the demands made upon 
them by the high cost of living, the Council agreed to grant all those whose weekly 
wage was £4.10.0 and less, a bonus of 6shillings per week up to January 31st 1920’. 
However, despite the committed assistance the mayor provided his ratepayers, he 
was also prepared to scold them at this time. His report mentioned that during the 
past year the head gardener had ‘planted in various streets 251 trees besides 200 in 
the various reserves’ which was intended to add to the beauty of the streets. 
However, Montgomery complained that the ‘general public does not seem to take 
very much interest in the Council’s attempts to beautify the town. Stock is allowed 
to wander in the streets at night time and on Sundays, when the Council’s officers 
are off duty, and much injury is done thereby’. Within the space of another year, we 
can see by the mayor’s report for 1920 that the town was in much better financial 
shape. In Frank Gibson’s first year as Mayor, he was able to reveal that of the ‘total 
amount of rates levied for the year 99.13% has been received, so that this year a 
record has been established, not only for this municipality but probably for the 
State’.453  
Recovery, at least in the short term, looked imminent by 1920. As Reece and 
Pascoe write, Fremantle in postwar years, ‘was a community which still looked to 
the harbour; from any direction the superstructure of ships peeped between 
buildings and over rooflines’.454 No doubt the great majority of people in this 
harbourside community hoped for a return to conditions as they had known them 
before the war. But the seeds of instability, both financial and social, sown during 
those four years could not be easily set aside. 
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Chapter Three: The Depression Era in Fremantle, 1927 to 1932 
Introduction 
The Depression era in Fremantle, as in the rest of Western Australia, began in 1927 
and then followed ‘its unbroken rise to the peak of 1932’.455 It was during the period 
from 1929 to 1932 that the Fremantle City Council experienced the worst of 
Depression conditions. During the crisis the mayor, Frank Gibson, proved an active 
civil leader in promoting the welfare of the unemployed. He led public meetings to 
promote fund raising and spearheaded a committee to involve private citizens in the 
creation of employment for local men and women. He designed extensive plans for 
relief works, organized collaboration with other local governments to get them on 
board, and urged the State government to establish comprehensive plans to assist 
the unemployed. Gibson’s Council was no less vigorous. Apart from the personal 
commitment to the welfare of the unemployed demonstrated by their service on 
relief committees, men like Joseph Sleeman and other councillors voted time and 
again to extend the Council’s budget beyond ordinary limits in order to create work 
for the unemployed.456 Relief projects such as those offered in Fremantle and by 
other local governments gave unemployed workers the opportunity to avoid having 
to accept charity, whilst waiting for a State Government scheme to aid them in their 
hour of need.  
Hard data regarding the scale of the crisis during the Depression years are 
difficult to pin down. In Council records, only those being given work were ‘counted’ 
so until the 1933 census there is no exact figure for the number of the local 
unemployed. Nonetheless between the Council records and the Premiers’ 
department records we can obtain a fairly reliable, though never exact, set of 
numbers for unemployment. Newspapers represent a further source for data on the 
scale of the crisis. Relief committees published their reports but even these did not 
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take into account the people who, in any particular week or month, had not taken 
relief for one reason or another: whether because they had found a day’s work or 
simply because they were reluctant to come forward. In 1931, a member of a ‘relief 
committee’ established by the Council to assist those in need, reported that ‘628 
orders for urgent relief in the shape of food, meat, etc has [sic] been issued to people 
who stood off until they were in dire want before seeking aid’.457 That families did 
not come forward until they were in absolute need is indisputable; state politicians, 
trade union representatives and local councillors all regularly commented on this in 
their correspondence and to the press.  
From 1929 to 1931 the State Government essentially left the ‘unemployment 
problem’ in the hands of local governments. The best authority on the Depression 
years in Western Australia, Geoffrey Bolton, writes that conventional thinking on 
the matter was that ‘the State government should involve itself only when it was 
clear that the task was too great for private charitable organisations and municipal 
councils’.458 Similarly, Graeme Snooks writes that in the early days of the Depression 
‘the State government preferred to take as small a part in unemployment relief as 
possible. It was felt that unemployed men should be given work by local authorities 
on relief works’.459 That this was the case is true, but it seems a lenient perspective. 
The State, struggling with financial difficulty, may have been under reasonable 
constraints which caused it to defer its involvement in the provision of relief for the 
unemployed, but on a local level, the practical repercussions of this meant that 
deprivation was magnified in Fremantle and other local government areas.460 
Similarly, apart from an initial grant for roadworks in 1929, the Federal government 
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also delayed facing its responsibilities. On the Federal government’s slowness to act, 
Robertson writes that ‘though it had obvious political and moral responsibilities, the 
Commonwealth government had no clear constitutional obligation to participate in 
unemployment relief’.461 Taking this point a step further, Fred Alexander accurately 
describes the position, that due to the Commonwealth government’s lack of 
intervention, ‘two whole years were virtually wasted by Australian governments 
while the hardships caused by the deepening depression were being felt 
increasingly’.462 In Fremantle, as in the rest of the state, the rapid upward trajectory 
of unemployment from 1929 caused almost immediate crisis in the community, with 
destitute families who could not provide their children with food, milk or shoes. 
That both the State and Commonwealth governments should absent themselves at 
such a time is not a development that can be dismissed lightly. 
In Fremantle, the impact of unemployment was particularly felt, partly 
because the port ‘had more than its fair share of unemployed, partly because of hard 
times among seamen and wharf labourers, but also because it attracted out of work 
migrants, who tended to drift back to their first port of call, apparently with the 
vague notion of picking up a ship sometime’.463 Fremantle was also affected in 
another sense. Alexander writes than in understanding Depression conditions, ‘it is 
important to stress that hardship came first to, and continued to be experience most 
sharply by, those who had no “fat” upon which to live while times were hard’.464 As 
we have seen in the previous chapters, and as Malcolm Tull also notes, Fremantle as 
a port town, with its ‘general reliance on a large labour force’, had a working-class 
population of casual labourers with very little ‘fat’ among them.465 
By 1932, the entire country, ‘the so-called ‘working man’s paradise’, as 
Robertson calls it, was experiencing mass destitution. The states had no other 
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option but to ‘devise emergency measures’.466 This chapter examines how the 
Fremantle local government managed the administrative, financial and social crisis 
created during the Depression era. 
Prologue to Depression: 1927-1929 
Fremantle in the 1920s considered itself the ‘Brighton of western Australia’.467 The 
description had some truth to it. The town was still a distant place from Perth both 
notionally and geographically. Although linked by the train line, the highway to 
Fremantle from the city remained little more than an unimproved, gravel country 
road. As road transport between the two cities was upgraded during the Twenties, 
however, Fremantle’s isolation from Perth slowly but steadily dissolved. ‘Special 
trains and trams brought day trippers in thousands at holiday time, many of them 
from country areas’, writes Reece and Pascoe. With a population in 1928 of 22,340, 
‘Fremantle was still of the size which made it possible to know just about everyone 
who was local’.468  
The 1920s were something of a hey-day. The trauma of the Great War was 
fading into the past and a sense of optimism dominated West Australian life, 
particularly in Fremantle where the port was again active after the decline in 
shipping over the four years of war. A thriving agricultural and wool industry in 
country Western Australia meant that there was plenty of work on the wharves, to 
handle ‘the dramatic increase in exports of primary products from the south-west 
and the wheatbelt and the building of the woolstores’.469 However, trouble lay just 
over the horizon. As Bolton writes, ‘it was in 1927 that the downswing in the main 
sections of the Australian economy began’.470 By 1928-29, the decade of post-war 
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contentment had begun to erode in the face of rising unemployment caused by a 
burgeoning world-wide economic depression.  
One of the earliest signs that crisis was already upon the town came in July 
1928, when a group of religious leaders, from all the main church groups of the 
metropolitan area, wrote to the Premier, Phillip Collier, concerned about the ‘acute 
distress that prevails at the present time owing to the unusual amount of 
unemployment’.471 The representatives of the religious bodies had met with each 
other a day earlier and had decided to form a committee to take up the troubling 
issue. The committee then invited members of the business community, the 
returned soldiers association, the trades hall and a number of metropolitan 
municipalities to a meeting at which they could discuss ways to relieve the distress 
of the unemployed. Recognising that the problem was an economic one, Archbishop 
Riley of the Church of England told the meeting that ‘the utmost that they could 
achieve would be merely palliative, as it was essentially a matter for the business 
community’.472 However, Riley and his fellow clergy also realised the urgent 
necessity of providing relief for the unemployed. During the Depression era in 
Western Australia, this ecumenical approach continued as churches of all beliefs 
joined with civic bodies to serve the needs of those in distress. 
Another warning of the impending crisis, captured in the records, came in 
September 1928 when Fremantle’s Town Clerk, James Shepherd, received a circular 
letter from the State Government Statistician. The statistician, prompted by the 
recent decline in employment rates, wrote that ‘the question of unemployment is of 
great importance in Australia at the present time’. He asked Shepherd for the 
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seasonal periods in which ‘exceptional temporary employment is experienced in 
Fremantle’ and for the main occupations of that employment. 473 Shepherd’s reply 
was consistent with Fremantle’s defining role, unchanged for almost a century 
remained defined, as a harbour town: during the period when wheat and wool were 
being shipped, employment was fairly plentiful, but as at any port it remained 
‘subject to fluctuations, and is dependent almost entirely on the amount of shipping 
which is going on’. As work at the port was managed outside of municipal 
jurisdiction, Shepherd pointed out that opportunities for ‘gauging accurately the 
questions of both employment and unemployment were limited’.474 As Tull explains: 
‘Lumpers were required on a casual basis, by the hour or by the day. This system of 
hiring evolved to cope with the wide fluctuations in trade flows which meant that 
there were days when the demand for labour was high and days when it was low.’475 
It was hard under such conditions to make firm plans for future spending on 
unemployment relief and social welfare. 
Aside from such statistical enquiries, there were, late in 1928, other 
indicators in the Council record that the ‘fluctuations’ in employment were having a 
detrimental effect on Fremantle’s working population. Letters sent by rate-payers to 
the Council reveal not only many individuals’ inability to pay their rates, but point to 
the wider issue of the unavailability of work which was leading directly their state of 
duress. The first such letters were sent in July 1928 from workers asking to pay 
their rates debt in small amounts over time because, as one of them described it, 
‘things are very slack just at present’.476  
That unemployment was heading towards a crisis point was undeniable. 
Western Australia’s traditionally strong timber, pearling and pastoral industries all 
suffered from the international economic decline. This in turn directly affected the 
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export trade: ‘the value of Australia’s merchandise exports … almost halved from 
1928-29 to 1931-32’. Wool accounted for nearly one-half and wheat for nearly one-
quarter of these exports.477 These conditions directly affected port employment 
rates in Fremantle. Indeed, the entire state was feeling the decline and there were 
few places to look for employment either in or out of the metropolitan area. By this 
time, as Alexander aptly notes, ‘the writing was on the wall’. 478  
In January 1929 a report tabled by the Health Inspector clearly signalled the 
significance of Fremantle’s unemployment problems. The report was on the derelict 
state of a tenement ‘occupied by the unemployed’ in Norfolk Street in Fremantle’s 
West End. The Inspector reported there were from twenty-six to thirty men 
temporarily sleeping at the tenement. The Inspector had to send a cart to clean up 
the rubbish from the yards and around the house as there were no bins and the 
occupants were not able to buy any. Identifying the prevailing social conditions as 
stemming from the economic downturn, he wrote that ‘the whole position is most 
unsatisfactory, and it seems likely to go on for an indefinite period. Something will 
have to be done for as long as this state of affairs lasts’. The Council had been aware 
of the tenement and its residents since the winter of 1928 but had allowed the 
unemployed men to remain in the premises with the understanding that when the 
fine weather came some other arrangement was to be made for their 
accommodation. In January when the Inspector made his report, summer had 
arrived yet there was still no satisfactory place to ask these thirty men to go. 
Indicating that the councillors were aware of the scale of the growing problem, 
Councillor Kerr recommended ‘that a deputation from this Council wait upon the 
Premier with the view to placing before him the acute position with regard to the 
unemployment in this town’.479 It was confirmation of the Council’s recognition that 
unemployment had reached a potentially critical stage.  
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The Depression begins to bite: 1929-1930 
According to Geoffrey Bolton, it was in 1927 that men ‘started greeting their 
acquaintances with the query “are you in work?”’; by 1930, he notes, ‘the question 
became unnecessary, if not tactless’.480 In Fremantle, the town’s social organisations 
testified to the changing conditions. At South Fremantle Football Club many of the 
players were employed on the wharves; they had, in the past, given up shifts in 
order to take part in football matches for which the football club fully compensated 
them. However, now that many had ‘joined the ranks of the unemployed’, not only 
were the players reluctant to surrender shifts they desperately needed, the general 
economy meant that the club was also no longer in a position to offer them 
compensation.481 In close proximity to the football club, the Soldiers’ Institute on 
South Terrace had grave concerns about its own members. The secretary of the 
institute wrote to inform the Town Clerk, James Shepherd, that owing to the number 
of returned soldiers out of work in Fremantle, it had decided to open an 
employment bureau at its own offices. The secretary did not hesitate to remind 
Shepherd of the Council’s obligation to returned soldiers and asked, in the case of 
any municipal projects being planned, that the Council give ‘distinct preference’ to 
returned soldiers and their dependents. He further reminded Shepherd that 
although the Great War had finished in 1918 the Returned Soldiers League still 
found it necessary ‘to continually remind the public “lest they forget” of the 
extravagant promises made between the years 1914-18’.482 A full decade after the 
war’s end, the moral aspects attached to repatriation (as discussed in the previous 
chapter) were still a sensitive issue. In response, given the Fremantle Council’s 
expressions of a continuing commitment to its local returned soldiers, Shepherd 
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replied that the Council would of course give such preference to returned soldiers 
and their dependents whenever work was available.483  
Unfortunately, work was not available. Local papers were peppered with 
comment on the unemployment situation and its social costs. In June 1929 a 
contributor wrote to the Fremantle Advertiser that ‘only those who come directly in 
contact with the workers realize how acute is the unemployment question’.484 Yet 
the tone of the commentary on the swelling number of unemployed was, at this 
time, critical and derogatory. The economic depression’s first victims were usually 
perceived as lazy, flawed or morally deficient in some way. In the words of Bolton, 
‘the conventional thinking of the time was that unemployment over long periods 
was usually the fault of the unemployed. Nobody need go long out of work, provided 
he were prepared to accept lower wages in harder times’. 485 This lack of 
understanding could be seen, for example, in the comments of the mayor of Albany, 
Charles Wittenoom. Upset by the number of unemployed in his region coming in 
from group settlements, who were ‘ill-nourished and in general distress’, he 
suggested ‘this may be their own fault’.486 The Fremantle Advocate, published by 
Fremantle’s trading and mercantile community, condemned the number of 
unemployed ‘roaming the streets of Fremantle’, adding ‘there are more bums or 
professional beggars in Fremantle today than ever before’. The newspaper urged 
the police to take immediate action to ‘suppress these wastrels, who would be better 
doing a stretch in Fremantle gaol’.487 
The town enjoyed a small respite in June when Fremantle was officially 
invested as a City. On a blustery day on 3 June 1929, the Lieutenant Governor 
‘sheltered under an umbrella’ to make the official proclamation in front of a large 
crowd. Following the proclamation, the new City Council held its first meeting in a 
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festive atmosphere, with the councillors’ wives and the lieutenant governor 
present.488 Yet the good feelings engendered by the occasion lasted only two weeks. 
On 17 June the newly-made Fremantle City Council received its first application 
from representatives of the local unemployed for financial assistance. In that same 
week a soup kitchen opened at the Wesley Church to supply one meal per day to 
twenty-five local unemployed single men who could not get assistance from the 
State government. The mayor formally announced the opening of the soup kitchen 
to his councillors, letting them know that the organising committee was made up of 
most of the leaders from the numerous churches in town, as well as many of the 
leading business people.489  
Newspapers were now describing the unemployment situation in Fremantle 
as ‘acute’, putting the number of unemployed at over 700.490 Residents quickly 
became used to the sight of lines of men waiting outside the soup kitchen every 
morning queuing for their meal tickets. The increase in their numbers was 
noticeable: twenty-three meals were served on the first day, increasing to forty-
seven the next day, and then to fifty on the third. Within a fortnight there were 537 
meals being served per week (about 77 per day, on average) to 166 unemployed 
single men at Wesley Hall.491 By September, in just a six-month period, the number 
of men being offered food weekly had more than doubled to well over 300.492 In 
order to receive their meal, these unemployed single men were required to produce 
their State Labour Bureau ticket, which showed that they were registered at the 
Bureau for work and hence officially unemployed. Only single men were able to 
receive this meal because they were precluded from receiving the government 
assistance provided to married men; married men could claim sustenance from the 
State government and could also receive benefits, such as food parcels, from the 
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local unemployment fund.493 For the single men, with no money from sustenance to 
tide them over, the provisions provided by the soup kitchen at least freed them from 
being reduced to begging for food. The meal tickets were distributed between 
10.15am and 11am daily by Fremantle’s Member of the Legislative Assembly, Joseph 
Sleeman, alongside the leader of the Methodist church, Reverend Eric. O Nye. The 
meals were served at ‘twelve-noon by ladies of the various churches’.494  
Whilst having to take in hand the feeding of the local men—at this early stage 
it was predominantly men, a marked rise in the unemployment of girls and women 
would not start until the following year—the Council also had to address the 
unemployed’s request for financial assistance. As the seriousness and scope of the 
Depression had not yet hit home, there were two types of opinion on the moral, 
social and fiscal nature of ‘charity’. The provision of ‘sustenance’ for the unemployed 
was seen as charity, pure and simple, but indicated a detached handout from an 
unaffected elite. ‘Relief’ was something earned, given from an understanding that 
the unemployed had not brought this condition upon themselves and were entitled 
to assistance from a socially responsible government and community. Yet 
ultimately, beyond these philosophical differences, the question was a financial one: 
where was the money for either to come from?  
Initially, money and donations were found from the local businesses and 
charity groups, but these still had to be collected, organised and disbursed. 
Traditionally, charities such as the Salvation Army or the Ugly Men’s Association 
would step in to help in cases of dire need. Although the Ugly Men’s Association was 
set up in 1917 to provide assistance for war widows and ex-servicemen, during the 
Depression it extended its aid to general welfare in Fremantle. Like other 
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municipalities, local events were held to bring in money and donations: concerts, 
jumble sales, contests, morning teas, and suchlike. To provide but one example, on 
15 July the Coastal, Dock, River and Harbour Works Union gave ‘a grand benefit 
concert in aid of distressed members’.495 Personal charity also played a role. One 
kindly donor was mentioned in the August 1929 Council minutes, when the Town 
Clerk reported that he had found an anonymous gift of £2 at the door of his office ‘as 
a donation towards the Unemployed Relief Fund’.496 However, such public 
donations and fundraising could never raise sufficient financial resources needed to 
meet the growing demands of Depression conditions. Clothes, shelter and food had 
to be provided every week to what was quickly becoming hundreds of unemployed, 
many of whom had been rendered homeless by their inability to pay rent.  
To administer the increasing numbers of residents in distress, the Council 
made a room available in the Town Hall for the purpose of creating a register of 
those who were unemployed in Fremantle. Significantly, the register was only open 
for a fixed period. The limited time ‘was to prevent an influx of people from outside, 
who, knowing there was a little effort to relieve them in Fremantle, would probably 
come in’.497 It starkly revealed the dilemma faced by local authorities in providing 
relief in a context where no state-wide assistance program existed. Each locality had 
to fend for itself, and naturally each wished to devote their limited resources to the 
aid of their own residents. Indeed, it was reported that the Minister for the 
Unemployed [Jack Scaddan] had suggested to the mayor that ‘each district should 
look after its own unemployed, and that if non-residents arrived in Fremantle 
needing assistance, they should be sent back to where they last resided’.498 The 
conditions under which single men were approved for relief in Fremantle were 
strict, though as a sea-port they also allowed for visiting seamen. Applicants were 
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required to be ‘bona fide residents of Fremantle, certified to by a ratepayer of good 
standing in the community, or by a union secretary as bona fide resident and 
unemployed and without parents to support him; seamen with satisfactory 
discharges from last ship or approved by the Marine Superintendents office, 
Fremantle’.499 All other applicants were referred to Perth for relief. This was 
reflected in the distribution of recipients. Data from August 1930 show that of the 
single men who were registered, 104 were residents of the Fremantle district, 75 
were non-Fremantle unemployed (immigrants and others who were at Fremantle 
when relief work was started), and 40 were seamen of various nationalities.500 
The greater issue, however, remained that of allocating responsibility for 
tackling the crisis as whole. Councillor Farrell noted in July 1929 that several local 
governing bodies were ‘making application to the Government to subsidise them in 
creating work for the unemployed’, and asked: ‘is this Council?’501 The mayor indeed 
approached the State government for its assistance but the following month 
received the reply that the ‘Premier regrets that the Government is not in a position 
to subsidise local government bodies for providing work for the unemployed’.502 
The State was not intending to take up a task, and the associated costs, which it felt 
rested at the local level.  
Without government assistance to provide work, and therefore payment, for 
the local unemployed, the Council was forced to provide what stop-gap measures it 
could manage. The first step, taken the week following the opening of the soup 
kitchen, was to form two committees: one for single unemployed men, the other for 
married. The purpose of these committees was simple: to garner public support to 
provide meals, clothing and sleeping accommodation for the unemployed. As the 
Advertiser reported, ‘feeding the unemployed has been the question that has 
absorbed our philanthropic-minded citizens during the past weeks. Now an equally 
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urgent consideration is that of housing them during the rough weather’.503 In the 
winter month of July, it would have been inhumane not to find shelter for rapidly 
growing numbers of destitute residents. Prominent town citizens responded quickly 
to the committee’s influence. H.W. Bland offered sleeping accommodation for forty 
men in his wool shed off Croke-lane in the West End, whilst ‘Messrs C. and H. Locke 
made a gift of stretchers, materials also being donated from Millars and Gadsens’. 504 
The Immigration Department also supplied 80 blankets and private citizens donated 
coats and rugs.  
That the plight of the unemployed had become increasingly serious was 
reflected in the press reportage, which revealed a shift in general perception of the 
character of the Fremantle jobless. The moral compass shifted away from the 
seeming faults of the unemployed; instead attention was now focused on the 
responsibility incumbent upon those who had to give to those who had not. No 
longer prepared to view their homeless citizens simply as wastrels, the sentiment 
popularly expressed in local newspapers was the need for generosity to the 
unfortunate. As one writer put it, ‘we who are housed and fed, should be prepared to 
make some sacrifice to help our less fortunate fellow men’.505 Another author, 
describing the situation of the unemployed as ‘pitiable in the extreme’, wrote: 
They have no place of abode and must suffer the agonies of hell during 
the bitterly cold nights when force of circumstances makes them 
endeavour to rest themselves throughout the night under the canopy of 
heaven. Everyone should give five minutes’ thought to this question 
when comfortably ‘bedded down’ for the night, and then, surely, 
something would be done speedily to help better the lot of those who are 
living under worse conditions than dogs.506 
Yet despite the drive for public support and the good feelings encouraged by the 
newspapers, the depression economy meant that there was increasingly little scope 
for people to give, even among those still in employment. Due to a lack of funds, the 
mayor was obliged to announce in September that the provision of meals at Wesley 
                                                        
503 Fremantle Advertiser, 5 July 1929, p1. 
504 Fremantle Advertiser, 12 July 1929, p5. Later, single men were given sleeping 
accommodation in the old tramways buildings on Cliff Street.  
505 Fremantle Advertiser, 28 June 1929, p1. 
506 Fremantle Advocate, 4 July 1929, p 4. 
 153 
Hall would have to close down.507 In the few months it had been operational, the 
committee had provided about 8000 meals and 3000 nights’ worth of 
accommodation, with most of the money found by private subscription. With the 
closing of the local unemployed fund the Council had now, as a matter of some 
urgency, to create a more permanent relief system for its many unemployed.  
In December 1929, with the level of national unemployment rising rapidly, 
the Federal government announced a plan for assistance. This did not mean it was 
yet willing to accept responsibility for guiding the country out of the economic 
crisis; rather, it was limited to finding some additional funds for the states to use 
locally to provide extra work. Following a meeting of the state ministries in 
Canberra to discuss plans for relieving the unemployment crisis, the newly-elected 
Labor Prime Minister Jack Scullin proposed ‘to make available to the states 
£1,000,000 from the federal aid road fund for the current year’.508 The only 
conditions attached to the grant were that the money must be spent without delay 
and that it must be spent upon road works.509 Western Australia’s share of this 
federal grant was £192,000.510 Of this, Fremantle was allocated £5,045.511 While it 
might be conceded that some assistance was better than none, the limited vision and 
restricted nature of the Federal government’s attempt at a solution in fact created 
an adverse effect in Fremantle. Road-work had traditionally been undertaken by 
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Council employees, as is the case today. By requiring the Council to direct the work 
on the roads funded by this emergency aid strictly to the unemployed, the Council’s 
existing staff came under threat. The Council was put in a position in which it had to 
create alternative works for twenty permanent staff of road workers or let them 
go.512 A report of the Works Committee was revealing of both the financial dilemma 
and the commitment to continuing the employment of its staff: 
it would be more economical for the Council to retrench approximately 
half the present number of employees until such time as the making of 
roads and footpaths in ordinary bitumen is possible next summer, but in 
view of the urgency of the question of unemployment in Fremantle, [the 
committee] believe that they can with reasonable economy find work for 
the present staff (all of whom are married men and residents of the 
Municipality) during the incoming winter months. The Committee 
understands that this action will mean the creating of an overdraft but 
they think such an action would be justified under the circumstances. The 
Committee further begs to recommend that in view of all the 
circumstances, this Council could best serve the ratepayers’ interests by 
making the necessary arrangements to continue the services of all men 
who are at present employed by the Council. 513 
This represented a wider problem, felt across the state. The loss of government jobs 
occurred not only at the municipal level but, as Crowley writes, ‘ordinary 
government employment also fell, a serious predicament for the State, as the 
government usually provided work for about one-fifth of the total working 
population’.514 
The small amount of money allocated by the Federal government in 1929 
unsurprisingly proved completely inadequate. With responsibility in practice thus 
still resting at the local level, Mayor Gibson sought avenues for the relief of his 
unemployed residents of a more permanent and sustainable nature. In January 1930 
the Council established a residence for homeless unemployed single men at the 
Immigrant’s Home on South Terrace. In March 1930 Gibson called a public meeting 
for the purpose of discussing possible solutions, at which he suggested that the 
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Premier be asked to summon a conference of the local governing bodies in the 
metropolitan area, at which they could discuss the problem of unemployment.515 
Gibson’s notion was that local councils might be able to propose a program of works 
and ask the State government to subsidise them. Fremantle was not alone in putting 
pressure on the government to provide some sort of scheme of relief. In Perth, 
throughout March, demonstrations were held with hundreds attending, urging the 
government to improve their situation. Unfortunately, ‘the only responsibility that 
the State government was prepared to take was the payment of sustenance rates to 
the unemployed’.516 This did nothing to expand the pool of work, to reduce the rate 
of joblessness, or to tackle the broader pressures (such as homelessness or inability 
to support families) that were placing increasing numbers of people under 
enormous social stress. 
As a result, both the mayor of Fremantle and the Lord Mayor of Perth, along 
with other municipal leaders, were compelled to establish their own funds, 
committees and plans for relief works. The Lord Mayor of Perth, in response to the 
needs of the unemployed in his own city, established a ‘citizens relief committee’ on 
18 March 1930.517 Likewise the Fremantle City Council formed its own 
‘Unemployment Relief Committee’ in early April, made up of members of the 
business community, the church community and councillors.518 This committee 
worked in combination with the already established single men’s and married men’s 
committees. In addition a ‘special committee’, consisting of one member from each 
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of the Council’s Works, Finance and Ovals committees was formed by the Council 
‘for the purpose of assisting to relieve the distress in the town caused by 
unemployment’. The committee was to act in conjunction with the mayor and Town 
Clerk in promulgating any work or works that would be of benefit to the town, ‘such 
as tree planting, drains and footpaths, etc’.519 Work created by the Council in this 
way provided men with cash, rather than a ration ticket. The chance of receiving 
cash was preferable to most of the unemployed as the money gave them some 
autonomy in making provision for their family.  
As a port town, Fremantle was particularly affected by the decline in trade 
and shipping, and therefore in employment at the docks. In February 1930 the 
Sunday Times proclaimed that ‘one of the pitiful sights at the port just now is the 
muster of men twice daily at the pick-up station from which hundreds return with 
no luck’.520 By July a return was submitted showing that ‘186 men were receiving 
sustenance plus 96 lumpers’.521 To local residents, it was obvious that the increased 
number of lumpers out of work indicated that the situation on the harbour ‘was 
worse than the usual seasonal unemployment trouble’.522 The precarious nature of 
work clearly produced substantial emotional stress. One paper reported how 
‘everybody began to sit up and take notice on Monday when all the lumpers on the 
wharf were engaged, and scouts were out to pick up additional labour. However, the 
jubilation was short-lived, as the rush only lasted for about twenty-four hours, and 
by mid-week, things were as usual’. The newspaper contributor, expressing the 
hope that work might soon again become plentiful, noted that sympathy with the 
lumpers was not entirely unselfish; ‘everybody knows that they are good spenders 
in their own town, and when things are slack with them, the effect is felt throughout 
all business circles’.523 
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The longer the State government delayed the establishment of a program of 
work for the unemployed, the more local families and their civic leaders had to rely 
on the munificence of their own community. Fortunately at this stage, in mid-1930, 
this was still being offered with ‘very excellent feeling’. Councillor Hollis referred to 
the charity being offered as a ‘Citizens movement’, in which councillors, members of 
parliament and ‘the most prominent people of the town’ all contributed, plus ‘over 
one thousand employees from Fremantle businesses’ who helped by giving weekly 
subscriptions’. The mayor also praised the great assistance that was being given 
from the Fremantle people in general and the generosity of two in particular: ‘Mr 
Warner, who has sent round twenty-five gallons of hot soup each morning, which is 
distributed to the married unemployed, and Messrs Baker Bros who give one 
hundred pounds of mutton and sausages each week’.524 Yet despite the generosity of 
its citizens, the simple task of ensuring that the unfortunate in Fremantle had food 
and shelter was growing too onerous for the limited means of the community. All 
the private goodwill that existed could not provide sufficient food and 
accommodation for the number of unemployed in Fremantle. The city needed a 
wider funding plan.  
The frustration of the unemployed themselves was captured in a petition signed by 
130 men on 12 September. The petition made reference to the ‘low condition’ under 
which they existed, in which the sustenance they were given was only ‘just enough 
for food and in some cases not enough’. Intimating that the higher powers did not 
understand their plight, the petitioners wrote that ‘we find now that it is only the 
man that is empty that knows what it is to be empty’. They did not want charity or 
handouts, the men emphasized, but simply to ‘that they be given sufficient work to 
enable them to buy food and pay their rent’.525 The desire to work , to contribute to 
their own upkeep and that of their families, was a defining sentiment during the 
years of the Depression. To exemplify this further, in August 1930, despite their 
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being 454 single men registered with the committee for food relief, the average 
attendance at the midday meals was 162. The West Australian reported that the 
‘reason for the comparatively low daily average is that 50 or 60 men each day 
absent themselves, following a day’s work’.526 Once having money in their pocket, 
they refused to suffer the perceived indignity of a public demonstration of their 
inability to feed themselves. 
 
The crisis deepens: May-December 1930 
In May 1930, a newly-elected Nationalist-Country party coalition State government 
took the reins with James Mitchell at its head. Despite, the fact that ‘by the winter of 
1930 Australia now obviously faced a financial depression without parallel in the 
thirty years’ life of the Commonwealth’, Mitchell’s policy on coming into office was 
without imagination or perspicacity.527 Apart from the provision of sustenance, he 
proposed to rely solely on the workings of the Labour Bureau as a solution to the 
mass of unemployment. Unemployed men were required to register at their local 
Labour Bureau and were then obliged to take whatever work was offered to them or 
relinquish their right to sustenance. Unfortunately, the figures that were published 
in contemporary newspapers reveal that, at this stage, the Labour Bureau was only 
able to find work for about a quarter of those registering.528 According to Bolton, in 
March 1930, there were 2,939 unemployed registered in the metropolitan area and 
410 in the country. During the next three months the number grew at an increasing 
rate. Soon ‘the number claiming relief strained the resources of the existing 
machinery’. By June, the total number of unemployed stood at 8,040, of whom 6,580 
were in the metropolitan area. The total figure of men, women and children 
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dependent on sustenance payments was estimated at around 10,000, about ‘five per 
cent of the entire population of Perth’.529 
In Fremantle, single men in distressed circumstances continued to receive 
one meal a day supplied by the single mens’ committee and whilst endeavours were 
being made to ensure adequate sleeping accommodation, the system remained 
insufficient to their needs. As a result, men were sleeping rough in both Esplanade 
parks (in Perth and in Fremantle). These many cases of destitution troubled an 
anxious population, such as a woman who wrote to the newly elected Premier in the 
cold, wet month of May 1930: 
Fancy a wet night like tonight sleeping there with nothing to lie on, and 
nothing to cover, it won’t bear thinking about. If they were your sons, or 
my sons, we would be heartbroken at them being brought to that degree 
of misery, and they are somebody’s sons, each one. So please try and get 
shelter and a meal for them until able to work for it themselves.530  
In order to promote their own advancement, the unemployed men of Fremantle 
formed themselves into a committee. A deputation from this group, supported by 
their representative and member of the Legislative Assembly, Joseph Sleeman, 
alongside Fremantle’s representative on the Legislative Council, Gilbert Fraser, 
organized a meeting in May with the new state Minister for Works, John Lindsay, 
hoping to have more success with him than they had with the previous government. 
The main aim was to persuade the minister to end the policy of relying upon local 
charity and stop-gap, locally-funded relief works and instead to create and finance a 
comprehensive plan for the unemployed. However, the deputation also wanted to 
represent to the minister the general plight of the jobless. Sleeman told the Minister 
that there were a large number of people in Fremantle in a very bad way. One of the 
contributing factors to the general impoverishment was the unemployment 
bureau’s policy of limiting sustenance to a fixed maximum. Financial assistance was 
only given for up to five children, so that a man with six or more children, as many 
men had, received no more than the man with five. Several married men had been 
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turned out of their homes, and a great number more were threatened with eviction, 
owing to their inability to pay rent. If the government would assist with financing, 
Fraser and Sleeman argued, the Fremantle Council was eager to create practical and 
positive solutions to the social emergency they had on their hands. Some of the 
unemployed were skilled workmen, who would be quite capable of carrying out 
formation work on roads by contract. The Council also had in mind projects for 
sewerage extensions and the reconditioning of the harbor. Fraser insisted that 
would such projects ‘absorb the whole of the unemployed in Fremantle, if only the 
money could be made available’.531 Gibson suggested that if the Council were able to 
use their share of the federal traffic fees, it could provide work for the unemployed. 
He told the minister ‘it was imperative that the council should be able to access as 
large a proportion of the traffic fees as we are entitled to’ to spend locally on roads, 
‘not only to relieve the unemployed but to provide our ratepayers with good 
highways’.532 
Frank Gibson’s notion that ‘unemployment and road-making at the present 
moment seem almost inseparable’ had merit. 533   Yet his attempts to find funding 
from either federal or state governments came to no avail. To make matters worse, 
the city treasurer told the Council on 3 June that, owing to their policy of 
‘maintaining in employment a number of men who in the ordinary course would 
have been retrenched upon their completion of the council’s programme of works’, 
the Council was now in an extremely difficult financial position. Without mincing 
words, he stated bluntly that ‘the whole of the money provided by loan and rates for 
the current year was exhausted at the end of April’. He regretfully advised that ‘it 
will be impossible for the Council to continue in employment the number of men 
who are at present employed without providing further finances, either by way of 
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loans or anticipating an increase in the rates next year’.534 The Fremantle Council 
was both unable and unwilling to take either of these financial steps. But the 
dilemma was excruciating. Loans from both State and Federal governments were 
unavailable and the notion of putting up rates in such difficult times was untenable 
to the mayor. Yet neither could the Council countenance letting go so many of their 
own employees into certain unemployment and distress.  
Following the meeting, and having received no assurances from Lindsay as 
Minister of Works, Gibson took his ideas to the next available option, detailing his 
scheme in a letter to the Minister for the Unemployed, John Scaddan. In his letter, 
Gibson identified the need for the ‘uninterrupted employment’ of the men currently 
receiving sustenance payments in his area and beyond. He identified, much earlier 
than the State government, the need for a plan that incorporated a vision for the 
future occupation of the unemployed. Gibson’s suggestion was to increase ‘the 
existing sustenance to the unemployed individual by twenty-five or thirty-three and 
a third per cent, on the condition that they perform work for the local authority 
equal to such amount at the ruling rate of wage’. In regard to the financial burden on 
the State government, he suggested a condition could be made on each municipal 
authority ‘that it will refund to the Government the increased difference between 
the Department’s sustenance and the increased subsidy’. In essence, Gibson’s 
scheme outlined a way for local authorities to provide their local unemployed with 
better living conditions, whilst at the same time allowing the municipality to benefit 
from the improvements carried out.  
Gibson pointed out that Scaddan’s department was at that time expending 
approximately £3,000 per week on sustenance for the unemployed, while 
simultaneously temporary subsidies were being funded by a number of local 
governing authorities who were trying to provide what additional work they could 
for their own local unemployed. Gibson knew that these local subsidies were for 
limited periods only with no guarantee for the future. So why shouldn’t the 
government, if it were already spending the money on sustenance, simply re-route 
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the funds to local governments and charge the ‘current bank overdraft rate’. In this 
way ‘many local governing bodies would be enabled to utilise a large amount of 
labour that otherwise would be wasted’. The salient conditions of Gibson’s scheme 
made sense: there were many willing workers eager to do the work, local 
authorities were not in a financial position to take on the extra expenditure, and the 
government was already spending the money on sustenance in any case. Why not 
direct the money into a scheme which would benefit a larger number of people for a 
longer period of time?535  
Gibson wrote that his suggestions were ‘forwarded with the idea of assisting 
the government to solve an unprecedented and difficult problem’ but despite his 
obvious good intentions, neither Scaddan nor his government took the mayor’s 
ideas any further. Scaddan’s cursory reply was that he was ‘negotiating with the 
Under Treasurer, who has been unavailable for some time’.536 Still waiting for an 
outcome in August, the Sunday Times revealed that the Fremantle Council, ‘nearly at 
tether’s end, is awaiting anxiously the result of negotiations between the minister 
and the under treasurer over the mayor’s relief scheme’.537 Whilst the State 
government seemingly sat on its hands, conditions in Fremantle continued to 
decline. 
A critical element in the worsening situation was that the limits of private 
donations and limited local government initiatives were now being reached. A letter 
to the editor of the West Australian decried that ‘the many schemes in operation for 
the relief of the unemployed, while useful at the moment, are of too temporary a 
nature to do more than minimize the evil for a time. With trade bad and money 
scarce, the public will not be able to subscribe the funds necessary for an indefinite 
period’.538  The relief committees were finding it harder and harder to fund their 
supplementary programs.  Yet the need continued to grow; in one week in August, 
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‘following a lean period on the wharves, 1004 parcels were distributed among 502 
persons’, representing half the labour force on the port at the time.539  
Throughout the metropolitan area, numbers of local men left home in an 
effort to find employment in the country. This rarely worked in their favour, 
however, as country towns had quickly become as devastated by unemployment as 
the urban districts. Bolton writes that ‘this did not stop a number of city youths from 
venturing into the outback, where before long they wore out even the large 
hospitality of the bush, with their cadging for hand-outs of food, their incompetence 
at any type of bush work, and their tendency to leave gates open, neglect their 
campfires, and generally ignore the code of the North’.540 
What had not yet been conveyed to Gibson was the result of the meeting of 
the Federal Loan Council in early August 1930. Senator Hal Colebatch had attended 
the meeting on behalf of James Mitchell, who was home with a sick wife.541 Sir Otto 
Neimeyer, as representative of the Bank of England, had been invited to the 
conference by the Prime Minister to help solve Australia’s fiscal difficulties and 
provide a solution to the unemployment problem.542 Colebatch telegraphed Mitchell 
a summary of the meeting and Neimeyer’s recommendations. In short, he reported 
that Neimeyer considered the Australian position so critical that it was essential 
that Australia should clear up its obligations to the London banks and that the 
Commonwealth and the States should undertake to strictly balance their budgets, 
and forestall borrowing money from overseas. Most importantly, Neimeyer 
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recommended that any internal loans raised in Australia should be ‘restricted to 
works that within twelve months will prove reproductive’.543 On receiving the 
telegram Mitchell replied, ‘my dear Colebatch, your telegraphed summary of the 
proceedings of the loan council leaves me stone cold’.544 Mitchell had hoped to 
borrow money from London to bolster the State government’s finances during the 
present crisis, but would now have to review his financial options. Certainly this set 
back presented a difficulty for the State government in funding unemployment 
relief. Yet the Fremantle City Council, and other councils throughout the state, were 
in the midst of depleting their own budgets for the welfare of the unemployed.  
Recognising that other local governments were trying to manage the 
financial and social crisis currently underway, Gibson actively pursued his scheme 
among his contemporaries in other metropolitan areas. A month after he outlined 
his ideas to Scaddan, a deputation of representatives of the local government 
association met the Minister for Unemployment in person. The stated object of the 
deputation ‘was to place before the Minister the suggestions made recently by the 
mayor of Fremantle, Mr. F.E. Gibson’.545 Gibson’s energy and even desperation to 
find a solution to the unemployment problem emerges clearly from the 
contemporary record. While the surviving documents do not provide any detail on 
Gibson’s links with other municipal authorities, or reveal whether his initiative 
received further serious attention in Perth, the fact that the State government never 
pursued his plan tells its own story.546  
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As the number of the unemployed in Western Australia rolled past ten 
thousand, the State government announced its reviewed sustenance program. The 
circular letter sent to the local government agencies detailing the scheme was a 
portrait of a severity. It began by emphasising that unemployment in itself was not a 
claim for Government sustenance and that a recipient must be in extreme necessity 
before qualifying. Sustenance was paid in exchange for physical labour and was 
available only to married men. Only once a man had exhausted all his assets except 
bare necessities due to unemployment, and thus been reduced to the point of not 
being able to buy food or meet obligations such as the payment of rent, then and 
only then could he be considered. The only factor taken into consideration in 
determining the value of sustenance the recipient would receive was the minimum 
required to provide food for the man and his family, plus payment of rent and 
clothing. Even then, clothing was not necessarily taken into consideration, because it 
was taken as a given that in most cases existing local relief organisations would be 
‘able to supply wholly or in part, an applicant’s requirements for either himself or 
his family’. In other words, a man claiming sustenance must not only have to prove 
the level of his desperation to the government agency, but would probably also have 
to be a supplicant to whatever local charity organisation might be able to provide 
his family with clothing. The letter reminded the local government agencies that the 
provision of sustenance was strictly a reaction to necessity and its ‘enjoyment’ was 
in no way to be encouraged among the population. The State government stressed 
that it would provide ‘the very minimum’ amount of work strictly as a relief 
measure, to avoid ‘the effect of the applicant’s not seeking normal employment’.547  
The State’s policy was a harsh imposition on the distressed. The subtext was 
clear: the unemployed were inherently lazy and untrustworthy, and hence had to be 
strictly watched as they might well prefer to be unemployed and rely on the 
government for an income, rather than having to work. Above all, therefore, they 
must not be cosseted through undue generosity. But evidence from the Council 
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records makes clear that the opposite was in fact the case. Alex McCallum had been 
Fremantle’s elected member of the Legislative Assembly since 1921 and a 
representative of Fremantle people in one form or another since 1905.548 As such he 
was deeply involved in the personal experience of the unemployed in Fremantle 
during the Depression years. A letter sent to him sometime later (in 1931) makes 
clear how the process that was implemented of applying for such relief was 
perceived by its recipients as ‘the source of much humiliation to honest men’: 
On application for relief, a person has to give a signed statement setting 
out his exact position, financially and otherwise…I don’t object to this 
procedure but I do emphatically object to having an inspector follow in 
the wake of such application, and running the rule over one’s 
possessions. The majority of applicants for sustenance have been 
residents of Fremantle for years. They have clean records. Their only 
crime is that they are unemployed. Why should they be subjected to the 
indignity of having an unwanted official inspecting their belongings. 
There may be a few that would take sustenance fraudulently, but I am 
sure a house examination is no way to entrap them. I am sure that other 
methods of verification could be employed that would be less humiliating 
and more effective.549  
The implication was clear: the unemployment bureau’s oblique suspicion of motives 
and a wanton denial of the right to privacy overshadowed the State’s sustenance 
policy.  
Fremantle authorities could do little to shelter their local applicants from the 
strict processes. Although the administration of government sustenance was 
undertaken by local governments, those authorities had no real power to grant 
sustenance to their own people, having to refer in every particular to the State body. 
Married men were required to register with the local authority for their district. 
That local authority had to satisfy itself as to the genuineness of the application and 
confirm that sustenance was a necessity. The State government’s policy stated that 
‘the strictest enquiry is imperative. Where sustenance is not deemed necessary, the 
application must be refused at once’. When the local authority had formed the 
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opinion that sustenance was necessary, then the provision of sustenance needed to 
be approved by an authorised officer of the Outdoor Relief Department in East 
Perth. To organize this, the local authority had to ‘arrange for an authorised officer 
to attend the local authority to definitely determine what sustenance was to be 
given, or on the other hand, refused’. When sustenance was finally approved, the 
local authority could then claim the sustenance amount so long as the applicant was 
employed by them on relief work. Again, the policy stated that ‘until the amount of 
sustenance has been fixed by the government representative no claim for work 
given by the local authority will be recognised by the government’.550  
In other words, it is worth restating, that having ascertained that one of their 
own citizens was living in absolute poverty and need, the Council was not allowed to 
provide them with relief until their assessment had been double-checked by the 
State authorities and the paperwork completed in Perth. The outcome was not only 
cruel delays but unnecessary intrusion into the lives of their local unemployed. The 
function of the State government was thus simply to fund the minimum amount of 
sustenance while contributing nothing to a real solution to the unemployment 
problem. It was left to the local authorities to provide relief work solutions for those 
receiving government sustenance, and even then they were exhorted not to 
encourage further applications, as ‘real distress will make its own appeal’.551  
There were further limitations on the government scheme which affected 
minority groups; in Fremantle this meant mostly returned soldiers and the female 
unemployed.552 A number of the Returned Maimed & Limbless Men’s Association 
were unemployed but, owing to the fact that they were receiving a pension, were 
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debarred from registering for unemployment relief work. Yet only in cases where a 
man was permanently and totally incapacitated was a pension large enough to cover 
the needs of a family. (The Association’s ‘Men Available for Employment’ list 
contained the names of 40 men from the metropolitan area, 7 of whom were from 
Fremantle.) It put the Fremantle Council in the very difficult position that if it did 
employ a pensioned returned soldier on relief work it was not able to them get 
recompense from the government, as it did in the case of men drawing 
sustenance.553 The system was simpler for single men. The Town Clerk described 
the system to his counterpart in Albany in July 1931: 
Council has nothing whatever to do with the single men. They are maintained 
by a Relief Committee, who receive donations from the public and a subsidy 
from the Government. The men are housed at the Immigrants’ Home and are 
given three meals a day. They do not work, other than routine work in 
connection with the preparation of their own meals.554  
The Premier also nominated a Ladies Sub-committee as an adjunct to the State’s 
Unemployment Relief Committee. Based on the assumption that married women 
were supported by their husbands, this sub-committee looked into the question of 
how to deal with single women, with its report circulated to all the metropolitan 
councils. The report recommended that each centre or local committee, in 
metropolitan areas and in the country, should have at least three women on an 
investigating committee and that local church, social and other committees should 
play a supporting role in assisting the committee, such as ‘arranging circles to help 
with clothing’. Although ideally the committee ‘thought it desirable that girls remain 
in their own homes’, if this could not be achieved then women and girls were given 
sustenance ‘on the same terms as apply to single men’. This meant that if a place of 
work was found for them elsewhere, they were compelled to accept it or surrender 
the right to sustenance. In this way, a number of women and girls were placed in 
homes in the suburbs of Perth and in country towns, and girls from outside of 
Fremantle came in to positions in the city. Clergymen and women’s organisations in 
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these districts were notified when a woman or girl had been placed away from her 
home, reporting on the suitability of the establishment and keeping in touch with 
the women and girls placed there.555  
On paper, the unemployed were being ‘handed over’ to the state, yet in 
Fremantle the burden on the local government did not significantly diminish. Due to 
the limitations of the State scheme in terms of scope, funding and eligibility, there 
remained a large number of unemployed in Fremantle who relied on the 
commitment of the local council to continue its own additional relief works. The 
Council came up with a detailed plan to employ 350 men. All the men were engaged, 
as much as possible, in the areas in which they lived. All those residing in South 
Fremantle were engaged on work improving Sandown Park; the Hilton Park district 
gang worked on road improvements on South Street; the North Ward gang were 
given work excavating the footpath in Canning Road between Canning Road and the 
river; and the Central Ward gang were employed initially on removing rock from the 
corner of High and Bateman streets. These men were then taken to the tip in 
Montreal Street to make the site safer by depositing rubble, and afterwards set to 
work to level and improve a number of other local streets. The North Ward gang, 
once they completed the footpath at Canning Road for pedestrian traffic, were sent 
to excavate rock on South Street and to form the roadway there to full width. When 
they had completed that work, they were ‘engaged on removing the rock formation 
at the corner of Finnerty and East Streets and the rubble from this being deposited 
on the Reserve adjoining’.556 This was intense physical labour and whilst in it is 
probable that there were experienced labourers among the men employed, there is 
no guarantee that all were accustomed to hard physical work. Jack Scaddan, putting 
a positive slant on things, said ‘many men were being given hard manual work to 
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which they were not accustomed, and apart from soreness for a few days, they were 
doing well’.557 
The work provided by the Council allowed it to engage a large number of 
local men, but the Council could not, as Gibson had previously pointed out on more 
than one occasion, offer any continuity of this work or make any guarantees for the 
future. The existing plan, as beneficial as it was, could only last for ‘the ensuing five 
months’.558 The Council had taken on debt when its own income was significantly 
reduced. By October, Council funds were depleted. Its bank overdraft at the end of 
September was £7,865, of which £5836 had been spent on work creation 
programs.559 The Council’s financial state was also affected by the decreased 
earnings of the Fremantle Tramways and Electric Lighting Board, who can best be 
described as the ‘business arm’ of the Fremantle City Council. According to Ewers, 
the balance sheet of the Tramway Board showed that the Council would receive only 
£284 in income for 1930, compared to an average of £3000 annually for the three 
previous years. Although the council knew their profits from the company would 
decrease, Ewers writes that ‘the council had expected an income closer to £2000 not 
£200’.560 The size of the Council debt and the lack of income raised once again the 
possibility that it might have to put to stop relief works if more suitable 
arrangements could not be made with the State government. The Council wrote to 
the Relief Committee in Perth that unless its proposal ‘regarding the financing of the 
unemployed is agreed to, the Council may be forced to abandon all work for the 
unemployed’.561 Whilst waiting for a response from the State officials, the Council 
decided to put a stop to any further relief works ‘except that which could be 
performed with no overhead cost other than the wages of the supervisor’. Men 
employed on all works except Monument Hill were notified that as soon as their 
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current work was completed no further work could be offered them.562 For future 
works, in order to keep debt to a minimum, payment for the work would be limited 
‘to the amount received from the Government in rations’.563 Fremantle’s position 
was this: without a comprehensive approach from the State government—and not 
another temporary stop-gap or highly restricted scheme but a realistic, long-term 
plan capable of operating for more than a few months—the City Council simply did 
not have the financial means to take care of its growing numbers of unemployed.  
That the breadth of the relief required was financially unsustainable for 
Fremantle on its own can be seen in the reports of the relief committees. In April 
1930 there were 122 single men on the register of the single men’s committee, by 
the end of August the figure had risen to 507 and by October to 544.564 By December 
1930 a staggering 23,930 hot midday meals had been fed to the unemployed single 
men, representing an average of 460 per week. Some 6,560 parcels of vegetables 
and groceries, 4,520 parcels of meat and 650 tonnes of firewood had been 
distributed to married men. The value of the food was £1,108 and the firewood 
£1,000. Relief orders for necessitous cases had cost £716.565 In an effort to ease the 
burdens of the community, the relief committee had some success in providing 
cheaper bread for the unemployed by forming a relationship with the Master Bakers 
to supply bread at 3½ pence per loaf.566 Even this was raised in December when, 
‘owing to the increase in the price of flour, by which the price for Unemployed Relief 
Bread is controlled, the price for sustenance workers will be increased to 3¾d. per 
                                                        
562 West Australian, 7 October 1930, p11. 
563 Town Clerk to Secretary of the Coordinating Relief Committee, Perth, 16 
September 1930 Fremantle Correspondence files, AN 217/3, Acc 1377, Item 45, Vol 
1, Unemployed 1930, SRO, Perth. 
564 In October, the single men’s committee provided 2121 meals in one week alone. 
The Daily News, 14 October 1930, p2. The paper also revealed the continuing 
program of relief funding being carried out in Fremantle; on October 24 the 
Fremantle Cycling Club and the Cycling Association were to hold a cycling carnival 
with 25 events, and the ‘whole of the proceeds will be donated to the relief 
executive’. 
565 See the committee reports published in the West Australian, 7 October 1930, p11. 
566 Fremantle City Council correspondence files: AN 217/3, Acc 1377, Item 44-45, 
1930-32, SRO, Perth. 
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loaf, until further notice’. 567 The Council sold the coupons for the requisite amount 
of bread at the reduced price and the coupons were honoured by all bakers in 
Fremantle. 
For all these costs, the committees still relied almost exclusively on the 
generosity of the people of Fremantle. Nonetheless, private donation simply could 
not cover the cost of all the needed relief areas. These included ‘sickness, maternity, 
housing, clothing, warmth, schooling, infant health, pre-natal and anti-natal help and 
all the ramifications of the well-being of our citizens’.568 In the last weeks of 1930 
the Fremantle sustenance workers welfare association (a reformation of the earlier 
committee of unemployed workers) asked the Council for two weeks of full time 
work before Christmas ‘which would enable them to better their lot and give a few 
comforts to their children at Christmas time’.569 The two weeks’ work was granted, a 
response typical of the commitment long demonstrated by the mayor and Council to 
the welfare of their local unemployed despite the continual diminishment of its 
resources. On another occasion the council employed ‘two of the Government 
sustenance workers who live in the vicinity of Hilton Park, to water the trees’.570 
Later, in 1932 the council created six weeks work for the unemployed, cleaning up 
the hospital grounds.571 The Fremantle businessmen’s association also took the 
initiative by forming a committee for ‘absorbing the unemployed on works of a 
reproductive nature’.572 They asked for a member of the Council to participate and 
once again leading from the front, Frank Gibson offered to join the committee 
himself. 
                                                        
567 Master Baker’s Industrial Union of Employers to Town Clerk, 2 December 1931, 
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But the underlying problem of resources could not be overcome by mere 
goodwill or personal commitment. Already by the end of January 1931, the 
Fremantle Advertiser reported that ‘the Committee now finds itself without funds. 
Distress in the district is growing. The need for help is urgent’. A public meeting was 
held to discuss the problem and the mayor and all the relief committee members 
were present, in order to listen to any solutions the public might be able to offer. 
Reverend Nye told the meeting that the funds of both single and married men’s 
committees were now exhausted. The chairman of the married men’s committee, 
Edmund Gray, told the meeting his committee had spent £308/12/6 providing milk 
for children, expectant mothers and the sick but ‘when the schools opened next 
week there would be no money to continue the supply of milk to the little ones’. The 
mayor confirmed that the ‘unemployed problem was an acute one, and the condition 
of these people during the winter months is unthinkable’. The Fremantle Advertiser 
concluded that ‘the question of unemployment has become the Council’s greatest 
anxiety’.573  
Facing despair: January to December 1931 
The year of 1931 brought increasing challenges to both Fremantle and the State. 
Initially, at the Fremantle Council, some small administrative changes were 
required.574 In February the mayor and councillors decided that the single men who 
had to visit Town Hall every morning for the distribution of meal tickets ‘should be 
removed to a more commodious and less conspicuous locality’. For this purpose, the 
                                                        
573 Fremantle Advertiser, 29 January 1931, p1. 
574 Since, according to the new regulations, the local authority had to interview every applicant for 
sustenance, it had become difficult to conduct the ordinary affairs of business in the Town Hall. The 
gatherings of unemployed men had clearly become something of a chaotic event. From February the 
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frequenting the Town Hall for the purpose of interviewing officials of the Unemployed Relief 
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or obscene language while waiting’. (Memo, Town Clerk to the Chairman of the Executive of 
Unemployed Relief Committee, Fremantle Fremantle Correspondence files: AN 217/3, Acc 1377, Item 
45, 1931, SRO, Perth.) Yet the newspapers did not rail against the general behavior of the 
unemployed in Fremantle, so perhaps the general sloppy behavior criticized by the Council was 
simply the product of the lengthy waiting periods required by a deeply unpopular administrative 
process.  
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mayor made arrangements with the Ugly Men’s Association for a separate and 
permanent position in Uglieland, opposite the railway station. In all likelihood the 
councillors were hoping to reduce the visual impact of this proliferation of 
unemployed men in Fremantle’s civic centre and perhaps apply some degree of 
normality to this change in the city’s social environment. However they also 
expressed the feeling that ‘the men who receive the meal tickets would prefer 
headquarters which are less public than the Town Hall’.575 This decision was less 
about moral opprobrium than recognition that despite the universality of the 
unemployment problem, there remained a sense of personal shame to the recipients 
in having to line up for a ration ticket. An additional burden on the single men 
specifically was that, when employment was available, preference was given in all 
cases to men who had families to feed. With so many men out of work and only a 
limited number of positions to be filled, this inequity was the cause of serious 
deprivation among the single men of Fremantle, whose numbers continue to grow. 
As the depression conditions continued, the Fremantle Advocate printed the 
following anecdotal story. The truth of the report is quite unlikely; what is more 
credible is the underlying dim view of the state system of unemployment relief held 
by the paper, and by the people of Fremantle: 
An official of the Labour Bureau discussing the unemployment position, 
expressed the view that hundreds of single men had been forced into 
matrimony in order that they might not starve. On numerous occasions, 
he stated, men, single and unattached, have applied for work at the 
bureau only to be told that work or sustenance was only given to married 
men. ‘Oh well’ hundreds of them have said, ‘I’ll soon fix that – marriage 
for me’. And sure enough within a week or so they return to register as 
married men.576 
The Council could with some justice feel that it had done all it could to 
protect its own workers at least. In March 1931 a letter to its insurers reveals that 
the Council had only twenty permanent employees who qualified to be covered by 
                                                        
575 Town Clerk to Chairman of the Executive of Unemployed Relief Committee, 3 
February, 1931 Fremantle Fremantle Correspondence files: AN 217/3 Acc 1377 
Item 45 1931. SRO, Perth 
576 Fremantle Advocate, 20 April 1933, p1. 
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their insurance policy. All its other workers were government sustained workers, of 
which they employed 325 and these were outside of the policy guidelines.577  
Times were grim. Throughout the year the dire condition of Fremantle’s men, 
women and children was one of the main topics in the press and these articles 
provide the best source for relief figures at the time. The newspapers reveal that in 
February 1931 the relief committees had 700 families under their care yet had had 
no contributions of clothing for three months and many needy cases had been 
turned away.578 A month later, registered single men in Fremantle numbered 494. 
By mid-April there were 225 destitute single men on the streets. The physical 
presence of suffering was inescapable in Fremantle, the city was burdened by need. 
Furthermore, the calls for assistance in the newspapers were staggering. For 
example, in April 1931 Fremantle people were told that 3,000 pairs of boots and 
shoes were needed for all ages, from children to adults.579 Efforts to find work and 
goods for the suffering population were also driven by the changing weather. With 
winter approaching, a scheme for the provision of firewood was established under 
which government sustenance workers ‘hewed the wood’. In July, there were 400 
families in Fremantle being given this assistance. At the same time, ‘200 families 
which included children under twelve months’ were supplied every week with milk 
and a staggering 1000 families in Fremantle were being helped by the local fund. Yet 
the most salient part in this whole exercise was the appalling lack of funding 
available for this staggering number of needy people. The July newspapers reported 
that ‘applications for relief were twice the number they had been last year but the 
available funds were fifty per cent less’.580 The balance among the local people, as 
more of them joined the ranks of those needing help rather than providing it, 
became more and more unequal. Yet the financial burden continued at this stage to 
                                                        
577 Town Clerk to Queensland Insurance Co., 17 March 1931, Fremantle 
Correspondence files: AN 217/3 Acc 1377 Item 45 1931. SRO, Perth 
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 176 
be borne only on a local level. Thankfully, the State government was now taking 
some long overdue steps to remedy the situation. 
In July 1931 Premier Mitchell joined the other State premiers in Melbourne for 
the Premiers’ Conference. In advance of the conference the Prime Minister, Jack 
Scullin, wrote to each of the Premiers: 
 As it is necessary that Governments undertake works to provide 
employment I suggest each Government bring to the Conference 
particulars of Government works that could be undertaken at once, a list 
of similar works which could be undertaken by Local Government 
authorities or State instrumentalities is also desired.581 
As a result of the conference, the Premier announced that ‘those people currently 
being paid sustenance relief, 16,089 in number, would be transferred to public 
works projects as quickly as possible’.582 On 28 September, the Minister for Works 
announced a government scheme through which the State government intended to 
provide 6000 men with part-time work within a month, and eventually provide 
work for 10,000 men. The Minister explained that the Commonwealth Bank had 
pledged to advance money to the States ‘for relief works of a reproductive 
character’, and the share to Western Australia was calculated at £1,100,000. The 
Premier had committed to spending at least eighty per cent of that money on wages, 
‘and as much as possible of the remainder on materials of local origin, for the 
stimulation of local industries and the further relief of unemployment’. The idea was 
to spread the available money over the greatest number of men possible. For 
Fremantle, the importance of the scheme was the inclusion of the ‘reconditioning of 
the north wharf at Fremantle’ among the projected works. The government 
intended to spend around £50,000 on the improvements to the north wharf on 
which ‘local timber and cement’ would be used whilst ‘150 married men would be 
employed upon the work’.583  
Among other projected works, the government planned to employ 4,240 men 
on work on metropolitan water supplies whilst sewerage and drainage would 
                                                        
581 Telegram from J. Scullin, Prime Minister, to Premier, 25 July 1931, Perth Mines Department AN 
350 Item No. 1409 1931. SRO, Perth 
582 Snooks, ‘Development in Adversity’, p265. 
583 West Australian, 29 September 1931, p1. 
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absorb ‘790 married men in various metropolitan and suburban areas’. In Fremantle 
this included sewerage work on the South Street drain. In the introduction of this 
particular project, although there is no correspondence on the subject extent in the 
archive, the mayor must have had the ear of the Minister for works, for this 
particular drain had been on the mayor’s ‘to do’ list since 1929.584  
On the down side, due to the new unemployment bureau policy, the Council 
could no longer choose the labourers for sustenance work from within the ranks of 
its own unemployed; instead labour was drawn from the main office of the 
unemployment bureau. This meant of course, that men from outside of Fremantle 
could be brought in to work on local projects. The system also meant that men from 
Fremantle were chosen for work outside their own town. The local men of 
Fremantle objected to this arrangement, feeling that they should be given preferred 
access to local work. The Town Clerk wrote to the Minister for Works that 
‘numerous applicants have represented to me their desire to obtain work on the 
South Street drain’ but had not been allocated to this job.585 At this time there were 
2,852 men distributed on sustenance work throughout the metropolitan area but 
only eighty-eight men on the Fremantle sewerage work, hence the competition for 
placement among the local men.586 For most Fremantle men, their desire to obtain 
work closer to home, and have some control over their working lives, was 
paramount. James Shepherd wrote to the Secretary of the Unemployed Coordinating 
Relief Committee that ‘the men who are on sustenance in Fremantle and who are 
working for the Council have organised themselves into a very efficient body, with a 
president, secretary and a reliable committee’.587 That committee wrote to the Town 
Clerk, ‘it is the wish of the majority of men working on sustenance to be allowed to 
work locally on South Street storm-water drains, making and forming footpaths, 
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road making and South Beach foreshore. We claim as rate payers that we should 
have the right to improve our local surroundings’.588  
Once again, in a case of a Fremantle Town Clerk butting heads with the 
supervisory authority in Perth, James Shepherd wrote to the unemployment relief 
office in support of his local men. Shepherd suggested to the Perth committee that 
the men, who had the support of the Council, could be given a little more autonomy 
within the sustenance program in organising the pick-up for the unemployed 
workers. The Secretary of the Unemployment Relief Office in Perth replied denying 
the request and reminding him that ‘the Supervisor will be making the selections 
according to the usual criteria; preference to be given to: men longest out of 
employment; experienced sewerage workers; men on sustenance’.589 The 
regulations regarding the pick-up changed as numbers of unemployed increased. 
Always the priority was the employment of men with families to feed. The hours a 
man could work in turn depended on how many children he had to support, which 
was set at 7 shillings for each child. Thus a man earning 35 shillings per week had to 
have at least five children.590 This new arrangement, whilst understandably 
prioritising men with large families, put further strain on local men who did not fit 
the criteria. With over 800 unemployed men in Fremantle and that number 
increasing, these limitations on work in their own city frustrated Fremantle’s 
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men.591 On their behalf the Town Clerk wrote again to the Minister for Works, 
complaining that ‘in the allocation of Government work in the metropolitan area, 
work in the Fremantle district was not in proportion to the number of unemployed’. 
Shepherd suggested to the Minister that more works should be created in Fremantle 
which would enable a proportionate number of married men to earn their 
sustenance in the district in which they lived, at a time when the Council was 
‘besieged with requests for work by men on sustenance, so that they may receive 
cash instead of ration tickets’.592  
The amount of the sustenance payment, deliberately set by the State at a 
minimum, contributed significantly to the distress among the unemployed, even 
those receiving relief work. The Secretary of the Trades Hall, James Burgess, wrote 
directly to the Premier protesting the deprivation that hundreds of men and their 
families belonging to the Trades Hall were experiencing. Burgess pleaded to the 
Premier to increase the sustenance allowance per family unit, because the amount 
being received was not sufficient to provide proper food, especially for children. In 
the clearest terms, he added a dire warning: ‘there is no doubt that the evil effects of 
malnutrition are quite apparent’.593 This was no exaggeration or cry of false alarm. 
As Bolton writes, in Fremantle there were now ‘cases of scurvy and rickets, diseases 
previously almost unknown in Australian hospitals’.594 Sadly, but perhaps 
unsurprisingly considering the vast sums currently being spent on sustenance, no 
addition was made to the allowance. Trying to do what he could on a local level, in 
                                                        
591 Premier’s Department Files AN 2/9 Acc 1703 Item 232/30 SRO, Perth 
592 Town Clerk to the Minister for Unemployment, 20 October 1931, Fremantle 
Correspondence files: AN 217/3 Acc 1377 Item 45 1931. SRO, Perth. Census data 
from 1933 suggests that the Fremantle men were correct in their representation 
that their employment was disproportionate to their unemployment. The census 
figures reveal that 3,203 Fremantle men were then receiving ‘no income’, out of a 
total of 13,320 unemployed males in the metropolitan region of Western Australia. 
Thus Fremantle unemployed comprised almost one quarter of the entire 
metropolitan area, yet were provided with far less than a quarter of the sustenance 
work. 
593 Premiers Department files, AN 2/9, Acc 1703, 232/30, Alleviation of distress and 
unemployment, SRO, Perth. 
594 Bolton, A Fine Country to Starve In, p 121. 
 180 
November 1931 Gibson boasted that ‘Fremantle has employed every man who 
resided in the district who has been sent along by the Department and given them 
the privilege of drawing cash instead of rations, which is very much appreciated by 
the men’.595 His boast was not insignificant considering the number of local 
unemployed men in Fremantle.596 By December 1931 the ‘number of families 
unemployed in the Fremantle district had risen to 1300 ‘representing around 5,200 
men, women and children’.597 In other words, by December 1931 about a quarter of 
the population of Fremantle was unemployed and in distress.598  
In an effort to disentangle themselves from unemployment at home, some 
Fremantle men looked toward the sustenance schemes which were available in the 
country. The largest of the government schemes were the Harvey drainage scheme 
and the Collie irrigation scheme.599 When the Harvey river diversion works were 
first introduced, two thousand single men were engaged within a month.600 Some 
men preferred work on these schemes rather than the sustenance work available 
for the Council because the country work tended to be of longer duration, plus for 
country work the rate of pay was £1 per week above sustenance.601 The living was a 
little rough, the men were required to take blankets and cooking utensils, but it 
placed their families in a better position. Not only was the pay and duration of the 
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work an improvement, but if husbands were picked up for jobs outside of town, 
their wives would be supplied with a ration order. In January 1932, ‘ninety men left 
Fremantle for the Government works at Harvey’.602 Men were also sent to many of 
the other country projects such as one week when thirty-four men from Fremantle 
were sent to Goomalling ‘and another twenty-eight men to a roads project at 
Brunswick Junction’.603 At this time an average of four-hundred men were employed 
each week by the Council on sustenance work. In early 1932 ‘there was a slight 
amelioration owing to seasonal activities at the port and some local men being 
employed on state government public works’ and the number of families considered 
to be in distress in Fremantle was reduced to 1,018.604  
Finding relief: gambling and the lottery 
The penury and uncertainty throughout the state caused social as well as financial 
problems. Unable or unwilling to rely solely on charity to relieve their distress, 
many of the unemployed took to gambling as a way of taking control of their own 
destiny. Many also gambled for amusement or distraction. Although local football 
matches were free for the unemployed after half time, most other entertainments 
were outside the budget of the unemployed, ‘the small sixpence fee to go to the 
pictures was more often than not beyond the reach of most’.605 Gambling offered 
excitement and an escape from ennui. So, understandably, gambling became a 
popular method of escapism, and generally took one of three forms: starting-price 
betting, newspaper competitions, or the purchase of illegal lottery tickets.606  
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For Fremantle men there was a popular tradition of betting with a starting-
price bookmaker, more commonly known as an S.P. bookie, with whom the 
unemployed could put on bets for as little as a shilling.607 Newspapers from 1927 to 
1930 contain numerous reports of the prosecutions at Fremantle police court for 
street betting, obstructing the footpath (which was due to street betting) and the 
keeping of betting houses or common gaming houses. Market Street was 
particularly disreputable. In the defence of one of the men charged with keeping a 
betting house in Market Street, his lawyer told the court that ‘Fremantle people 
must have their bets, the sooner these houses are licensed the better for all’.608 In 
defence of his own electorate, the member for Fremantle, Joseph Sleeman, argued 
that gambling was seen as the workingman’s evil and therefore ‘the law was 
invoked rather heavy-handedly in Fremantle’. He told his fellow assembly-men that 
‘a man can go to the racecourse and bet as much as he likes. If another man takes up 
a position on the other side of the river and desires to have a shilling bet, the police 
become active and he is put inside’.609 
Into this environment, with the costs of administering sustenance and relief 
being, as Premier Mitchell stated, ‘quite literally unremunerative’, the Minister for 
Police, Jack Scaddan, announced that it was his intention to introduce during the 
next session of Parliament a Bill to legalise State Lotteries.610 Scaddan introduced 
the Lotteries Control Bill to the Legislative Assembly of the West Australian 
parliament on 28 September 1932 but had established the viability of a State-run 
                                                                                                                                                                     
them in plain envelopes to the persons designated in the order. Bolton writes: ‘Thus 
the cryptic announcement “I communicate with Hobart” announced that the person 
advertising could obtain Tattersall’s tickets for anyone willing to send the money 
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lottery eighteen months before. In June 1931, Scaddan had initiated a State-run 
Charities Consultation Committee. This committee ran ‘consultations’, an alternative 
term for ‘lotteries’, profits of which were distributed entirely to charities, once the 
expenses and prizes had been taken from the ticket sales. By the time he introduced 
the Bill to the Legislative Assembly in September 1932, the trial Charities 
Consultations had received subscriptions of a little over £68,000.611 This 
represented an enormous figure, capable of doing a great amount for the welfare of 
Western Australians. Scaddan tried to convince parliament that it was pragmatic to 
legalise lotteries: 
Were it not that it is hoped to provide benefits for these people I would 
not be introducing the Bill. I am not bringing it down to enable people to 
indulge in gambling. I want that to be distinctly understood. There are 
people who are struggling and finding it difficult to get the wherewithal 
to live. Many of these too, are not responsible for the condition in which 
they find themselves. If institutions cannot get money in any other way I 
am not prepared to take the backwash from a conscientious section of 
the community and be roundly abused for bringing down a method that 
savours of stepping into the breach.612 
Despite the success of Scaddan’s trial lottery, the introduction of the Bill 
caused an enormous amount of controversy among the public and politicians alike. 
The problem with gambling, for those objecting to it, was that it was an unethical 
way of obtaining prosperity. Gambling contravened the Protestant work ethic 
‘because it broke the link between work, merit and reward’; indulgence in gambling 
equated to moral and spiritual danger. 613 One of the fundamental pretexts for the 
Lotteries Bill was its contribution to the social good; but the social reformers (which 
included the very church group which combined to ease the distress of the 
unemployed in 1928) insisted that money earned by gambling was inherently 
immoral.614 At one of the many rallies in opposition to the Lotteries Bill, a visitor 
from Belfast, the Rev. A. Wylie, told his audience that ‘the appeal for gambling on the 
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ground of the need for charity is wrong and rotten’.615 Moral arguments against 
gambling also dominated debate of the Bill in the Legislative Assembly. The Leader 
of the Opposition, Phillip Collier, declared that ‘it is not the province of Parliament to 
cater for the weaknesses of the people, but to legislate in such a way as to diminish 
the opportunities of the people to give way to the weaknesses inherent in them’.  
Collier argued that the traditional method of voluntary giving would sustain 
charities and he refused to accept that a lottery was a proper method to fund 
charitable organisations. Scaddan asked Collier and his supporters to find a better 
solution. He argued that the people were already overburdened with taxation; a 
State lottery would provide a method by which people could voluntarily tax 
themselves. The benefit of that kind of taxation, argued Scaddan, was that there was 
no compulsion about it. No one need subscribe to a sweep or a lottery who objected 
to paying taxation by that means. The moment a person objected to that form of 
taxation he ceased to pay the tax, because he no longer contributed to the lottery. 
That, according to Scaddan, was a much more equitable way of gaining the 
necessary funds for charity.616 
Scaddan prevailed and on 2 February 1933 the Lotteries Control Act was 
proclaimed. In the light of all the public speculation and criticism the Government 
took some care in the choice of the four members of the inaugural Charities 
Consultation, soon to be everywhere known as the Lotteries Commission. In a 
testament to his commitment to community welfare, Frank Gibson was nominated 
to the four-man board. On 23 March 1933 the West Australian published an article 
announcing the fruits of the very first lottery draw, drawn on 21 March, which was 
described as ‘a vindication of the government’s policy of controlling lotteries to 
serve charitable ends. The allocation covers a very wide field of deserving 
organisations and institutions, the majority of which benefited by a substantial 
sum’.617 In Fremantle, the Lotteries Commission funds found their way to numerous 
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charities, including the local unemployment fund, at a time when they were most 
needed.618  
The Council confronts its finances, 1932-1933 
In January 1932 the Council identified that the widespread non-payment of rates 
had left a significant hole in its finances that directly impacted on its ability to 
maintain its own staff. The finance committee told the councillors that the Council’s 
well-intentioned commitment to keeping employees on half-time rather than 
putting them out of work, had actually left these employees ‘in a worse position than 
Government sustenance workers’. Thus the finance committee suggested a policy ‘of 
pressing persons able to pay their rates’ which would allow the Council to employ 
council workers on a pattern of two weeks on and one week off. If they did not 
pursue this policy of recovery, the committee warned, the alternative would be to 
‘arrange for the whole of the Council’s road work to be performed with sustenance 
labour’. The recommendation was that ‘all those ratepayers who owe rates for last 
year and who have not made satisfactory arrangements for payment be given seven 
days’ notice that the Council will commence proceedings for the recovery of the 
rates outstanding’. At the end of July the amount of outstanding rates was 
£12,654.619 Aware of the amount of employment that could be created with even a 
portion of this figure, the City Treasurer, Councillor Stevens, made an appeal to the 
ratepayers to meet their obligations in connection with municipal rates and charges. 
At the same time, the finance committee became more proactive in pursuing 
repayment plans, deciding on a policy of examining the merits of each individual 
case where ratepayers had not met their obligations and what action to take to 
ensure that wherever possible, all rates that could be collected would be 
recovered.620 However, by October, the amount of outstanding rates remained 
                                                        
618 Lotteries money also funded the extension to the outpatients clinic at Fremantle Hospital, built 
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619 Fremantle City Council files AN 217/3 Acc 1377 Minute Book 1931-1932 SRO, 
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almost undiminished.621 As a result the finance committee recommended that the 
Council employ a ‘collector of arrears of rates, at a salary of £1 a week and 
commission of twenty per cent on all moneys collected’. After considerable 
discussion, the recommendation was agreed to on a division, the voting being six to 
five in favour of the proposal. It was explained by the chairman of the finance 
committee, Councillor Stevens, that the committee had no wish to harass those who 
were not able to meet their obligations. It was proposed that a list be made of those 
who owed rates over of period of four or more years. The matter was 
straightforward according to Councillor Stevens, who said simply ‘the Council 
needed money’.622 
Since the introduction of the Municipal Act of 1906, which enabled councils 
to charge interest on rates owing over one year, the Fremantle Council had never 
acted on it. In November, however, the finance committee wanted to do so. In fact, 
the chairman took the position that the Council was obliged to comply with the Act. 
Perhaps being a touch disingenuous, Stevens said ‘the Council has tried to do its 
utmost to relieve the ratepayers as far as possible and I don’t think the Council 
would force the issue now if the law would permit it to escape it’. The finance 
committee’s suggestion produced a heated debate in Council which was reported in 
the press. Councillor Edmund Davies was absolutely opposed to the idea and 
challenged Stevens’ suggestion that it was ‘obligatory’ for the Council to enforce the 
Act. ‘Why then’, he asked, ‘had the Council not done so before?’ Newly elected 
councilor and former secretary of the Fremantle Trades Hall, James Burgess, 
advocated taking a middle ground and taking action only against those the Council 
judged ‘would not’ pay their rates as opposed to those who ‘could not’, because ‘the 
indiscriminate imposition of interest at the present stage was manifestly unfair’. The 
mayor was not as confident that there was any such distinguishing line. He told the 
meeting that he could ‘see no reason for imposing the interest charge at a time like 
                                                        
621 The report of the finance committee stated ‘that £7,060 was outstanding in 
current rates and £3,823 in arrears’. West Australian, 18 October 1932, p11. SRO, 
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622 West Australian, 18 October 1932, p11. 
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this when people are out of work and businesses fail owing to abnormal conditions’. 
In the mayor’s opinion there was no wrong in allowing ratepayers to pay their 
obligations the best way they can. Those who can’t pay deserve the utmost 
consideration’. When councillor Grigg suggested that they couldn’t defy the Act, the 
mayor responded: ‘we are not defying the Act. We are just not putting it into 
operation’. While the mayor’s heart was in the right place, his sanguine attitude to 
the Council’s finances was perhaps imprudent. The finance committee, however, 
was more prosaic. It had its eye on the five per cent interest it could charge on the 
substantial overdue amount of rates. The figure would certainly make a significant 
contribution to the Council’s depleted coffers. This divided opinion among the 
councilors was reflected in the final vote, in which the motion was defeated seven to 
six.623  
Despite the lack of income resulting from non-payment of rates the Council 
continued its program of relief works. Whilst this was of benefit to the city’s 
unemployed, the fact of the matter was that the work had to be paid for. In February 
1933 the finance committee resurrected the notion of taking strong measures to 
collect overdue rates. The mayor and councillors who had protested against 
aggressive action for the recovery of rates in 1932, were now overruled. When the 
finance committee again introduced the motion to charge interest on overdue rates, 
this time it prevailed. At the Council meeting, similar arguments were debated as 
they had been four months previously, until councillor Hollis, a member of the 
finance committee, told the councillors that they had legal advice to the effect that ‘if 
we do not put this into operation councillors who vote against the proposal may be 
called upon to pay the interest. You must realize that any councillor who votes 
against the proposal will make himself personally liable’. This threat was not enough 
to sway the entire council; councillor Thornett bravely said he would take the risk. 
However, when it came to a vote, the recommendation to enforce payment of 5% 
interest on overdue rates was put and carried, by six votes to five. The decision, 
                                                        
623 West Australian, 15 November 1932, p7. 
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unsurprisingly, was not well received in the Fremantle community. The Fremantle 
Advocate had this to say: 
For 27 years there has been a law in existence which provides that 
interest at the rate of 5% shall be charged on all municipal rates 12 
months in arrears. And the provisions of the Act insofar as they relate to 
this imposition, have never been enforced until now, the year 1933, the 
worst year of depression ever known. Why have the civic Rip Van 
Winkles now awakened from their 27 years sleep to impose a hardship 
upon people which they will be unable to stand?624 
That the Fremantle people were facing incredible hardship at this time was 
undeniable. Alex McCallum addressed a crowded hall in Fremantle in March, telling 
them: 
I never thought I would ever see people living under the conditions they 
are faced with today. Men can’t get a job unless they are on sustenance, 
and they can’t get on sustenance until they have got right down to a state 
of utter destitution.625 
McCallum was at this stage Leader of the Opposition, so his speeches were of course 
going to be strident, but his point that people were living in destitution was 
accurate. In June 1933 the national census revealed that about half the unemployed 
males in Western Australia had been without a job for over two years, about one in 
ten for four years or more.626 In Fremantle, the census figures showed that 3,203 
men in a male population of only 8,445 were receiving ‘no income’. Of these, 1,968 
men had a combined total of 4,406 dependent children. As we have seen, ‘no 
income’ generally meant no warm clothes, no shoes, no rent, no proper food and all 
the connected misery that the condition entails.627  
In May about 600 Fremantle men who were finishing other relief works were 
given employment on ‘new works in various parts of the State’.628 There was also 
some work provided at home on the Fremantle fish jetty where ‘the small job of 
reconditioning the wall which protects the fishing boat jetty at Fremantle employed 
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about twenty men on part-time for nine weeks’.629 The Town Clerk’s ‘summary of 
sustenance workers employed for week ending 7 January, 1933’ shows that the city 
had only 203 men employed on nineteen different projects.630 As this number was 
so small, the Council asked the works committee to confer with the Ovals and Parks 
committee and suggest a program of works for the ‘profitable employment of 
sustenance labour for the ensuing six months’.631 As a result, the head gardener 
submitted a plan showing that ‘a good playing area could be constructed 
economically on the Stephen Street reserve’ and the Council decided to employ 
sustenance labour in this way. By June the Council decided, for the future of 
Fremantle and of its unemployed, ‘that the whole of the sustenance labour available 
to the Council is to be engaged on beautifying the reserves and providing increased 
playing grounds’. The administration of the sustenance workers then moved from 
the Works committee to the Oval and Parks committee.632 This committee told the 
Council that ‘sufficient labour will be available for the next four months to perform 
all the work necessary on Parks and Reserves, and also to provide one properly 
organised and continuous gang on the construction of foundations of footpaths in 
outlying residential districts’.633  
 In August1933, J.J. Kenneally, the new Minister for Employment, wrote to the 
Town Clerk that the State government believed that the ‘position of the workless 
people of Western Australia would not improve until a complete wage basis had 
been restored’.634 Accordingly the state-supported program for local works came to 
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an end.635 Following his announcement that the employment of sustenance labour 
by local governing bodies was to cease, there was a backlash among most of the 
metropolitan local councils and in the media. The Sunday Times, for example, 
criticized the decision as being premature, as the Minister had not made any 
provision for absorbing the men who would be put out of work as a result. In 
Fremantle this amounted to 300 men.636 With so many of his local men facing 
unemployment Mayor Gibson wrote to Kenneally asking if the Council could employ 
more men, but pay them the full basic wage. The Council would employ these men 
on the completion of the work already started on Fremantle Park and Stephen 
Street reserve. These works, Gibson explained, were put in operation for the 
employment of men on sustenance over twelve months previously, and would be of 
considerable benefit to the community if completed. However, Gibson explained 
that the Council would need the help of the government to complete the work: ‘the 
Council are prepared to do this provided your Department will contribute one third 
of the amount paid by the Council, which is estimated to cost ₤1,250 for labour. 
Under this scheme the Council would employ approximately 24 men continuously 
for 13 weeks’.637 Kenneally agreed to the arrangement in September.  
Conclusion – Moving forward 
Years later, in his final annual report for the year ending 31 October 1951, Frank 
Gibson reflected on the enormity of the experience he had shared with his 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and the end of the Depression Era, see Bolton, G. A Fine Country to Starve In, pp237-
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ratepayers: ‘we have had to contend with a world depression, a destructive 
economic condition that destroyed contentment and happiness and created 
uncertainty and bitterness, the consequences of which were almost as chaotic to our 
well-being as a war’.638  
The parallels with previous experience exhibited during the crisis of the 
Depression are illuminating. The situation in Fremantle by 1930 was reminiscent of 
the problems the Council had faced in the years of the bubonic plague. As in 1900, 
the efforts of a Mayor earnestly trying to secure the welfare of his citizens were 
hampered by the constrictions of bureaucracy and politics. At the time of the plague, 
it was control of the waterfront and issues of health and sanitation that caused a 
clash between the State and local government. In the Depression, the problem was 
unemployment and the solution was relief work. As they had thirty years earlier, the 
Fremantle Council suggested a number of solutions to local problems which, had 
they had autonomy to enact, they were convinced would be of benefit to their 
residents. The State government, however, had both the financial and jurisdictional 
upper hand, and would only fund unemployment relief of its own design.  
The unemployed were being let down by the State government’s slowness to 
act, which forced them to accept the perceived humiliation of charity. Repeatedly 
they had asked for the chance to work for a basic wage. They simply needed to feel 
that, despite the change in their circumstances, they were still able to provide 
something for their family. In Fremantle, possibly more than in any other 
metropolitan suburb, the need of the working-man to feel his worth in this way 
received the understanding and empathy of the mayor and councillors. In August 
1933 the Minister for Employment, J.J. Kenneally wrote to the Town Clerk in 
Fremantle that his department ‘trusts that the co-operation of all those who are 
desirous of assisting Western Australia to be one of the first States to emerge from 
the depressed period will be freely given’.639 By this time, the state was ‘slowly 
emerging from the trough of depression’, writes Crowley, and ‘each year thereafter 
there were fewer men on sustenance, export prices were generally improving and 
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the government was able to use loans for public works’.640 This recovery and the 
program of public works, were carried out with the financial, administrative and 
most importantly, ideological support of local governments.641 Snooks observes that 
over the years of the Depression, ‘the main public relief projects included water and 
sewerage, railways, roads and public buildings’. As a result there was a considerable 
increase in the ‘length of roads and the number of bridges, culverts, fords and 
drainage facilities constructed by municipalities and road boards’. 642 In Fremantle 
this was certainly the case: roads, footpaths, reserves, parks and Monument Hill 
were all improved and beautified by the labour of the unemployed. Snooks writes 
that in April 1933, ‘sixty per cent of the men under government care were employed 
on public projects’.643 By January 1934, all government sustenance workers had 
reverted back to the State government and were no longer employed by the 
Fremantle City Council.644 Over the course of 1934, Fremantle did not begin new 
ventures or programs of works, but quietly got on with those it had already begun. 
By November 1935, the mayor was able announce in his Annual Report that 
‘visitors from all parts of the world have commented on the improvements that have 
taken place and the beauty which exists’.645 It was a fitting end to the trials that had 
beset Fremantle over the previous six years, and one which must have swelled the 
heart of a Mayor so attached to his City. The recovery was equally as positive for the 
rest of the country. As J.R. Robertson writes, ‘despite the setback of the early thirties, 




                                                        
640 Crowley, Australia’s Western Third, p270. 
641 In addition, a particular result of the Depression at the port of Fremantle was that ‘the pressure to 
reduce costs led to the introduction of bulk handling of grain’. M. Tull, A Community Enterprise: The 
History of the Port of Fremantle, 1897 to 1997 (St Johns, Newfoundland: International Maritime 
Economic History Association, 1997), p59. 
642 Snooks, Depression and Recovery, pp100-3.  
643 Snooks, ‘Development in Adversity’, p265. 
644 Fremantle Correspondence files AN 217/3 Acc 1377 Item 45 1933 SRO, Perth 
645 West Australian, 28 November 1935, p23. 




This has been the story of a community coping with crisis and the municipal activity 
that supported its efforts. At its centre was the Fremantle Council as the 
representative and voice of its community. This thesis has argued that the Council 
was effective in the management of the three periods of crisis examined. .In 
contending with these crises, the council had to do so within the wider landscape of 
governmental authority. Depending on whether the larger administrative processes 
were driven from Perth or Melbourne, or from within Fremantle, the understanding 
of each time of crisis differed slightly. In this context, the Councils, placed both 
within and against institutional arrangements, did find a way to make their own 
solutions. The Council did make a difference.  
The common themes stretching across the three case studies are a sense of 
identity and a struggle with outside authority. Fremantle Council understood the 
needs of its community better than did Perth or Melbourne and was more engaged 
and had a clearer sense of what was needed, in each of the three times of crisis. The 
other constant theme can best be summarized in the questions ‘who is going to pay 
for this’? and ‘who is in charge’? The evidence shows in the wider administrative 
landscape, the responsibility for funding in each time of crisis was both contentious 
and unclear. Fremantle, in its efforts to steer through periods of social disruption, 
repeatedly put itself into debt in order fund its policies effectively. Equally, the 
Council had to enter into battle over jurisdictional authority in order to safeguard 
the welfare of its local people. 
The crises which Fremantle experienced between 1900 and 1933 were not 
what they might be presumed to be at first glance. The bubonic plague was not 
about swathes of dead bodies, as might be immediately expected by anyone with 
any knowledge of the great epidemics of medieval Europe.;Rather, while some tragic 
deaths did occur, it was a crisis of sanitation and health in a port-side town that had 
deteriorated to such an extent that it required a plague epidemic to occasion change. 
During this time, with the presence of plague in its midst, whilst not only bearing the 
brunt of outside derision for its lack of sanitation, the Council and the people of 
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Fremantle recognized themselves that changes had to be made for the health of the 
community. Far-reaching improvements were initiated as a result of the plague to 
building laws, the sewerage system, paving of back-yards and general matters of 
sanitation. At the same time, Fremantle had to negotiate through the existing chaos 
of authority on the waterfront, resulting in the successful introduction of a single 
port authority, the Fremantle Harbour Trust.  
The Great War for Fremantle and its Council was not about the tragedy and 
loss of life that defines so much of what we know of that conflict, particularly as we 
see it from the centenary perspective. The crisis for Fremantle was how to settle 
over two thousand men, many of them broken in mind and body, into civilian life. 
On this occasion, the Fremantle Council conformed with rather than butted against 
the larger authority. The Federal government had instituted a Department of 
Repatriation with a large and generous policy for the resettlement of returned 
soldiers into their former lives, as best they could. The nation-wide feeling of 
gratitude to these soldiers dominated policy during this period and Fremantle was 
fully committed to the well-being of its own local men. Fremantle felt and acted as 
the country did, that they owed their soldiers a debt and this had to be repaid in 
terms of safeguarding their return to employment and security.  The Council 
returned to its employ all the soldiers who had left for the war and wished to return. 
For other locals who could not return to their usual occupations, the Council 
ensured that street barrows and stalls were available to them; the ‘wingies and 
stumpies’ were given employment on the gates of Fremantle Oval for cricket and 
football games, as Fremantle’s sporting life became reestablished after the war. The 
issue of funding was again a battle in this period, but of a slightly different nature. In 
order to look after those of its own who were made unemployed during and after 
the war, Fremantle pitted itself against the larger, Perth-run charity. The period was 
not without controversy, the 1917 strike took its toll not only on the social harmony 
of the town but on its prosperity. The influenza epidemic was another disruption as 
was the threat of venereal disease, but the impact of these, whilst transiently 
chaotic, did not challenge Fremantle’s sense of purpose during the crisis of the Great 
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War. Fremantle managed to get through the war years and through the return of its 
soldiers with relative equanimity.  
In the Depression era, known historically as a time of great unemployment 
and poverty, the crisis in Fremantle was centered on the creation of a solution. 
Whilst knocking on the doors of both State and Federal governments to create 
policy and provide funding, Fremantle resolved its own crisis by creating local 
employment and depleting its own coffers. The Fremantle Council and the local 
business community quickly realized that the secondary but equally important 
nature of the crisis of unemployment was how to salve the position of local men, 
how to give them work that would return to them a sense of personal value and 
dignity. Fremantle’s unemployed told the Council explicitly that they wanted to 
work for whatever sustenance or relief they could be given. The Council responded 
to the voice of its own community rather than await policy change and funding from 
the State or Federal governments. In the lack of a solution coming from higher 
authority, the Council determined to find a solution of its own. For two full years 
before the Premier of Western Australia introduced a ‘sustenance scheme’ for the 
unemployed, Fremantle took in and created work for its own local unemployed, 
willingly going into debt to do so. Yet for this two-year period, the Mayor, Frank 
Gibson, took a strategic plan for the employment of the unemployed to the State 
government, haranguing both the Premier and the Minister for Works to initiate a 
broader solution to the crisis. Here we see for the only time across the three case 
studies, evidence and public reports of conflict within the Council itself. Some 
councillors wanted to press the local population for their unpaid rates, while the 
Mayor and other councillors did not want to harass an already overburdened 
population. Eventually financial necessity prevailed, but this did not curb the 
Council’s continuing commitment to create projects that would allow unemployed 
men to work at home.  
During the Depression Era, the Fremantle Council answered the crisis as it 
had the two crises before it, by identifying what would work in Fremantle and for 
Fremantle. The Council responded to the challenges of these times of crisis, by 







In writing a history of a community or, more specifically in the case of this thesis, a 
council’s role in that community during three times of crisis, there are few, if any, 
studies on which to model a thesis.  With that in mind, it was necessary to 
encompass a broad range of secondary studies that crossed over the case studies 
included in this thesis.  It was also necessary to consider urban histories in general. I 
have discussed the more pertinent of the secondary readings in the introduction to 
this thesis.  However, it is the aim of this addendum to further elucidate the 
secondary sources with which this thesis interacted. 
 
Patricia Brown’s The Merchant Princes of Fremantle provided essential background 
reading in understanding the men who made up the various councils during the 
three cases studies of this thesis.647  Brown discusses the role of the ‘merchant 
princes’ in the civic arenas of Fremantle, as members of the Fremantle Road Board, 
the Town Council and various boards and departments.  Brown writes that these 
merchants became power brokers in Fremantle.  In point of fact, Brown asserts on a 
quest of ‘self-aggrandizement’, the Fremantle merchant elite had to ‘try to impress 
on those over whom they exercised a hegemony a strict system of manners and 
standards, upheld by law and by religious belief and practice’.  The rules, she 
suggests, were based on the tenets of the Protestant faith and the British public 
school.  Brown’s examination of the nineteenth century certainly holds during the 
plague era.  My thesis concurs that the homes of the merchant elite were outside of 
plague-infected areas and that those living in the tenements of the West End were 
the plague’s only victims.  In support of Brown’s research, the ruling elite were 
unaffected in many ways by the plague but uninterested in any but a financial way 
in the effects of the plague on the town.  However, once we move beyond the plague 
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years and into the twentieth century, my thesis suggests the ruling hegemony has 
significantly changed. During the Great War and the Depression Era, the function of 
the Fremantle civic body was a much more organic and responsive group.  Further I 
would suggest that the Fremantle community itself was no longer dominated by a 
merchant-led ‘hegemony’ but was more self-sufficient than the Fremantle of 
Brown’s Merchant Princes.   
 
Another secondary source of importance in researching a civic history of Fremantle 
was M. J. Edmonds City of Fremantle: Progress through Purpose.648 
Edwards’ report is a result of an overseas study in the management, development 
and growth of port cities in Europe and the United Kingdom.  It questions the 
'fundamental function and purpose of government' in terms of social change, which, 
while tantalizingly close to being useful, veers instead to a focus on how a city such 
as Fremantle can and should respond to the reality of urbanisation.649   
 
Placing Edwards’ work in the context of other urban histories, such as 
Lawton, and Lee(eds) Population and Society in Western European Port-Cities c.1650-
1939, examines the work of a port city in the wider context of demographic 
dynamics. 650 Most important to my thesis was Lawton and Lee’s ‘hypothesis that 
the demographic profile of a city ‘is, at least in part, a reflection of its function’.651  
This hypothesis was pivotal to my approach in examining Fremantle as a 
community or urban study.  Through these texts my thesis is able to understand the 
relative importance of the demographic characteristics of port-cities and the 
economy and labour markets of port-cities.  Expanding from this work, in my thesis 
I is able to position a port-city such as Fremantle within the urban profile.  This 
                                                        
648 Edmonds, M.J Deputy Town Clerk, City of Fremantle: Progress through Purpose (Fremantle: City of 
Fremantle 1969) 
649 For further information on the West End area itself I would refer the reader to City of Fremantle, 
Conservation Policy for the Fremantle West End Conservation Area  (Fremantle: City of Fremantle, 
1990).  
650 Lawton, R. and Lee, R. (eds)  Population and Society in Western European Port-Cities c.1650-1939  
Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2002 
651 ibid, p5 
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work was most useful in understanding the relationship between Fremantle, as a 
port-city with the capital city of Perth further up river.  The text’s examination of the 
social conditions of nineteenth century port-cities, however, relied heavily on 
themes of labour and migration, both of which were outside the scope of my 
thesis.652 
Having placed the thesis in the larger urban framework, it is necessary then to move 
to the more particular aspects of a civil history. Specifically, it was necessary to 
consider not only the people who constitute the council, but the role of the council 
itself on each of these occasions.  These aspects of the council had varying degrees of 
relevance.   
During the plague years for example, it may be that the poor quality of residential 
housing and sanitation in the West End of Fremantle was not high on the list of 
concerns among Fremantle Councillors, whose predominantly mercantile interests 
meant that, in general, improving the roads and the harbour were foremost on their 
agenda.  However, their representative, the Town Clerk, George Bland Humble, was 
at the centre of the crisis.  Bland Humble, who served as town clerk of the Fremantle 
Town Council from 1874 to 1883 then of the Fremantle Municipal Council 1883 to 
1904, also acted as secretary of the Local Board of Health.  In this capacity, Bland 
Humble had a constant dialogue with the secretary of the Central Board of Health 
throughout the years of the plague in Fremantle and it is through this material that 
we see the role of the council during the period. It is through the pens of these two 
                                                        
652 Also outside the scope of my thesis, but providing important contextual secondary material, was 
Davies, S et al. (eds)  Dock Workers, International Explorations in Comparative Labour History Vol.1-3  
(Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 1988)In their introductory chapter, ‘Towards a comparative 
international history of dockers’, Sam Davies and Klaus Weinhauer discuss what they call 
‘international explorations in comparative history’ of dock labour history.  The comparative 
approach is highly useful in that it draws together general questions from port histories around the 
world, and provides a framework for analysis.  The comparative history looks at dock-workers as a 
distinctive occupational group and provides a general methodology and historiography for looking at 
histories of these groups and the port in which they operated.  Whilst the framework provides a 
comprehensive starting point for a thesis that includes waterfront workers and their families, it is 
only valuable so far as studying the lives of port workers.  Whilst the chapter poses some interesting 
and helpful points of reference, such as the existence of ‘waterfront neighbourhoods’ which was a 
useful tool in my examination of the plague, and ‘housing, living and workers’ culture in the port city’, 
the text provided merely close examination only of waterside workers without situating them in a 
wider context and certainly not in the framework of their representative civil body. 
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men that the battles of jurisdiction were fought and won and their colourful letters 
inform the plague years.   
 
During the Great War it is the Mayor, William Wray, upon whose character the 
period revolves.  Historian J. K. Ewers wrote that William Wray had only agreed to 
accept the re-nomination for the position of Mayor in 1914 in the hope that he 
would one day ‘be able to hoist the Allied flags at the top of the town hall’.653 
Certainly the records show William Wray as unswervingly active during the war, 
along with his wife who had an acknowledged role assisting the Red Cross during 
the war years, Wray’s leadership best signifies the role of the Fremantle’s civic body 
during the years of the Great War. In addition, during this entire period, Mayor Wray 
had as his Town Clerk Henry Haynes, whose letters to bereaved parents in 
Fremantle and on behalf of returned soldiers looking for work, are a testimony to 
his personal involvement in the work of the council during this time.    
 
In the Depression Era, Frank Gibson plays the leading role on the stage of both local 
and state politics, in his activism for changing the lives of the unemployed. In this he 
is joined by several leading councillors.  Councillor Joseph Sleeman was as much an 
advocate for the unemployed as Frank Gibson.  Both were in the early years of what 
would become lengthy and historic, years of service in their respective positions.  In 
1930 Sleeman was in the second year of what would become thirty-five years as a 
Member of the Legislative Assembly. Gibson became the Mayor of Fremantle in 
1924 and served almost twenty-nine years in that role (excluding a two year break 
between 1924 and 1926), retiring as Mayor in 1951.  He was knighted in 1948. As in 
the earlier two periods of crisis, Fremantle’s town clerk during the entirety of the 
Depression Era, James Shepherd, was also unceasing in his efforts to co-ordinate 
relief for the affected families in his community throughout this period. 
Whilst acknowledging the personal efforts of Fremantle’s leaders over the 
three case studies considered in this thesis, it is important to recognize that 
                                                        
653 Ewers, Western Gateway, p118. 
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Fremantle in each period has emerged as community whose experience of three 
times of crisis forged a unified response.  Whilst each crisis was unique, strong 
representation from the Fremantle community’s representatives in Council, elicited 
solutions that were distinctly local. This thesis argues that a civic-driven response 
enabled a self-defined community to emerge from each of the three times of crisis in 
Fremantle.  
 
In comprehending the physical environment in which this thesis was located, City of 
Fremantle’s Conservation Policy for the Fremantle West End Conservation Area was of 
considerable use.654  The report lists the council’s heritage policy areas specific to 
the West End and studies the role of Local Government in the interests of heritage 
issues.  It details the various conservation zones and gives a statement of 
significance for the West End.  It differs from previous reports in that it suggests 
that the Gold Boom years provide the highlight for historical significance in the area, 
whereas previously the 'gateway to Western Australia' theme was prevalent in 
assessing the area's heritage.  It also provides interesting detail on architecture and 
construction.   
Whilst these urban histories helped my thesis by allowing an initial ‘starting-block’ 
from which to base the ‘concept’ of an urban or community based history, the most 
important work was obviously that which directly related to the three case studies 
of my research.   
 
Bubonic Plague 
Whilst there has not been any historiographical exploration of the plague in 
Fremantle, there has however, been considerable discussion of Fremantle during 
the turn of the twentieth century – the time at which the international plague 
pandemic made its way to the town.  Among these, the text of most use to this thesis 
was Patricia Brown’s Merchant Princes which provided a demographic overview of 
the west end. Brown suggests that by the end of the nineteenth century, the 
                                                        
654 City of Fremantle’s Conservation Policy for the Fremantle West End Conservation 
Area  (Fremantle: City of Fremantle, 1990) 
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Fremantle merchants ‘were the largest employers of labour at the port apart, 
probably, from the Government’. This would certainly agree with the findings of this 
thesis.  Brown continues that rate books show that in the 1880s and 1890s the 
biggest occupational group comprised industrial workers. This general classification 
included lumpers, carpenters, carters, blacksmiths, bootmakers, clerks, mariners 
and shipwrights’. Whilst my thesis did not conduct an analysis of the rate books, 
Brown’s contention would certainly have been borne out by the empiric evidence of 
my research, namely the occupations of the residents of the homes, boarding houses 
and tenements of the west end during the plague years. 
As mentioned in the introduction, primary among the relevant texts for the plague 
case study was Myron Echenberg’s work Plague Ports.  Echenberg’s study examines 
the progress of the bubonic plague pandemic at the turn of last century throughout 
the world. It is worth further mentioning that Echenberg does not include Fremantle 
in his investigation of ‘plague ports’, possibly because Fremantle has not been 
chronicled in existing historiography, however he does consider to a limited extent 
the civic reactions to plague in the harbourside city of Sydney.655  Most particularly, 
Echenberg writes that the plague pandemic ‘produced highly variable results’ and 
that whilst millions were killed in India, China and Indonesia, ‘elsewhere, the 
pandemic proved relatively benign’.656 This was certainly the case in Fremantle.  His 
work was also influential in understanding the socio-demographic conditions in 
which the plague-flea operated.  Echenberg writes that ‘the risk for humans boils 
down to whether they come within range of an infected rat flea, especially for the 
urban poor who lived in overcrowded, unsanitary and rat-infested housing.657  
Essentially, this aspect of Echenberg’s study provided important support for the 
findings of this thesis.   
 
                                                        
655 M. Echenberg, Plague Ports: The Global Urban Impact of Bubonic Plague 1894-1901 (New York: 
New York University Press, 2010). 
656 Ibid p,5. 
657 Ibid, p9 
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Another useful text for the examination of health in port-side Fremantle at the turn 
of the twentieth century was Lawton and Lee’s, Population and Society in Western 
European Port-Cities which explores the mortality and fertility rates within port 
cities.  The work pays particular reference to issues of health in port cities, but its 
examination is restricted to the mortality rates specific to dockside worker’s 
increased risk of exposure.   
 
These texts’ identification of the tendency for epidemic diseases to follow shipping 
routes and enter ports provides an essential framework the bubonic plague in 
Fremantle in the age of shipping.  This thesis expands upon the work, primarily of 
Echenberg but also of Lawton and Lee by examining how Fremantle’s role as a port 
town, with its issues of administrative dysfunction and sanitary deficiency was 
vulnerable to bubonic plague from 1900 – 1906. Further, this thesis has argued that 
the town’s sanitation, alongside its role as a harbour town (and therefore vulnerable 
to incoming diseases from shipping) was the centre of crisis for Fremantle during 
the plague years. 
 
Great War 
In examining the Great War as a time of crisis in Fremantle, it is the conclusion of 
this thesis that the war itself, as in the war fought abroad between 1914 and 1918, 
was not in itself the cause of crisis in Fremantle.  Rather, it was the issues 
engendered by returning soldiers that caused a crisis in the community. This thesis 
would argue that ‘repatriation’ of these men became one of the most important 
issues of the time, asserting itself as one of the most essential social and civil 
concerns of the post-war period.   
 
The most recent texts on the Great War in Fremantle are Deborah Gare and Madison 
Lloyd-Jones’ When war came to Fremantle  and Andrew Pittaway’s Fremantle’s 
Anzacs.  Gare and Lloyd-Jones’ informative work examines both the presence of and 
the effect of, war on Fremantle.  The breadth of the subject matter includes a 
consideration of the lives of women in the city.  The text examines the 
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administrative and social implications in Fremantle of the existence of a war abroad, 
which aspect was of particular relevance to this thesis, in particular, its discussion of 
the base hospital and the role of the Red Cross.  The study does not, however, extend 
the examination, to any significant degree, to the issue of repatriation, which was 
the central focus of this thesis.   
Likewise, Andrew Pittaway’s Fremantle’s Anzacs whilst providing a statistical 
analysis of the men who left and then returned from war, once again provides no 
serious discussion of the implications of their return. 
 
Thus, one of the most important works to provide a point of embarkation for this 
thesis was the work of Ernest Scott.  Scott wrote that ‘repatriation is defined as the 
process of restoring or returning men or women to their native country. Applied to 
Australian soldiers, it was properly the process of bringing back to Australia those 
who were overseas, and in that sense it was used by the commander and staff of the 
A.I.F. when endeavouring to forecast, as they did as far back as 1916, the methods 
which must be prepared for returning the A.I.F. to Australia at the end of the war’.658  
He adds that ‘in Australia, however, the word was already being employed to 
describe the subsequent and even more difficult function of replacing the returned 
men in civil employment’.  Whilst Scott examines this function in an Australia-wide 
study, this thesis examines the issue of repatriation at a community level, examining 
repatriation in Fremantle. 
Scott writes that the Federal Parliament’s War Committee, which had previously 
had charge of recruiting and training camps, recognised in 1916 that some 
organisation needed to be established to deal with the problem of returned soldiers. 
The formation of  ‘War Service Committees’ in each local government area then 
followed and between 1915 and 1917, ‘these bodies remained chiefly responsible 
for the actual work of repatriating invalided men, and caring for their dependents’.  
Once again Scott examines these issues on a national basis, looking at the 
administrative role of these organisations.  With this thesis, I was able to take this 
                                                        
658 Ernest Scott, Official History of the War of 1914-1918. Volume XI: Australia During the War (7th 
edition, 1941), ID no: RCDIG1069950 Digitised Collection, Australian War Memorial, Canberra. P9 
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notion a step further and examine how this organisation worked within the 
Fremantle community. 
 
This thesis, in the absence of any historiographical discussion on the subject, 
examined the repatriation of soldiers following the Great War, and how the return of 
Australia’s ‘soldier-heroes’ became a civil and civic undertaking in Fremantle and 
the rest of Western Australia.Between 1915 and 1919 thousands of returning 
soldiers from the Great War came home to re-settle into civilian life. Of these men, a 
vast number were wounded; many, the self-styled ‘wingies and stumpies’ had to re-
established life without one or sometimes two, limbs.  Whilst the recognition of the 
physical boundaries which limited the wounded of these soldiers’ chances of being 
returned to ‘normal’ life formed the impetus for administrative and civil action on a 
local, state and federal level during the war and the post-war period, this thesis has 
examined how Fremantle, as a civil society responded, in terms of policies and 




By far the most influential text on Depression Era Australia is Geoffery Bolton’s A 
fine country to starve in.  Bolton writes that the State governments of Australia 
considered that their prime responsibility to the unemployed was merely to provide 
‘sustenance’ or ‘a dole’ for their temporary relief.  Likewise, John Robertson writes 
that ‘though it had obvious political and moral responsibilities, the Commonwealth 
government had no clear constitutional obligation to participate in unemployment 
relief’.659  Economic historian Graeme Snooks lets the government further off the 
hook, by suggesting, rather benignly that both State and Commonwealth 
Governments in Australia followed a ‘philosophy of non-intervention’.660  Whilst 
their work provides a body of unsurpassed academic merit, and are essential as an 
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 205 
interpretative framework, the work of these Historians overlooks the question, ‘if 
the government were not looking after the welfare of the unemployed, who was?’. 
 
The historical record shows that as early as June 1928, a group of religious leaders, 
from all the main church groups in the metropolitan area, met in the State’s capital, 
Perth, met to discuss ways to relieve the distress of their communities.  At the 
meeting were leaders of the Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, Baptist, Hebrew, 
Congregational, and Presbyterian churches, as well as the Church of Christ and the 
Salvation Army.661  That the leading church groups should cooperate on behalf of 
their communities seems a quite natural response to the suffering among their 
congregation.  But why should it belong to the churches to remedy a situation that 
was obviously a state-wide concern, if not a national one? The result of this meeting 
of minds was the formation of a committee. Whilst initially made up of the 
representatives of the leading churches, the committee then invited members of the 
business community, the returned soldiers association, the trades halls and, most 
importantly, a number of metropolitan municipal councils to a meeting at which 
they could all join in discussing ways to relieve the poverty and want created by the 
large scale unemployment. The Mayor of Fremantle was one of the first civic leaders 
to join this committee, and further, to recognise the urgent necessity of providing 
relief for the unemployed and to find ways to relieve the distress of his local 
community.   The committee’s first action was to write to the Premier of Western 
Australia, urging him in one voice to treat they matter as urgent, in the hope that the 
state government would take up the baton.  This thesis asserts that what actually 
happened, was that the committee set in motion the formation of a ‘civic movement’ 
for want of a better expression, in which religious and civic institutions, alongside 
private individuals and business organisations, would support and administer the 
provision of food, clothing and shelter for thousands of men, women and children 
over the next two and a half years. 
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Bolton writes that ‘if the government and people of Western Australia were slow to 
recognize the need to prepare for a prolonged depression, their lack of foresight was 
no greater than that of any other part of Australia, or indeed of the world’.662  Yet 
this thesis identifies that the ‘people’ of Western Australia were not slow to act at all.  
Alexander, commenting on the government’s slowness to act, observes that ‘two 
whole years were virtually wasted by Australian governments while the hardships 
caused by the deepening depression were being felt increasingly’.663  Yet he does not 
examine the community-level attempts to address the hardship which he 
acknowledges.  Again, Graeme Snooks rather writes that in the early days of the 
Depression ‘the State government preferred to take as small a part in 
unemployment relief as possible. It was felt that unemployed men should be given 
work by local authorities on relief works’ but does not consider what form that 
unemployment relief actually took.664   
The benign oversight shown by Bolton et al in their historiography of the 
Depression Era creates a gap that this thesis, albeit with only Fremantle in its focus, 
has attempted to address.  This thesis examines how the local government of 
Fremantle, working with church leaders and local men and women, created a civic 
movement during a time of crisis in Australian society during the Depression Era. 
 
This thesis argues that whilst the State and Commonwealth governments, were 
patently ignoring their ‘moral responsibilities’ and delaying the establishment of a 
program of work for the unemployed, the more local families and their civic leaders 
had to rely on the munificence of their own communities.  It further examines the 
case in Fremantle showing that by January 1931, the Committees’ funds had 
completely depleted, whilst distress in the district was growing and that the 
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problem caused by unemployment had become the ‘Council’s greatest anxiety’.665  
Historians have recognized that neither Federal nor State governments had taken 
the initiative to provide funding or create administrative solutions.  Indeed it would 
be a full two years before they would do so.  Yet this thesis examines how, in the 
absence of state or federal funding, local governments and religious groups worked 
together for the relief of the unemployed, facilitating and overseeing a ‘citizens’ 
movement’ which brought food, housing and clothing to thousands of struggling 
families. 
In July 1931 Premier Mitchell joined the other State premiers in Melbourne for the 
Premiers’ Conference.  As a result of the conference, the Premier of Western 
Australia announced that the people then being paid sustenance relief, ‘would be 
transferred to public works projects as quickly as possible’.666  Put simply, the 
introduction of this scheme meant that, both single and married men could, by 
means of working on projects sponsored by the state government, receive a higher 
rate of sustenance and better conditions for their families.  From this point and for 
the remaining years of the Depression, the State and Commonwealth governments’ 
took custody of Australia’s unemployed. 
This thesis has argued that with the leadership of local government, in concert with 
church leaders and other members of the local community, a robust civic movement 
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